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A B S T R A C T 
Political realism has enjoyed a renaissance in International Relations (IR). Recent studies 
have provided insightful accounts of its timeless virtues and philosophical depth. Although 
the concept of human nature has long been the philosophical basis of realism, it has now 
become a largely discredited idea. The thesis, Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature 
in International Relations, provides an important re-examination of the concept of human 
nature in realist international-political theory with special reference to one of the truly 
consequential figures of Western thought: Sigmund Freud. The thesis questions whether 
human nature is really dead and also asks whether human nature ought to be dead. 
Examining a variety of theorists from Morgenthau to Mearsheimer commonly invoked as 
classical and post-classical realism's foremost proponents, the thesis shows that 
contemporary realism has not eliminated the concept of human nature from its study of 
world politics. Further, the thesis offers a powerful argument for the necessity of a 
sophisticated theory of human nature within realism, seeing Freud as offering the most 
appropriate starting point. This study wi l l interest IR theorists and historians of 
international thought as well as Freud scholars. 
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V I I 
Chapter 1 . Introduction 
P O L I T I C A L R E A L I S M AND T H E S T R A N G E D E A T H O F H U M A N N A T U R E 
International relations may be the 'realm of recurrence and repetition' (Wight 1966:26). 
Yet something fundamental has changed in the realm of realist international-political 
theory. I mean the almost dichotomous division of realism into two camps: classical 
realism/neorealism (Keohane 1986c), human nature realism/structural realism 
(Mearsheimer 2001), or evil realism/tragic realism (Spirtas 1996). I wi l l refer to this ideal-
typical division as classical realism/post-classical realism. It signifies a profound rif t that 
runs down the middle of realism. On the one hand, there are the 
Morgenthauians/Niebuhrians grounding the origins and necessities of Realpolitik in an 
animus dominandi or in human sinfulness. On the other hand, there are post-classical 
realists such as John Herz (1951) and Kenneth Waltz (1979) arguing that it is irrelevant 
whether human nature is good/bad, social/asocial, or peaceful/aggressive, for the security 
dilemma inherent in an anarchical international environment makes the Hobbesian bellum 
omnium contra omnes a primary fact of the relations among separate political 
communities. Save for a few exceptions, post-classical realism's socio-structural or third-
image approach has eclipsed the human nature/psychological or first-image approach of 
classical realism. Few disagree that realism 'got rid of the first image' (Guzzini 1998:127). 
This thesis challenges the view that post-classical realist international political 
thought has no basis in underlying conceptions of human nature. Is human nature really as 
dead as post-classicals would have us believe? I wi l l argue it is not dead. My argument that 
post-classical realism still relies on largely hidden assumptions about human nature 
naturally leads to the second main research question. I f human nature is not dead, should 
we purify realism from the tutelage of human nature? Or should we bring 'back' the 
concept of human nature to the centre of realist international-political theorising? 1 wil l 
argue that human nature ought not to be dead. 
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This thesis is not only concerned with the past and present of the concept of human 
nature (is-question) as well as with its future role in realism (ought-question). My 
theoretical concern with the past, present, and future of the concept of human nature in 
realism is tied to one of the truly consequential thinkers of Western thought: Sigmund 
Freud, a terribly understudied figure in International Relations (IR). In light of its scope, 
analyses, and arguments, this thesis is a study at the intersection of political theory and IR. 
It concerns one of the most fascinating but most controversial political philosophies of 
international relations (realism) in relation to one of the most fascinating but equally 
controversial politico-theoretical concepts (human nature) with special reference to one of 
the most fascinating thinkers of Western thought (Freud). 
I w i l l now expand on the two research questions—Is Human Nature Dead? Ought 
Human Nature to be Dead?—as well as on this thesis's special reference to Freud. In the 
subsequent section, I wi l l provide an outline of the structure, methods, and arguments. 
Is human nature dead? Ought it to be dead? Where's Freud? 
We have reasons to doubt that human nature is really dead in contemporary realism. From 
the viewpoint of the history of realism, the division of realism along the human-
nature/intemational-structure line seems questionable. For much too long have realists 
based their international-political theories upon certain conceptions of human nature. In 
fact, not only realists have used assumptions about human nature as philosophical 
backdrop. As Martin Wight (1991:25) noted aptly: ' A l l political theory presupposes some 
kind of theory about human nature, some basic anthropological theory' (see also Pennock 
& Chapman 1977; Forbes & Smith 1981; Berry 1986). But realists have been—across the 
millennia—particularly drawn to the concept of human nature. They have been quite overt 
about these assumptions. We can agree with Roger Spegele's (1996:129) observation that 
the fact that realists have been 'traditionally committed to some concept of human nature 
wil l hardly come as a surprise to international relationists familiar with the writings of 
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Thucydides, St Augustine, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, or of such modem realists as 
Morgenthau, Butterfield, Niebuhr, and Isaiah Berlin' (see also Smith 1986; Forde 1992; 
Tellis 1996; Doyle 1997; Boucher 1998; Donnelly 2000; Clinton 2007b). 
The ancient and intimate relationship between realism and the concept of human 
nature, however, has been disturbed. Post-classical realists have kept repeating that human 
nature is an irrelevant concept. The turn away from realism's concern with human nature is 
predominantly one of Kenneth Waltz's accomplishments (or mistakes). Both his Man, the 
State, and War (2001(1959]) and Theory of International Politics (1979) have helped to 
silence Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style realism which was already ailing due to the 
'behavioral revolt' of the 1950s/60s (Vasquez 1998:39). Over the course of a few decades, 
evil realism got replaced by tragedy realism (Spirtas 1996). But the implications of post-
classical realism's move away from the concept of human nature towards the concepts of 
the security dilemma and international structure have been more profound than the quarrels 
about different 'images' would suggest. 
Post-classical realism's move away from human nature has implied a significant 
shift in terms of the philosophical basis of realism. Gone were the times when realists 
readily agreed with Morgenthau's (1967[1948]) dictum that 'Political realism believes that 
politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in 
human nature' (4). What used to be the genuine 'political realism' is now being dismissed 
as the playing field of a handfiil of antiquated so-called 'human nature realists' 
(Mearsheimer 2001) or 'biological realists' (Donnelly 2000). What used to be one of the 
main ingredients, i f not the main ingredient, of any genuine realist international-political 
theory, the concept of human nature has become an essentially discredited notion (Waltz 
1979:117; Keohane 1986b:164-165; Shimko 1992; Frankel 1996a:xiv-xviii; Tellis 
1996:5 I f f ; Mearsheimer 2001:17-18; Donnelly 2000:7-8; Schweller 2003:325-329; Dunne 
& Schmidt 2005:172-176). 
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But it seems strange that a meagre half-century of post-classical realism really 'got 
rid' of a concept which had been the philosophical backdrop of realism for more than two 
millennia. To hypothesise that human nature is not really dead seems not wide of the mark. 
Leading post-classical realists do engage in 'human nature talk'. None other than the 
'father of structural realism' (Schweller 1998:2) confessed some intellectual ties to 
Niebuhrian assumptions about human nature. Waltz (1986) admitted that 
The influence behind my preference [balanced-power] is partly 
Immanuel Kant and partly Reinhold Niebuhr. Kant feared that a 
world government would stifle liberty, become a terrible 
despotism, and in the end collapses into chaos. Niebuhr drew the 
conclusion from his dim view of human nature that domestically 
and internationally the ends of security and decency are served 
better by balanced than by concentrated power. I distrust 
hegemonic power, whoever may wield it, because it is so easily 
misused. (341, italics added) 
Preferring a balanced-power system over a hegemonic system is a matter of politico-
theoretical taste. But what shall we make of the fact that Waltz brings in human nature 
when he needs a justification for a fundamental normative proposition? 
Other post-classicals also turn to human nature when it seems expedient. 
Neoclassical realist Randall Schweller (1999) argued that 
no one really believes that the 'haves' wi l l voluntarily hand over 
their riches to the 'have-nots'. There is no historical precedent for 
such altruism on a global scale, and, no matter how much we all 
communicate with each other in the future, / cannot imagine that 
human nature will change so dramatically in my lifetime. (148, 
italics added) 
Again are we being presented with a human nature-driven line of argument—by someone 
who is said to have contributed to realism's move away from the concern with human 
nature. It indicates that the concept of human nature is not as dead in contemporary realist 
discourses of international relations as post-classicals have claimed. 
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Waltz and Schweller, however, are not some high-profile statistical outliers among 
post-classical realists. This has been the argument of a recent book-length study. Annette 
Freyberg-Inan (2004) has shown that post-classicals still make assumptions about human 
nature and that these assumptions are constitutive of their respective international-political 
theories. It is an impressive study that demonstrates how realists have conceptualised 
human nature across the millennia. It marks a substantial contribution to our understanding 
of realism. For it is correct when she writes that 'Given the vast amount of material 
published that employs, defends, or criticises realist theory, it is striking how few authors 
ever even address the psychological foundations of realism' (4n.32). Still, her account of 
classical and post-classical realist assumptions about human nature must be taken with a 
pinch of salt for two reasons. 
First, the analysis of individual realists seems, at times, superficial. This can be 
explained by the large quantity of realists under analysis, which implies sacrificing 
analytical depth for breadth, but this does not exempt from criticism. Waltz is, for instance, 
quoted for holding the view that 'our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. 
The root of all evil is man, and thus he is himself the root of the specific evil, war' (73). 
This is misleading. Waltz is merely referring to first image pessimists such as St. 
Augustine and Niebuhr. This raises the second problem. The work is a damning indictment 
of both realist conceptions of human nature as well as of the whole tradition of realism. 
Realists across the millennia, critics have said, have been biased in favour of 'destructive' 
aspects of human nature; and this bias has helped stifling the chances for peaceful 
coexistence (Freyberg-Inan 2004, 2006). But what does 'destructive' mean? Unless the 
human nature question is being raised anew, the assumptions about human nature of both 
classical and post-classical realists wil l continue to be subject to what Mearsheimer 
(2001:23) rightly called 'realism bashing'. Even more so, i f realists continue to remain 
agnostic vis-a-vis the concept of human nature. 
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The causa Freud also requires us to raise the human nature question. We know that 
20"'-century classical realists buih their international-political theories on certain 
conceptions of human nature; and we may believe that post-classical realists still rely on 
assumptions about human nature. Against this background, it seems not too hypothetical 
that the nature and intellectual origins of some of these realists' assumptions about human 
nature are of Freudian provenance. Such a line of enquiry has not been taken up yet. 
Surely, due to increasing interest in our disciplinary history, increasing awareness of the 
fruitful relationship between political theory and IR, and increasing dissatisfaction with 
Waltzian-style structural realism, we have seen a recent renaissance of interest in classical 
realism. Morgenthau has received most attention (Lebow 2003; Mazur 2004; Hacke et ai 
2005; Williams 2005; Mazur 2006; Russell 2007; Shilliam 2007; Williams 2007; Cozette 
2008; Scheuerman 2009), followed by Herz (Stirk 2005; Hacke & Puglierin 2007; Booth 
& Wheeler 2008; Puglierin 2008) and Niebuhr (Elie 2007; McKeogh 2007; Thompson 
2007; Lovin 2008). This renewed engagement has impressively shown that these realists 
help illuminate a wide range of analytical and moral/ethical dilemmas that occupy the 
minds of post-9/11 IR theorists and foreign-policy makers. 
Yet this otherwise insightful literature has left gaps. 11 has not looked into the 
intellectual relationships between realists and Freud. To remain with realism's 'group 
leader' (Rosenthal 1991:12), the literature devoted to Morgenthau's intellectual family-tree 
is impressive. Recent studies have shown how Morgenthau's realism was influenced by 
thinkers such as Aristotle (Lang 2007a), Hans Kelsen (Koskenniemi 2006), Abraham 
Lincoln (Ferrell 2006), Reinhold Niebuhr (Shinn 2004), Friedrich Nietzsche (Frei 2001), 
Carl Schmitt (Scheuerman 2007a), Hugo Sinzheimer (Scheuerman 2008a), the Sophists 
(Johnson 1996), and Max Weber (Turner & Mazur in press). I do not question these 
trajectories, but I hypothesise that Freud, too, had influenced Morgenthau. 
It seems puzzling but perhaps understandable why Freud has escaped much 
attention. Every now and then, Freud has cropped up in the context of a potential 
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Morgenthau/Freud connection; often with regard to Morgenthau's unpublished German 
1930 manuscript 'Uber die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen [On 
the Derivation of the Political from the Nature of Man]' (see Frei 2001; Koskenniemi 
2001:448-449; Lebow 2003:291-292; Molloy 2004:16; Scheuerman 2009:37-38). But this 
has not led to any substantial commentary, partly because of Morgenthau's own Freud 
verdict. Morgenthau (1978) admitted that he toyed with Freudian concepts but that he soon 
realised 'the impossibility of accounting for the complexities and varieties of political 
experience with the simplicities of a reductionist theory' (67). Why then bother about 
Freud? Because some Freudian traces may have survived. 
It seems unlikely that a thinker like Morgenthau, who was steeped in the tradition of 
German and Continental thought (Honig 1996), shows no intellectual ties to Freud. The 
same applies to severaK other classical and post-classical realists. I , therefore, hypothesise 
not only that the concept of human nature is not dead in contemporary realism but also that 
the assumptions about human nature of these realists may be—to varying degrees of 
explicitness and consciousness—of Freudian provenance. The literature backs such 
hypothesis. Although scattered, cursory, and brief, it has been pointed out that there may 
be some Freudian elements in the international-political theories of E.H. Carr (Johnston 
1967:878), John Herz (Ashley 1981:226), George F. Kennan (Costigliola 1997:1323; 
Christenson 1986:350n.l7), Walter Lippmann (Steel 1980), Carl Schmitt (Carty 1995), and 
also Max Weber (Mcintosh 1970; Strong 1987). This thesis examines in greater depth such 
potential links to Freud. 
This thesis's special focus on Freud requires us to dwell a bit further on what seems 
a strange neglect of Freud in our discipline. It seems unthinkable that 20'''-century classical 
realists as well as post-classicals have had no intellectual ties to the creator of psycho-
analysis. These realists have been bom, raised, educated and worked in the 'Freudian 
century' (Thurschwell 2000:1) or 'era of Freud' (Elliott 1998a:3). Despite the continuing 
Freud controversies (Zaretsky 2004:323-344; Gomez 2005), few disagree that Freud has 
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had an 'enormous impact on Western culture in the twentieth century' (Billington 
1998:ix). And, in allusion to the (in)famous 1993 Time cover story, 'Is Freud dead?' (Gray 
et al), we can say that Freud is not dead. 
Freud may be not dead, but he is terribly understudied in JR. This puts us in a 
puzzling situation vis-a-vis other disciplines. Freud's impact has been enormous across the 
sciences, social sciences, arts and humanities. Comparable with Darwin and Marx, Freud's 
intellectual and cultural impact was already two decades after his death virtually 'beyond 
description' (Kazin 1957:13). To the present day, Freud's ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
insights continue to 'pervade our intellectual life and culture, and influence our everyday 
thinking about ourselves, others and the world in which we live' (Elliott 1998a:2). It is not 
wide of the mark to claim that 'Mo one thinker of the twentieth century...has so 
impregnated contemporary consciousness, permeating every facet of economic, social, and 
intellectual l ife ' (Johnston 2000[1972]:399-400). Save IR, Freud has provoked major 
controversies and debates in virtually all academic subjects. Freud has been debated, 
celebrated, and ridiculed by anthropologists (Wallace 1983), art/literary/film theorists 
(Kaplan 1998), economists (Goodwin 2000), historians (Gay 1998), legal theorists 
(Ehrenzweig 1971), philosophers (Ricoeur 1970; Wollheim & Hopkins 1982), 
philosophers of science (Griinbaum 1984), moral philosophers/ethicists (Wallwork 1991), 
sociologists (Elliott 2004; Manning 2005), an d by theologians (Homans 1970). These 
engagements with Freud have led to the emergence of fascinating sub-disciplines such as 
psycho-analytic sociology (Bocock 1977), psycho-analytic jurisprudence (Ehrenzweig 
1971), psychohistory/psychobiography (Erikson 1958), and a psycho-analytic approach to 
international relations (Volkan 2004). 
Yet Freud is not a figure of the margins. He may be in IR (unjustified as it is) but 
not in other disciplines, including disciplines closely related to IR such as political science, 
economics, jurisprudence, and sociology. The impact of Freud has been deep and wide. 
We know that one of the most 'eminent of political scientists' (Eulau & Zlomke 1999:76) 
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was one of the earliest importers of Freud to American political theory (Sunshine 1993). 
Harold D. Lasswell based his (international-) political theorising upon Freudian 
assumptions about human nature (Bimbach 1962:156-176) and recognised that the 
'spectacular and influential nature of Freud's work...is of more general application to 
practical problems of political research and political practice than is usually understood' 
(Lasswell 1951 [1930]:17-18). In economics, John Maynard Keynes made extensive use of 
Freudian insights, although in a largely concealed manner as Keynes knew that 
professional economists were not showing a too great overt appreciation vis-a-vis Freud in 
these times (Winslow 1986; Winslow 1989). Unlike Keynes, the great Hans Kelsen 
concerned himself overtly with Freud's individual and group psychology (Kelsen 1924). 
We now know that the founder of the Viennese school of law was both intellectually and 
personally attracted to Freud (Jabloner 1998). 
Talcott Parsons also drew from Freud (Elliott 2004:22; Manning 2005:96-116). One 
of the most influential sociologists (Goddard & Nexon 2005:15), Parsons was completely 
aware of Freud's significance. He recognised that Freud is one of the 'great founders of 
modem social science theory' (Parsons & Shils 1962[1951]:52) and he once rhetorically 
asked whether 'the sociologist can do without the insights of psychoanalysis' (Parsons 
1962[1950]:62). To paraphrase Parsons: No, sociologists couldn't. Freud has become a 
central part of the 'culture of sociology'. As Immanuel Wallerstein, protagonist of 
structuralist world-systems theory (Wallerstein 2004), observed only recently: 
Freud has in fact been well incorporated into the culture of 
sociology. Freud's topology of the psyche—the id, ego and 
superego—has long been something we use to provide the 
intervening variables that explain how it is that Durkheim's social 
facts are internalized inside individual consciousnesses. We may 
not all use Freud's exact language, but the basic idea is there. In a 
sense, Freud's psychology is part of our collective assumptions. 
(1999:9) 
This suggests that Freud is perhaps also part of realism's collective assumptions. 
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Freud's impact has been profound. The psycho-analytical conception of human 
nature has transformed modem science and social sciences and demanded new 
methodological and psychological foundations (Ruitenbeek 1962; Taylor 1979; Rosenberg 
2008; Weinert 2009). Lik ewise, Freud has left his marks in contemporary social and 
political thought (Rieff 1959; Johnston 1965; Roazen 1969; Abramson 1984; Anderson 
1993; Drassinower 2003). We do find Freudians among liberals, Marxists, conservatives, 
feminists, postmodernists, and—strangely enough—also among fascists (Roazen 2003). In 
light of Freud's omnipresence in Western society, culture, and thought, the neglect of-
Freud in IR seems puzzling. It is hard to believe that there are no intellectual links between 
realists and Freud in matters human nature. The causa Freud, therefore, is a promising 
reference point regarding the wider question of whether human nature is really dead in 
contemporary realism. 
This raises this thesis's second research question: Ought the concept of human 
nature to be dead in contemporary realism? It is the natural follow-up question of the is-
question. Based on my reading of a variety of realists commonly invoked as classical 
realism's and post-classical realism's foremost proponents, I wi l l argue that the concept of 
human nature is by no means dead in contemporary realism. I wi l l also argue that these 
assumptions are not only constitutive of these realists' respective international-political 
theories but also that these assumptions are—to varying degrees of depths and 
explicitness—of Freudian provenance. Yet, regardless of whether these realists' 
intellectual sub-structures are Freudian or not, the is-question raises a series of other 
questions. I f human nature is not dead, we must ask where realism should go from there. 
Should we aim for realist international-political theories that are purified of the concept of 
human nature? 
Or should we, rather than attempting to perfect the Waltzians, recognise the 
impossibility and/or undesirability of theorising the international-political without an 
explicit conception of human nature? Were those attempts by post-classicals to get rid of 
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human nature sensible in the first place? Is it possible to detach the international-political 
from human nature? Should we overtly and proactively defend the concept of human 
nature as a central component of realism? Regardless of whether the ought-question is 
being answered in the positive or negative, the result wi l l have important implications 
about the future of realism, about its philosophical basis, about its nature, and about how 
we understand realism. It wi l l also impact on wider IR theory. I wi l l answer the ought-
question in the negative. The concept of human nature ought not to be dead. The politico-
philosophical basis for realism must be: human nature or, as I wi l l refer to it, the concept 
of the Realist Man. 
This brings us back to Freud. My argument for the continuing significance of the 
concept of human nature in contemporary realism and for the intimate relationship 
between realist international-political theorising and the concept of human nature raises a 
further question. I f the Realist Man ought to be the sole politico-philosophical basis of 
realism, what is a useful conception of the Realist Man? In this regard, Freud offers a most 
appropriate starting point. Freud is not a genuine political philosopher but his concerns, 
writings, and themes have gone beyond the usual enquiries of a neurologist. For instance, 
in Totem and Taboo (1913), Freud has presented us with a social contract theory-style 
explanation of the origins of political communities. Freud was not heavily concerned with 
archetypical politico-philosophical concepts such as justice and legitimacy, but he was 
fascinated with the intricacies of the psychological 'sources of social order' (Rieff 
1959:222). 
Freud has been useful to social/political theorists, and he may be of use to realists, 
too. First and foremost, there is his theory of human nature (on Freud's life and work, see 
Jones 1953-57; Marcuse 1956; Roazen 1975; Gay 1988; Roth 1998; Elliott 1998b; Merlino 
et al. 2008). Freud's theory is not merely a conception of human nature. It is a genuine and 
profound theory of human nature, a theory that involves a theory of civilisation and the 
human condition. As Herbert Marcuse (1972[1955]) aptly remarked: Freud developed 'a 
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"psycho-logy" in the strict sense. With this theory, Freud placed himself in the great 
tradition of philosophy and under philosophical criteria' (25). 
The 'great unriddler of human enigmas' (Gay 1988:4) went beyond studying mental 
processes and treating mental disorders. Freud sought to demystify some of the most 
perplexing problems of humankind such as the nature and origins of political communities, 
morality, religion, social order, conflict and war, and civilisational development. Besides 
his clinical-medical work, Freud has presented us with a psychology of primitive cultures 
in Totem and Taboo (1913); of religion in Moses and Monotheism (1939) and The Future 
of an Illusion (1927); of group formation and group behaviour in Group Psychology and 
the Analysis of the Ego (1921); of war in 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death' 
(1915b) and 'Why War?' (1933b); and of civilisation in Civilization and its Discontents 
(1930). Particularly the latter remains one 'o f the most distinctive statement[s] in the 
philosophy of existence and civilization' (Nelson 1957:8). 
This does not imply that Freud is uncontroversial, but it suggests that Freud is an 
appropriate starting point vis-a-vis realism's search for a human nature foundation. True, 
Freud's theory of human nature, which explains human behaviour in terms of biological-
instinctual dynamics (ego-instinct/sexual-instinct; EroslThanatos), economic-instinctual 
dynamics (unpleasure-pleasure principle, seek pleasure/avoid pain), and structural-
instinctual dynamics (id/ego/super-ego; pleasure principle/reality principle/morality 
principle), has been condemned as biologist-reductionist (for systematic introductions, see 
Freud 1916-17a, 1933a, 1940). Freud's proclamation that 'the ego is not master in its own 
house' (1917:143) has earned him the reputation of being a biologically reductionist 
fatalist. Freud's psychological/socio-philosophical axiom that 'there are present in all men 
destructive, and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural, trends' (1927:7) has been criticised 
by progressivists. 
Yet it is exactly Freud's (peculiar) scepticism vis-a-vis human nature why Freudian 
Man is an appropriate candidate for providing realism with a suitable human nature sub-
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structure. The political philosophy of realism has never believed in purely Kantian 
animalia rationabilia. Instead, it has emphasised across the millennia that we must always 
reckon with the often harsh socio-political implications of humans' profound flaws and 
irrationalities (see Boucher 1998; Donnelly 2000; Doyle 1997; Smith 1986; Tellis 1996; 
Clinton 2007b; Forde 1992; Loriaux 1992; Frankel 1996b). Martin Wight already hinted 
briefly at a Freud/realism connection (1991:25) and Abraham Kaplan (1957a) noted that 
Freud is 'possibly the most thoroughgoing realist in western thought' (224). Freud may 
yield rewarding results when it comes to realism and the human nature question. 
This brings this section to a final point. I have dwelled on Freud, on his significance 
in Western thought, and on his impact across the sciences, social sciences, arts and 
humanities as part of a rhetorical strategy that illuminates how understudied Freud is in IR. 
My concern with Freud vis-a-vis this thesis's two main research questions aims at raising 
the profile of Freud. It seems simply awkward that Waltz mentions Freud in Man, the 
State, and War—after all, a powerful critique of dozens of political philosophers, 
behaviouralists, sociologists, historians, and psychologists—merely in three footnotes and 
one epigraph (2001 [1959]:69, 71, 187). Surely, Freud has received explicit attention 
occasionally (Forbes 1984; Elshtain 1989; Bloom 1990; Coker 1994; Gammon 2008), 
often in connection with his 1933 essay 'Why War?', but this has not led to a wider and 
more in-depth engagement with Freud's psychology and social philosophy in IR. To the 
contrary, the semi-prominent status of Freud's Einstein letter might have been a Pyrrhic 
victory. For it is often deemed as being ' in many ways peculiarly unsatisfying' (Forbes 
1984:16). Such criticism may not be entirely mistaken. Freud's 'Why War?' letter is surely 
not his most intriguing piece. In fact, Freud confessed that he was bored with this letter 
exchange and that he was not expecting a Nobel Peace Prize for this 'sterile so-called 
discussion with Einstein' (quoted in Jones 1957:187). In Freud's defence, though, IR 
scholars must recognise that Freud's osuvre fills 24 volumes (Freud 1953-74; 18 vols, in 
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the original German, Freud 1940-52). Freud's significance and usefulness for 
international-political theory can hardly be judged on the basis of a 13-page letter. 
With the intellectual scenery of the strange death of the concept of human nature and 
the strange neglect of Freud in realism and IR being laid out, I wi l l now provide a chapter 
outline. 
The thesis: Plan, method, structure 
In light of the strange death of the concept of human nature in realism, I question whether 
human nature is really dead. I wi l l argue it is not. This raises the question: Ought human 
nature to be dead? I wi l l answer that it ought not to be dead. The arguments wil l unfold 
along the thesis's two-part structure; this helps to separate the is-question (Chapters 2 and 
3) fi-om the ought-question (Chapters 4 and 5). In Chapter 6, 'The "Resurrection" of the 
Realist Man, Freud, and Human Nature', I wi l l conclude that we must bring 'back' the 
Realist Man into realism; that we must bring 'back' Freud into realism; and that we must 
bring 'back' Freud and the concept of human nature into IR. 
I begin my examination of the is-question with a re-reading of several leading 20*-
century classical realists. In Chapter 2, 'Classical Realism on Human Nature and Freud', I 
examine how five truly consequential classicals have conceptualised human nature. 
Specifically, I look at Hans J. Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann, E.H. 
Carr, and Reinhold Niebuhr. These five thinkers do not exhaust the list of leading 20""-
century classical realists. Such a list would perhaps include Raymond Aron, Isaiah Berlin, 
Herbert Butterfield, Carl Schmitt, Georg Schwarzenberger, Max Weber, Martin Wight, and 
Arnold Wolfers (Thompson 1980; Smith 1986). Yet a selection must be made, a balance 
between analytical depth and breadth be struck. A l l five realists chosen are, to borrow 
Kenneth Thompson's (1980) phrase, 'masters' of international-political theory and were 
influential in the theory and practise of international politics. 
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Morgenthau was perhaps 'the most distinguished and articulate exponent of political 
realism in the twentieth century' (Tellis 1996:39; on Morgenthau, see Williams 2007). 
Kennan earned his reputation as the creator of containment policy and is regarded as the 
US foreign service's 'most highly esteemed scholar and shaper of foreign policy' (Guldin 
2004:13-14; on Kennan, see Lukacs 2007). Lippmann was the realism-turned co-author of 
Wilson's Fourteen Points and the 'most influential American journalist ever' (Pierce 
2008:ix; on Lippmann, see Syed 1963). Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis (2001[1939]) 
ranks among 'the three most influential realist works of the twentieth century' 
(Mearsheimer 2001:14; on Carr, see Johnston 2007). Last not least, Niebuhr was not 
without justification called realism's 'father '(K ennan, famously quoted in Thompson 
1972[1960]:23) and 'the greatest living political philosopher of America' (Morgenthau, 
quoted in Merkley 1975:viii; on Niebuhr, see Thompson 2007). 
These five thinkers represent the intellectual broadness and richness of 20"'-century 
classical realism (Smith 1986). Based on my successive readings, I argue that their 
conceptions of human nature are— t^o varying degrees of depths and explicitness— 
Freudian or that they show striking similarities to Freudian psychology. This argument has 
two implications. First, it rescues these realists from widespread criticisms concerning 
their assumptions about human nature. Secondly, it demonstrates that these realists cannot 
be taken without their human nature baggage, a point all too often forgotten in the recent 
renaissance of classical realism. 
Yet what happened to this human nature baggage? This is the underlying question of 
Chapter 3, 'The Hidden Human Nature Assumptions of Post-Classical Realism'. Based on 
the hypothesis that human nature is not dead in post-classical realism, I examine various 
post-classical realists and uncover hidden assumptions about human nature. I explore John 
Herz's realist liberalism, Morton A. Kaplan's systemic-scientific realism, Kenneth N . 
Waltz's defensive structural realism, John J. Mearsheimer's offensive structural realism, 
and neoclassical realism. This is not an exhaustive list of post-classical realisms. But, 
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likewise, a selection must be made. These post-classicals have been among the most 
outspoken critics of Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style realism. 
Herz is one of the most fascinating international-political theorists. His concept of 
the security dilemma has considerably helped a new generation of realists (largely from the 
US) to 'systematize political realism into a rigorous, deductive systemic theory of 
international politics' (Keohane 1986a: 15; on Herz, see Stirk 2005). Kaplan, a somewhat 
enigmatic figure, spearheaded the post-classical realists' scientific revolution (on Kaplan, 
see Tellis 1996:51-66). Waltz's work represents a distinctive turning point in the evolution 
of realism in that the 'fountainhead of an egoist, evil, human nature as the causal source of 
all political action—a watermark of traditional realism—now disappears' (Tellis 1996:88-
89; on Waltz, see Little 2007a: 167-212). Mearsheimer's Tragedy of Great Power Politics 
(2001) is widely seen as 'the definitive work on offensive realism' (Schweller 
2003:328n52; on Mearsheimer, see Little 2007a:213-248). Last but not least, neoclassical 
realism is post-classical realism's latest invention (see Rathbun 2008). 
Despite these post-classical realists' overt preference for the concept of the 
international structure over the concept of human nature, my e xamination shows that 
assumptions about human nature are still being made. Despite their 'human nature lie' and 
the fact that these realists prove to be much less reflective about the concept of human 
nature than the classicals, I still defend these post-classicals against unwarranted human 
nature criticism. Yet, despite all defense, post-classical realism has led contemporary 
realism into a serious theoretical cul-de-sac. This has forced contemporary realism to ask 
again a question that was thought answered long ago: ought human nature to be dead? 
The is-question answered, the focus of the thesis wi l l then shift to the ought-
question. This implies two ideal-typical solutions to the human nature problem. Either we 
purify realism from the tutelage of human nature, or we pro-actively defend the concept of 
human nature as the philosophical basis of realism. In the two chapters of Part I I , 'Ought 
Human Nature to be Dead?', I argue in favour of Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style realism. 
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Chapter 4, 'Human Nature Criticism and its Vices', marks the first step of the 
argument for a central role of the concept of human nature in realism. Its analytical-
argumentative strategy is essentially negative. Based on a critical engagement with the 
main forms of human nature criticisms, I conclude that we must take the concerns of the 
human nature critics with a pinch of salt. Their critical arguments against the admissibility 
of the concept of human nature in the realm of the political and international-political are 
too weak to pose a threat to human nature-sympathetic Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian realists. 
I present what is being referred to as the six sins of the concept of human nature. 
These six sins represent the most common and powerful concerns that are raised against 
the application of the concept of human nature in matters social, philosophical, and 
political. These six sins represent a truly powerful critique of the concept of human nature 
but those sympathetic to human nature must not be deterred. Human nature critics often 
fail to recognise the hidden complexities of assumptions about human nature. True, some 
have sinned when handling the concept of human nature, but human nature critics have 
failed to produce convincing arguments why human nature-theorising per se is as evil as 
they claim. Further, according to the argument of the hidden omnipresence of human 
nature, human nature criticism is virtually meaningless, for these human nature-critical 
philosophies, theories, and Weltanschauungen are also based upon certain sets of 
assumptions about human nature. It appears impossible to construct international-political 
theories that have no basis whatsoever in underlying human nature conceptions. 
This helps to take the wind out of the human nature critics' sails, but it is not a fully 
satisfying answer to the ought-question. Human nature criticisms may be flawed and we 
may be human nature sinners. Yet this does not lead to the conclusion that we ought to 
make human nature the central concept again in realist international-political theorising. 
The analytical-negative argumentative strategy, therefore, must be complemented by a 
positive set of arguments in favour of the concept of human nature. 
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In Chapter 5, 'The Virtues of Freudian Human Nature', I provide such pro-active 
arguments and make the case for Freud. A Freudian conception of human nature helps to 
solve several problems associated with contemporary realist international-political 
theorising. I provide realism with a human nature background theory that explains and 
legitimises the realist 'Weltanschauung and its analytical and normative claims. 
I argue that Freud has three virtues for realism. First, Freudian human nature helps 
realists to demystify their defining themes, principles, and concepts. Freudian Man helps to 
resolve into their individual-psychological elements many of post-classical realism's 
anthropomorphological projections and hypostatisations. Secondly, Freud's conception of 
human nature helps realists understand the underlying psychological mechanics of group 
formation and internal and external group behaviour vis-a-vis other political communities. 
Freud explains the link between human nature and the nature of the political community 
and offers realists a powerful statement of the nature and inner workings of the 
(international) human condition and international relations. Thirdly, Freud's human nature 
conception serves as a timeless reminder for realists never to expect too much but also not 
too less from human nature. Freudian Man helps realists to define both the possibilities and 
limits of international relations and to manoeuvre steadfastly between reality and Utopia. 
Over the course of four chapters, I wi l l have argued that the concept of human 
nature is not dead in realism and that Freud has— t^o varying degrees—influenced the 
assumptions about human nature of leading classical and post-classical realists. I wi l l have 
also argued that the concept of human nature ought not to be dead in realism and that 
Freud ought to play a major role in the process of re-transforming and re-configuring 
realism along Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian lines. The implications for contemporary realism 
as well as contemporary IR are manifold. 
In Chapter 6, 'The "Resurrection" of the Realist Man, Freud, and Human Nature', I 
discuss what I regard as the three main tasks that derive from the fact that not only the 
Realist Man but also Freud and the concept of human nature have never been really dead 
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and ought never to be dead. First, we must bring the Realist Man 'back' into realism and 
help make it again the philosophical backdrop of realist international-political theorising. 
Secondly, we must bring Freud 'back' into realism and study further his potential 
intellectual impact and the virtues of his psychology and social/political philosophy. 
Finally, we must bring Freud and the concept of human nature 'back' into IR. 
Contemporary IR must engage more thoroughly with one of the most intriguing thinkers, 
both from a historical but also politico-theoretical viewpoint. As regards the concept of 
human nature, I suggest that we become both less dismissive and more sincere and 
reflective vis-a-vis the concept of human nature in IR. 
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C L A S S I C A L R E A L I S M ON H U M A N N A T U R E AND F R E U D 
Introduction 
Hans J. Morgenthau's analytical and normative international-political theory is based upon 
a distinctive conception of human nature. Morgenthauian Man is possessed by an animus 
dominandi, a wi l l to power that inclines him to dominate fellow Men. It is neither a 
perfectible saint nor a Kantian animal rationabile. Consequently, Morgenthau has 
continually warned us of too much faith in Man's moral capacities. With such scepticism 
towards Man in the social, political, and international-political sphere, Morgenthau has 
placed himself firmly in the realist tradition, which has, despite all its diversity and 
different degrees of pessimism/optimism, always be genuinely wary of the natural Man, 
the Man of the passions (Meyer 2000 provides an insightful exegesis of Western thought's 
conceptualisations of the passions). In this regard, Morgenthau has been joined by fellow 
20'''-century classical realists George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann, E.H. Carr, and 
Reinhold Niebuhr. They never bought into the Rousseauian assumption of the pre-societal 
noble savage. Michael J. Smith (1986) hit the nail on its head when he argued that such a 
'treatment of human nature, reaching back to Thucydides, informs every facet of realist 
analysis' (219). 
Yet the almost symbiotic relationship between realism and sceptical assumptions 
about human nature has always provoked criticism. Virtually the entirety of IR theorists 
from the liberal, Marxist, feminist, and postmodern camp have criticised Morgenthau's and 
other classical realists' conceptions of human nature. Realist assumptions about human 
nature have been denounced by critics as being a universal, fixed, and flawed, being 
deduced from some mythical Fall or other metaphysical speculation. One of these critics 
argued recently that realists were biased towards destructive assumptions about human 
nature, portraying Man as an anti-social, fearful, self-interested, and power-driven animal; 
that these assumptions were false, because scientifically untenable; that realists' 
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pessimistic views about human nature had sinister effects on theory construction and 
foreign-policy making; and, finally, that these assumptions about human nature ca use 
policies of distrust, promote paranoia, increase the probability of international violence, 
and stifle chances for peaceful coexistence (Freyberg-Inan 2004, 2006). 
But realists, too, became increasingly wary of Morgenthau's postulation of an 
animus dominandi or of Niebuhr's Augustinian-style Man. John H. Herz was among the 
first who argued against the underlying philosophy of a human nature-driven 
Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian realism and made clear that 
Whether man is 'by nature' peaceful and cooperative, or 
aggressive or domineering, is not the question. The condition that 
concerns us here is not an anthropological or biological, but a 
social one. It is his uncertainty and anxiety as to his neighbors' 
intentions that places man in this basic dilemma, and makes the 
'homo homini lupus' a primary fact of the social life of man. 
(Herz, 1951:3) 
Herz's socio-structural reasoning that states are trapped in what he called the 'security 
dilemma' had a profound impact on subsequent generations of predominantly U.S. realists, 
particularly on the formulation of structural realism (neorealism) as epitomised by the 
international-political theories of Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer (2001). The notion that 
the vicious circle of security and power accumulation among states does not stem from an 
innate urge for power but rather from the social fact that states must provide for their own 
security in an anarchical environment has allowed these structural realists a comfortable 
opt-out from the internecine scientific and philosophical debates about whether Man is 
good/bad, perfectible/improvable, fact/fiction, or naturalistic/socially constructed. 
Neoclassical realists have done likewise. Although they have incorporated first- and 
second-image (intervening) variables, they have remained committed to the concept of 
international structure (third image) (Schweller, 2006). Human nature or biological 
realists, also wary of socio-structural explanations of international politics but also 
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sceptical of metaphysical speculations, have turned to biology and the neurosciences to 
buttress their claims (Thayer, 2004; Rosen, 2005). Human nature-based classical realism 
had to endure harsh attacks. One critic argued, for instance, that Morgenthau 'had some 
rather unflattering and unsophisticated views of human nature, and an embarrassing habit 
of parading them as the philosophical basis of Realism' (Rosenberg, 1990:292). These are 
damning indictments from both within and without realist circles. 
The critics' claims are, however, not always justified. The stakes are high in the 
controversy surrounding classical realists' assumptions about human nature. Most of these 
critics are not only challenging the underlying assumptions about human nature but are 
attacking the whole body of political realism that has based its analytical and normative 
international-political theory on calculations about human nature since its birth in ancient 
Greece (Doyle 1997; Frankel 1996b). It is essential to revisit the assumptions about human 
nature of classical realism. Morgenthau is of prime interest, but this chapter also examines 
Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr. I wi l l focus on these five classical realists' 
assumptions about human nature paying special attention to potentially Freudian elements. 
Based on my successive readings of each realist, this chapter argues that their 
conceptions of human nature are—to varying degrees of depths and explicitness—of 
Freudian provenance or show striking similarities to Freudian psychology. This has 
profound implications. First, the widespread criticisms from both within and without 
realist circles against classical realist assumptions about human nature are misleading. 
Neither are these assumptions unsophisticated, nor are they merely metaphysical 
speculations. Secondly, this reinterpretation of classical realists' assumptions about human 
nature helps us to understand that any (re-)engagement with these classical realists and/or 
the whole political philosophy of realism is necessarily accompanied by taking up a 
particular set of assumptions about human nature. One cannot take classical realism 
without its human nature baggage. 
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Morgenthau and the animus dominandi 
No other 20'''-century classical realist (save perhaps Niebuhr) is as outspoken and candid 
about the intimate relationship between the concept of human nature and realism as 
Morgenthau. In fact, Morgenthau considers human nature to be the philosophical starting 
point of his realism and political realism in general. Both famous and infamous has 
become his first principle of realism as laid out in Politics among Nations that 'Political 
realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that 
have their roots in human nature' (1967[1948]:4). Dividing the history of (international-) 
political theory into two camps, Morgenthau argues that while idealists believe in the 
'essential goodness' and 'infinite malleability' of human nature, realists presume that the 
world is 'the result of forces inherent in human nature', and he, therefore, warns us that we 
must not work against but always with these 'forces' (3). For having too much faith in a 
human nature driven by primordial forces is, to use Herbert Butterfield's (1949:47) words, 
not only 'a recent heresy' but also 'a very disastrous one'. 
Despite the central role of human nature in realism, Morgenthau remains, however, 
rather vague in Politics among Nations about the actual content of his assumptions about 
human nature. Morgenthau (1967[1948]) merely says—without any further or deeper 
substantiation—that Man is driven by 'elemental bio-psychological drives', i.e. the drives 
'to live, to propagate, and to dominate' (31). Further, Morgenthau makes no direct or overt 
references to Freud. This is unsatisfactory on two accounts. First, because it does not 
reflect properly the significance of the concept of human nature vis-a-vis his realism. 
Secondly, because it does not reflect the significance of Freudian human nature vis-a-vis 
Morgenthau's realism. To remedy these two defects, this section takes a wider focus. In 
order to receive a fuller picture of Morgenthau's conception of human nature, his Politics 
among Nations must be read alongside Morgenthau's Scientific Man vs. Power Politics 
(1946), the earlier and neglected 1930 manuscript 'On the Derivation of the Political from 
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the Nature of Man' (henceforth: 'Freud-Script'), and his Commentary essay 'Love and 
Power' (1962b). Such a reading reveals the Freudian dimension of Morgenthauian Man. 
The perhaps most fruitful starting point for any study of Morgenthau's conception of 
human nature is Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, his fijndamental and controversial 
critique of the prevailing (largely Anglo-American) wisdom of the time and its belief in 
behavioural scientism, liberal Enlightenment rationalism, pacifism, and a largely 
optimistic view of human nature (for a recent reinterpretation of Scientific Man vs. Power 
Politics, see Scheuerman 2007b; an impressive 300-years history of the notion of human 
nature in American thought is provided by Curti 1980). It is in Scientific Man vs. Power 
Politics where the (in)famous animus dominandi does appear. Morgenthau argues that 
Man is not only truly selfish but is also possessed by a lust for power, an animus 
dominandi. The selfishness of Man refers to the natural concern of human beings to 
preserve their life. It involves Man's striving and yearning for food, shelter, and physical 
security. As a result of such selfishness, Morgenthau (1946) argues, 'individual egotisms, 
all equally legitimate, confront each other' and Man is, therefore, confronted by a 
Hobbesian homo homini lupus situation (164). The societal consequences of Man's 
inclination to selfish behaviour may be harsh. But it would be misleading to read some 
form of selfishness into the primordial desire as seen by Morgenthau—for instance, to lead 
a 'comfortable life ' (Freyberg-Inan 2004:93) (which is normatively of entirely different 
order)—because Man is not so much concerned with luxury or any other surplus value but 
rather with the preservation of his life. Man is selfish in that he wants—above all else—to 
live. 
Morgenthau's second assumption about human nature, i.e. that Man is driven by an 
animus dominandi, is both more complex and more controversial. Even fellow realists 
misunderstand Morgenthau. They are not convinced and do not believe Morgenthau's 
'simple assumption' (or what they deem as a simple assumption) that 'states are led by 
human beings who have a "wi l l to power" hardwired into them at birth' (Mearsheimer 
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2001:19). The animus dominandi must be seen as being distinct from Man's inner 
selfishness and constitutes an independent motivational force. As Morgenthau (1946:165) 
argues: the will-to-power 'concerns itself not with the individual's survival but with his 
position among his fellows once his survival has been secured'. The animus dominandi 
inclines Man to the pro-active yearning and striving for power, power after power. In other 
words: Man lusts for power; and the fact that Man is a power-seeker is an 'all permeating 
fact which is of the very essence of human existence' (1962[1947]:312). It is argued in the 
following that the animus dominandi is neither an unfounded chimera by Morgenthau nor 
an irrelevant ingredient of his international-political theory, but that it is, instead, one 
possible manifestation of Freud's Eros instinct and is central to Morgenthau's realism. 
This interpretation takes its starting point in the 1930 'Freud-Script', which was 
Morgenthau's unpublished attempt to derive the nature of the Political from a Freudian 
human nature. Largely unknown and presently only available in an archival version, the 
100-page script was written by the young Morgenthau while still in Frankfurt in 1930, in 
his formative years between his doctorate (1929) and Habilitation (1934). Despite 
Morgenthau's (1978) autobiographical claim that this script is unsatisfactory, it is an 
important document because Morgenthau has re-used parts of it in Scientific Man vs. 
Power Politics (Frei 2001). The labels might have changed, but the assumptions about 
human nature of both works are largely identical—and, above all, of Freudian provenance. 
Morgenthau suggests in the 'Freud-Script' that Man is driven by two instincts: the 
instinct of self-preservation and the instinct of self-assertion. This dualistic instinct 
structure corresponds to that of Scientific Man vs. Power Politics which contains an 
instinct of selfishness and an animus dominandi, respectively. The instinct of self-
preservation of the 'Freud-Script' is rather straightforward and describes Man's longing 
for physical survival. This primordial desire to live (and avoid, basically, death) is largely 
self-centred or inward-driven (though it has, obviously, social consequences), whereas the 
instinct of self-assertion is outward-driven. This distinct instinct directs itself to others, to 
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fellow Men. It urges Man to demonstrate his abilities and powers. By nature, Man seeks to 
assert himself in his environment—by whatever means at his disposal: this ranges from 
impressing the other sex, to expressing himself and impressing others through arts and 
sciences, to participating in sports contests and any other physical and cognitive 
competition, to the heroic marching through the fields of war. For only by these or any 
other means can Man be aware of himself and recognise his place in the cosmos among 
fellow Men, can he experience and feel what it truly means to live and to be alive 
(Morgenthau 1930:5-6). 
This dualistic instinct configuration of Morgenthau that distinguishes between an 
instinct of self-preservation and an instinct of self-assertion follows essentially the early 
instinct theory of Freud whose clinical observations and metapsychological theories led 
him to presume the existence of two instincts: an ego-instinct and sexual-instinct. 
Morgenthau's instinct of self-preservation follows Freud's ego-instinct, which is again 
rather uncomplicated. It represents Man's primordial desire for physical survival. 
Morgenthau's second instinct—^the instinct of self-assertion—follows what Freud called 
the sexual-instinct, which is not biologically confined to the reproductive organs but 
includes rather a Platonic notion of love, too. This instinct directs itself towards other 
human beings or any other objects deemed worthy of love/sex. Perhaps most succinctly, 
Freud (1930:117) referred to the ego-instinct and sexual-instinct as hunger and love, 
respectively: ' I took as my starting-point a saying of poet-philosopher, Schiller, that 
"hunger and love are what moves the world'". Morgenthau follows Freud when he writes 
in the 'Freud-Script' that 
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I f the striving for the preservation of one's life [i.e. instinct of 
self-preservation] arises from a deficiency, it is, figuratively 
speaking, a child of hunger—it seeks to compensate for a lack of 
energy. Analogously, the effort to make good a surplus of energy 
seeking a release finds, again speaking metaphorically, in love 
one of its most characteristic expressions. The appearance of love 
corresponds both in the narrower physiological sense as well as in 
the more comprehensive meaning of Eros to the striving to prove 
oneself [i.e. instinct of self-assertion]. (Morgenthau 1930:4-5) 
The fact that Morgenthau's assumptions about human nature of the 'Freud-Script' are of 
Freudian provenance, i.e. that the instinct of self-preservation and the instinct of self-
assertion follow Freud's early instinct theory of an ego-instinct and sexual-instinct, 
suggests that Morgenthau's instinct theory of Scientific Man vs. Power Politics 
distinguishing between the primordial inclination to selfishness and the animus dominandi 
has its roots in Freudian psychology. For it has already been shown that Morgenthau has 
kept his instinct theory largely intact between the 1930 'Freud-Script' and the 1946 
Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, only changing the respective labels. Whether 
Morgenthau calls it selfishness or instinct of self-preservation, what lies under the 
primordial desire to live and avoid death is, ultimately, Freud's ego-instinct. 
The second part of Morgenthau's assumptions about human nature—the animus 
dominandi—is equally Freudian. It is a product in nature and origin of Freud's sexual-
instinct. In the 'Freud-Script', Morgenthau (1930) follows Freud insofar as it is argued that 
the objects in which the instinct of self-assertion can find gratification are manifold. Here, 
he adopts from Freud the possibility for the instinct to direct itself towards various objects 
(25-26). This object-based and psychic-determinist character of how instincts yearn for 
gratification as well as the deeply social nature of both Freud's sexual-instinct as well as 
Morgenthau's animus dominandi helps us to shed light on the Freudian dimension of the 
animus dominandi. In line with realism's a ncient and self-defining e mphasis on such 
human irrationalities as power, honour, glory, etc., Morgenthau stresses Man's desire to 
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dominate fellow Men: dominating fellow Men brings Man the maximum of instinctual 
satisfaction (43). This implies, of course, that Man needs, and is reliant on the existence of, 
social relationships. For otherwise, Man in pure isolation would not be able to find the 
much needed gratification of the instinct of self-assertion—who is there to impress and to 
dominate in the life of the solitary and autarchic Rousseauian noble savage? Therefore, the 
animus dominandi is perhaps best considered as one of the most important manifestations 
or outlets of the instinct of self-assertion. This, however, makes then, in Morgenthau's 
system of human nature, the animus dominandi—because the instinct of self-assertion has 
already been identified as Freudian—an important manifestation or outlet of Freud's 
sexual-instinct. Thus, it is not only the desire to live and avoid death (selfishness, instinct 
of self-preservation) that is of Freudian provenance, but it is also Morgenthau's (in)famous 
animus dominandi (instinct of self-assertion) of Scientific Man vs. Power Politics that has 
its roots in Freud's early instinct theory. From a history of political thought perspective, 
the fact that Morgenthau's assumptions about human nature seem fairly heavily influenced 
by Freud's theory of human nature is significant in its own right, largely because such an 
intellectual relationship has long been suspected but never really understood or made 
explicit. It improves our understanding of Morgenthau, the most important classical-realist 
international-political theorist of the 20"" century. But perhaps even more importantly, it 
improves, as is now shown, our understanding of Morgenthau's Man of Politics among 
Nations and the individual- and socio-psychological processes and mechanisms by which 
the animus dominandi of Man turns into some sort of collective animus dominandi that 
drives and governs political communities vis-a-vis others in the international sphere. 
In Politics among Nations, Morgenthau speaks neither from an instinct of self-
preservation and instinct of self-assertion as in the 'Freud-Script', nor from Man's 
selfishness and the animus dominandi as in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. This is 
rather confusing. Instead, he refers to three bio-psychological drives: namely, the drives to 
live, to propagate, and to dominate. This confusion, however, can be remedied, because the 
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new language signifies merely a change in rhetoric rather than a change in substance. What 
Morgenthau now calls the drive to live is merely another label for the instinct of self-
preservation and Man's selfishness. It designates or perhaps intentionally conceals Freud's 
ego-instinct that seeks to embrace and prolong life and seeks to avoid death. Likewise, the 
drives to propagate and to dominate, too, are neither Christian-realist Niebuhrian, nor 
Nietzschean, nor mere metaphysical speculation. Just as Man's drive to live is rooted in 
Freud's ego-instinct, the drives to propagate and to dominate—which is actually the 
animus dominandi by another name—are manifestations of Freud's sexual-instinct or Eros. 
(To avoid potential confusion regarding Eros: in his early instinct theory of 1910, Freud 
distinguished between an ego-instinct and sexual-instinct, the latter of which Freud called 
Eros; in his later (third and last) instinct theory as developed in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, Freud (1920) merged the ego-instinct and sexual-instinct into one instinct, 
namely Eros, and presumed the existence of the (in)famous death drive (Thanatos), i.e. the 
eternal biological-instinctual antagonist of Eros.) 
Thus, Morgenthau's animus dominandi is not, as critics of both realist and non-
realist persuasion often claim, a child of God or the devil or of any other myth. Rather, 
Man's longing for power and assertion is a child of Freud's Eros. This may seem odd, for 
why should power or the wish to dominate others be in any meaningful way connected to 
Eros or love. But it surely is i f Eros is rightly recognised in its transcended meaning of 
sex/love. As Freud (1930:122) has shown, the aim of Eros is to 'combine single human 
individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, 
the unity of mankind'. Yet what sounds like the assumption of the genuine and peaceful 
brotherhood of humankind has a darker element to it: namely, Man's yearning for power. 
Power is intimately connected with Eros insofar as Man's desire to gratify the sexual-
instinct goes hand in hand, as Freud (1915a) has argued, with Man's 'urge for mastery', 
for power is but a 'primitive form of striving for...the sexual object' (139). To put it 
shortly: Eros dictates Man to unite; power is its main means. 
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On that score, Morgenthau agrees with Freud. In his 1962 Commentary article, 
'Love and Power', Morgenthau argues that 'Power and love are organically connected' 
(247). Both drives share an essentially similar aim in that they both seek to combine 
human individuals into relationships, i.e. in that they both incline Man to enter 
relationships with his fellows. The only difference between these two pertains to the 
means. While love seeks these relationships through 'spontaneous mutuality', power seeks 
to combine fellow Men via 'unilateral imposition' (247-248). Paraphrasing Clausewitz 
here helps us to illuminate the distinction between the means of love and power as well as 
the function of the animus dominandi fairly well: the animus dominandi is the continuation 
of Man's longing for love by other means. But although both love and power long for 
uniting Man with other Men, human unions based solely upon power or unilateral 
imposition are of different depth and quality compared to those based upon love or 
spontaneous mutuality. The former relationships are rather inferior, genuinely flawed, 
unstable and wil l eventually become not more than rather primitive master-servant 
relationships. Ideally, Morgenthau (1962b) argues, the 'power of the master is founded not 
upon the master's threats and promises but upon the subject's love for the master' (249). 
This, however, is hardly achievable in pure form. Therefore, Man—by birth a potential 
master—seeks to compensate for the lack of the potential subjects' love for him by an 
accumulation of ever-increasing power. Man's yearning for gaining and keeping power 
after power over fellow Men wi l l , of course, never secure him love in the sense of Eros. 
Unable to secure all or portions of love for himself, Man is almost destined for frustration. 
Based on such Freudian instinctual configuration, Morgenthau argues that any 
search for power is ultimately and essentially a 'fruitless search for love'; that any power 
relationship is ultimately and essentially 'a frustrated relationship of love' (250). Surely, 
the fact that Morgenthau presumes the existence of an animus dominandi does not make 
him a human nature optimist, for the yearning for power—in Weberian terms the 
'probability that one actor within a social relationship wi l l be in a position to carry out his 
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own wil l despite resistance' (Weber 1947[1915]:139)—is not a very reassuring character 
trait, particularly when it is of primordial nature. But one must not, on the other hand, 
gloss over the fact that Morgenthau's understanding of power and the animus dominandi is 
intimately intertwined with Man's longing for love, because it is exactly this perhaps 
paradoxical inner relationship that makes the animus dominandi such a central, puzzling, 
and lasting element of the human condition. For even i f it was possible to completely 
eradicate or ameliorate to a minimum level all the security concerns that derive from 
Morgenthauian Man's instinct of self-preservation or selfishness, the longing for power, 
which is a longing for love {Eros) really, would remain virtually unaffected by changing 
economic, political, security, and social circumstances. Thus, Morgenthau's animus 
dominandi is neither metaphysical and embarrassing, nor is it the product of some form of 
inherent human violent aggressiveness or of pure self-interest. Instead, the wil l to power 
derives from Man's deeply social nature, from Freud's sexual-instinct or Eros. Just as 
power cannot be meaningfully dissociated or separated from love and Eros, Morgenthau's 
instinct theory of Politics among Nations (and his international-political theory as a whole) 
discriminating between three bio-psychological drives—namely, to live as well as to 
propagate and to dominate—must be seen against the backdrop of Freud's early instinct 
theory distinguishing between an ego-instinct and a sexual-instinct (Eros), respectively. 
We can identify further significant traces of a Freudian dimension in Morgenthau's 
assumptions about human nature in Politics among Nations. These pertain to some of the 
most central claims of his classical-realist international-political theory, including 
Morgenthau's assumption of an universal struggle for power among nations. Morgenthau 
(1967[1948]:25) argues that 'international politics...is a struggle for power'. Political 
communities, he says, have three different ideal-typical policies at their disposal that they 
can pursue. They either seek to keep power (policy of the status quo), or they seek to 
increase power (policy of imperialism), or they seek to demonstrate power (policy of 
prestige). Regardless, however, o f which policy is being pursued, the power struggle 
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among nations—rooted, ultimately, in human nature, particularly in Man's animus 
dominandi—is in itself 'universal in time and space' (31). But Morgenthau's argument 
about how the power-seeking behaviour and nature of political communities derive from 
the power-seeking behaviour and nature of Man has often been misunderstood, partly 
because the Freudian dimension of Morgenthauian Man has been overlooked thus far. 
How does Morgenthau derive his assumption about the eternal power-struggle 
among political communities from the animus dominandil I argue that Morgenthau's 
reasoning proceeds in essentially two steps. First, he follows Freud's recognition of one of 
the most profound facts of the human condition, namely, the existence of an inherent and 
deep antagonism between Man and society, a dilemma which roots in Man's structural-
instinctual dynamics. And then, secondly, Morgenthau employs two of Freud's defense 
mechanisms—displacement and identification—which provide the transmission belt that 
allows Morgenthau to translate Man's animus dominandi into the thirst for power of 
political communities vis-a-vis others in the international sphere. 
Morgenthauian Man has to pay a very hefty price in order to gratify his instinctual 
desire to enter human relationships, to combine with other Men, and to belong to a group. 
For civilisation (as Freud calls it) or societies or human relationships or groups require 
from Man to forego or sacrifice his psyche's biological, economical, and structural 
yearning for instinctual satisfaction. Or put the other way round: the nature of societies 
demand the renunciation of their members' instincts—Man cannot do, act, behave as he 
wishes, for the demands society puts upon him are too great. Morgenthau (1967[1948]) 
recognises quite clearly that Man is being confronted with a 'network of rules of conduct 
and institutional devices for controlling individual power drives' which either 'divert 
individual power drives into channels where they cannot endanger society' or 'they 
weaken them or suppress them altogether' (98). The consequences are simple but 
extremely harsh. These societal devices (laws, cultural norms) do not only force Man to 
suppress his power drives but they also work against the laws of human nature—namely: 
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Man cannot (must not) satisfy his instincts. Yet Morgenthau's Man (his ego) is capable of 
seeking other channels in which he may find instinctual gratification. Thus, Morgenthau 
argues, Man might project those instincts unsatisfied onto, for instance, competitive 
examinations, sports contests, social clubs, fraternal organisations, and so forth (98). This 
suffices to unearth Morgenthau's further debts to Freud's theory of human nature (and 
society). 
Morgenthau follows one of Freud's central psychologically-grounded arguments 
which the latter has most forcefully laid out in one of the 20'''-century's masterpieces on 
the human condition. Civilization and its Discontents. There, Freud (1930) argues that 
there exists an irreconcilable and inherent antagonism between the demands of Man's 
pleasure principle for instinct gratification on one hand, and society's inherent repressive 
and over-arching demands for instinct renunciation on the other (96). Morgenthau agrees 
with Freud that Man is essentially trapped in a dilemma. Man longs for instinct 
satisfaction, but Eros demands love and uniting with fellow Men, which requires at least a 
minimum compliance with social norms that help erect and control the society of Men. He 
also agrees with Freud that Man is to a large degree an anti-social and anti-cultural being, 
a view that is based on the inherent and instinctual incompatibility between Man and 
civilisation. This does not mean or imply that Man is a purely self-interested homo 
oeconomicus-style rational machine that seeks to maximise its own share of material gains 
and utility, but merely that Man's instinctual dynamics are not completely compatible with 
societal requirements. 
This essential fact of the human condition, i.e. the profound antagonism between 
Man and civilisation, bears quite heavily upon the international struggle for power, peace, 
and prestige. In order to make this argumentative connection between the domestic and the 
international sphere, Morgenthau continues to draw from Freudian insights. Morgenthau 
does not only recognise this profoundly antagonistic character of the human condition, but 
also refers to 'channels' into which Man's unsatisfied instincts can possibly be diverted. 
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Yet what Morgenthau innocuously calls 'channels' represent, in fact, his adherence to 
Freudian defense mechanisms (displacement, identification), which in turn presupposes 
Freud's tripartite structural theory of the psyche (id, ego, super-ego). 
As laid out in 'The Ego and the Id ' , Freud (1923a) presumes that Man's mental 
apparatus can be seen in terms of various structural-instinctual dynamics played out by 
essentially three different agents. The id remains unconscious and follows the unpleasure-
pleasure principle; it contains Man's passions and instincts. The super-ego is Man's 
conscience and contains internalised norms as shaped by parental and societal prohibitions; 
it follows the morality principle and punishes Man through feelings of guilt in cases of 
non-compliance with its demands. Thus, the id is in perennial conflict with the super-ego. 
To keep these two powerfiil forces in a healthy balance, the ego— t^he conscious ego that 
follows the reality principle—employs a variety of defense mechanisms. The ego brokers 
between the demands of the instinctual id and the demands of the societal super-ego by 
employing a variety of coping strategies of which the most significant and common are 
repression, displacement, denial, projection, reaction formation, intellectualisation, 
rationalisation, and sublimation. Through these defense mechanisms, the ego aims at 
reducing the tensions caused by instinct suppression (Freud 1966[1936]). Thus, when 
Morgenthau suggests 'channels' into which Man's unsatisfied instincts can be diverted, he 
not only adopts Freud's structural theory of the psyche but also his theory of defense 
mechanisms. More specifically, Morgenthau uses displacement, a defense mechanism that 
allows Man to redirect his id-impulses which conflict with societal norms (super-ego) to 
outlets ('channels' according to Morgenthau) that are conform with such norms. 
Yet to link Man's animus dominandi to the power-drives of political communities, 
i.e. to link the broad behavioural patterns of political communities to the animus 
dominandi in that the latter—ultimately, human nature—provides the actual and 
philosophical origins of state-behaviour and international-political outcomes, Morgenthau 
uses another of Freud's defense mechanisms, that of identification. Morgenthau suggests a 
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few channels in which the animus dominandi, which must be suppressed within the 
societal context, might find gratification, i.e. sport, arts, science. But he singles out one 
very distinctive channel: the sphere beyond the political community's boundary, the 
international sphere. Since Man can hardly satisfy his instinct's within the society's 
boundaries. Men do, Morgenthau argues, 'project those unsatisfied aspirations onto the 
international scene', for there they 'find vicarious satisfaction in identification with the 
power drives of the nation'; as Morgenthau (1967[1948]) continues: the 'power our 
representatives wield on the international scene becomes our own, and the frustrations we 
experience within the national community are compensated for by the vicarious enjoyment 
of the power of the nation' (98-99). What Morgenthau here refers to as 'frustrations' and 
what he presents as one of the cornerstones of his realism—namely, the rooting of the 
power-drive of political communities in the animus dominandi of Men—is, however, 
essentially Freudian reasoning based on a distinctive psycho-analytic conception of human 
nature. 
Freud has argued that as a member of a group such as families, castes, states, 
nations, or any other social-institutional regime, Man can never act according to and can 
never comply with the imperatives of the pleasure principle as dictated by the id. But in 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud (1921) has shown how Man's ego 
seeks a solution to this seemingly eternal dilemma: namely, identification, i.e. by means of 
the unification with the object of pleasure or the subject who is capable of acting out such 
suppressed instincts. What is forbidden by societal norms and cultural values for individual 
Man to pursue, might possibly be pursued as a nation/political community or by its 
representatives be cause there are no effective societal restrictions on the international 
sphere since international law and a shared morality is rather weak. Yet since Man cannot 
but long for instinctual satisfaction, Freud has shown the individual and social-
psychological processes by which Man identifies himself with the group-leader, e.g. the 
powerflil statesman, in order to overcome his frustrations and partake in the power, 
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prestige, and glory that the nation and the political community's leader wield in the 
international sphere. Via the process of identification, Man receives a share in the power of 
the nation and consequently becomes powerful himself, thereby finding compensation for 
the lack of instinctual satisfaction within society. The ego brokers the seemingly perfect 
arrangement between the instinctual id and the societal super-ego in that Man represses his 
instincts domestically by means of his capacity to act them out internationally. 
It is, then, such psychological and socio-philosophical background of predominantly 
Freudian assumptions about human nature against which Morgenthau sees international 
politics taking place. Man's psychological makeup and instinctual dynamics certainly 
cannot explain—not to mention, predict—why political community A has attacked its 
neighbour B at a certain time. But it can help explain the broader patterns of world politics 
which are, to quote Morgenthau's (1967[1948]:4) first principle of realism, once again but 
the manifestations of 'objective laws that have their roots in human nature'. One of the 
most central parts—if not the central part—of such 'objective laws' is the inherent and 
profound antagonism between Man and civilisation which is rooted, ultimately, in Man's 
distinctive instinctual dynamics. It is these instinctual dynamics, taken together with social 
circumstances (which are, however, in turn merely the product of other instinctual 
dynamics), which provide, as Morgenthau makes clear in Politics among Nations, the 
'explanation for the increasing ferocity with which foreign policies are pursued in modem 
times'; and he continues his (broadly Freudian) argument which is worth quoting at length: 
The growing insecurity of the individual in Western societies, 
especially in the lower strata, and the atomization of Western 
society in general have magnified enormously the frustration of 
individual power drives. This, in turn, has given rise to an 
increased desire for compensatory identification with the 
collective national aspirations for power. (100) 
Thus, all political phenomena can eventually and ultimately be traced back to the nature of 
Man. Surely, Freud is not the single intellectual influence upon Morgenthau's realism. 
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However, that he stood under the influence of Freud in some significant aspects of his 
realist argument about world politics can hardly be wished away. 
My interpretation that central claims of Morgenthau's realism have their roots in 
Freudian assumptions about human nature seems also not too surprising when seen from 
another perspective. Even from a merely biographical perspective, it is noticeable that 
Morgenthau had close links to Freud-friendly intellectuals and intellectual circles 
throughout his life. Early in his career, Morgenthau worked with social-democratic lawyer 
Hugo Sinzheimer in liberal-minded 1930s Frankfurt where Freud was in high regard 
(Scheuerman 2008a). After Frankfurt, he went (fled) to Geneva. There Morgenthau stood 
under the influence of social-democratic lawyer and legal philosopher Hans Kelsen from 
whom he obtained his Habilitation and who would not only become his life-long mentor 
but who had also both close personal and intellectual ties to Freud (Jabloner 1998). And, 
then later in life, already in New York, Morgenthau became friend and mentor of psycho-
analyst Ethel Spector Person, who taught him, as Morgenthau's colleague John Stoessinger 
(2004:145) remembers, 'a great deal about Sigmund Freud and those who stood upon his 
shoulders' (see Morgenthau & Person 1978; Person 2004 for her personal recollection of 
Morgenthau). 
Freud's theory of human nature accompanied Morgenthau from the cradle to the 
grave of his intellectual life, which led to the infusion of Freudian assumptions about 
human nature and insights into two of Morgenthau's magna opera—Scientific Man vs. 
Power Politics and Politics among Nations—and, more broadly, to his classical-realist 
international political theory. 
The 'cracked vessel' of Kennan 
Consistent with classical realism, George F. Kennan's analytical and normative realism is 
based upon two core elements—the emphasis on the forces of nationalism and human 
nature. International conflicts are mainly the product of nationalist sentiments among 
37 
Chapter 2 
political communities; and these sentiments are mainly driven and reinforced by group 
psychological processes that have their origins in the nature of Man. We know that Kennan 
toyed with psycho-analysis throughout his life. In 1942, he lectured American officials in 
Germany proposing to 'psychoanalyze' the Soviet Union; and two years later, Kennan 
sought out Freud's daughter, Anna, in London (Costigliola 1997:1323). Kennan's 
preoccupation with psycho-analysis seems to have had a lasting impact on how he 
conceptualised human nature. I argue that his assumptions about human nature—as 
formulated in Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy (Kennan 
1993), a work that condenses his international-political theory—reveal some striking 
similarities with Freud's theory of human nature. 
As classical realist, Kennan knows—in contradistinction to 
Waltzian/Mearsheimerian structural realists—that any international-political theory must 
use a theory of human nature as its starting-point (1993:17-36). Kennan's Man is a 
'cracked vessel' that is driven by two primary impulses and that is entangled in profound 
and existential struggles on two fronts: both within his own self and vis-a-vis other Men. 
As Kennan writes: 'Man, to the degree that he tries to shape his behaviour to the 
requirements of civilisation, is unquestionably a cracked vessel. His nature is the scene of 
a never-ending and never quite resolvable conflict between two very profound impulses' 
(17). Kennan's metaphor of Man being a 'cracked vessel' signifies a potential intellectual 
proximity to Freudian-style assumptions about human nature. Indeed, intellectual links 
between Kennan and his 'cracked vessel' and Freud and his psycho-analytic Man can be 
established, albeit without raising the point unnecessarily too far, for it is not argued that 
Kennan's Man is Freudian Man or that Freud was a direct and/or the sole intellectual 
influence upon Kennan. 
Like Freud, Kennan recognises and identifies quite clearly Man's profound 
discomfort as member of civilised society or political community. Kennan emphasises this 
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essential fact of the human condition throughout his discussion of human nature, and it is 
worth quoting at length. The 'psychic makeup' of the cracked vessel, he argues, is 
the scene for the interplay of contradictions between the primitive 
nature of his innate impulses and the more refined demands of 
civilized life, contradictions that destroy the unity and integrity of 
his undertakings, confuse his efforts, place limits on his 
possibilities for achievement, and often cause one part of his 
personality to be the enemy of another. (27) 
Here, Kennan is in broad agreement with Freud's socio-philosophicai argument of 
Civilization and its Discontents (1930:96) that Man's impulses are irreconcilable with 
civilisation. Man is confronted, to use Kennan's (1993) words, with the profound conflict 
'between what the individual actually is and what the interests of civilisation would ideally 
require him to be' (27). This profound antagonism would, however, not exist and remain to 
be irreconcilable i f Man was not driven by two conflicting impulses that drag him in 
essentially two different directions. On one hand, Kennan's Man is driven by the need to 
preserve himself and by 'self-regard, self-love, egotism, or whatever one wishes to call i t ' 
(20). But, on the other side, Kennan recognises that Man is also a compassionate 'social 
animal' that wishes to comply with societal demands (23). Such is Kennan's conception of 
Man's instinctual structure; and regardless of whether Kennan was inspired directly by 
Freud, the similarities between Kennan's 'cracked vessel' and Freud's early instinct 
theory, which distinguishes between Man's ego-instinct (self-preservation, self-regard) and 
sexual-instinct (other-regard), respectively, which are both aiming for immediate 
gratification, are nonetheless striking. 
Based on that instinctual structuring of Man, however, Kennan is, just as Freud was, 
deeply aware of the dilemma that neither the pure renunciation nor the pure gratification of 
the instincts is realistically feasible and desirable. But Kennan also recognises that some 
'people do better or worse in contending' with these contradicting instinctual demands 
(28). In Freudian terms, Kennan means—thereby perhaps implicitly adopting Freud's 
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structural theory of the psyche—that the egos of some Men are capable of balancing more 
effectively the demands of the unconscious id vis-a-vis the demands of the semi-
unconscious super-ego than are other Men, but that, ultimately, we all do make use of 
defense mechanisms however successful we may be in employing these coping strategies. 
Yet, unconscious motivations always lurk in the back of the psyche; and to those Men who 
think that their egos are (apparently) balancing the instinctual demands fairly well, Kennan 
delivers a warning message: 
One would do well not to be too easily mislead by those 
impressive displays of a total personal autonomy. There are few 
who have not, at one time or another, had to do battle with the 
little troublemaker[s]; and i f there is at the moment no outward 
evidence of its being a factor in their lives, don't worry: you may 
be sure it has been there in the past, or soon wi l l be. (29) 
Like Freud, Kennan recognises that Man must permanently and prudently reckon and 
grapple with the amazing depths of his soul, the (sometimes ugly) battle-ground for 
profoundly conflictual instincts and impulses—this not only for individual-psychological 
reasons or concerns of inner well-being, but also because virtually the entirety of social 
and (international-) political phenomena have, ultimately, their origins in Man's dualistic 
instinctual makeup. This includes one of the most powerful forces and profound problems 
of intemafional relations: nationalism. 
For Kennan, as for virtually all classical realists as well as for Freud, the force of 
nationalism, one of the most constitutive problems of international relations exacerbating 
the Schmittian us/them problematique that haunts contemporary normative international-
political theory, finds its origins not so much in socio-structuralist laws but rather in laws 
that have their roots in human nature. Kennan (1993) argues that nationalist sentiments are 
the consequent and powerful forces of a 'universal need for people to feel themselves a 
part of something larger than themselves, and larger than just the family' (74). Such 
universal need to affiliate with fellow Men and to be a member of a group or a political 
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community is, as he says, a 'natural need' (78). Kennan's Man is a deeply social animal, a 
Man which may be described as some sort of Aristotelian zoon politikon, who cannot 
thrive except in a social context but with a Freudian spin to it. 
First, even though the family constitutes Man's initial and primary social group, the 
aim of Man's instinctual configuration is such that it {Eros) seeks to combine individuals 
into ever larger units (Freud, 1930:99,122). Secondly, this drive to affiliate is like a natural 
programme inbuilt into human nature in that Man's inclination and disposition to group 
formation is an 'inherited deposit from the phylogenesis of the human libido' (Freud, 
1921:143). And, thirdly, Kennan seems to share the group psychological views of Freud, 
as formulated in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), that emphasise the 
impact of inner-group identification processes on the internal and external behaviour of 
groups and political communities. To Kennan, nationalism is 'the greatest emotional-
political force of the age' (1993:76-77), but he does not consider all forms of nationalisms 
as equally problematic. Kennan distinguishes two forms: patriotism versus romantic 
nationalism (77-81). Although both are rooted in Man's social nature, it is only the latter 
that constitutes a 'pathological form' of nationalism, quite sadly a 'mass emotional 
exaltation to which millions of people... appear to be highly susceptible' (78). 
The reason why Man is highly susceptible to aggressive forms of nationalism is 
rooted in Man's dualistic instinctual structure. It roots, uhimately, in Man's inclination to 
self-regard or self-love on the one hand, and in his social predispositions to affiliate with 
fellow Men, on the other. The perennial conflict of antagonistic drives within Man's self 
finds its outlet on the international scene caused by large-scale, Freudian-style processes of 
'collective self-identification' (77) in political communities. Frustrated by his impotence, 
Man is capable of establishing and fuelling his self-regard by being/becoming a member of 
a nation. It is the nation that provides him with the necessary 'reassurance as to his own 
worth'; in addition, by receiving a share of and indulging in the glory of the nation, to 
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which Man has become emotionally attached, Man cannot only compensate for his 
frustrations but can also satisfy his natural need to affiliate with other Men (79). 
Against the background of such a conception of the nature of Man, i.e. assumptions 
about human nature that represent some striking resemblances to Freud's individual and 
group psychology, Kennan has formulated the profound scepticism vis-a-vis two 
(international-) political projects. The first concerns the role of the state. Kennan argues 
that the idea of the abolishment or retreat of the state—or any other Weberian-style form 
of political community—pertains more to wishful thinking rather than to a realist(ic) 
assessment of the human condition and international-political life. Though he shares the 
hope that 'these exaggerated concepts of national dignity and these excesses of collective 
self-admiration decline' in the not too distant future, the state will, Kennan argues, remain 
the 'central entity' around which the struggle for power and peace takes place (81). 
Kennan's second scepticism, which also comes directly from his assumptions about human 
nature, concerns Marxist (international-) political theory. Its philosophical and practical 
attempts that call for a major overhaul of the international-political status quo seem ill-
founded to Kennan, for Marxists do not recognise that 'a measure of tragedy is built into 
the very existence of the human individual' and that this 'is not to be overcome by even 
the most drastic human interventions into the economic or social relationships among 
individuals' (36). On that point, Kennan also agrees with Freud, who argued against 
Marxism on many occasions (Freud 1927, 1930). Freud once confessed that he was a half-
Bolshevist: a patient told him that the Bolshevist revolution would initially bring chaos 
and misery but then an ever-lasting period of universal peace and prosperity—to which 
Freud replied dryly that he 'believed the first half (quoted in Jones 1957:17). More 
seriously, like Kennan (and so many other classical realists), Freud derived such 
scepticism from the nature of Man and argued that 
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the psychological premises on which the system is based are an 
untenable illusion. In abolishing private property we deprive the 
human love of aggression of one of its instruments, certainly a 
strong one, though certainly not the strongest; but we have in no 
way altered the differences in power and influence which are 
misused by aggressiveness, nor have we altered anything in its 
nature. Aggressiveness was not created by property. (1930:113 
(italics added)) 
Kennan's 'cracked vessel' constitutes not only a rich and well-constructed conception of 
Man, which is, in fact, rather a statement about the human condition, but also that the 
'cracked vessel' shares many similarities with Freudian Man. This seems to have been 
forgotten among a large section of contemporary realists obsessed with philosophy of 
science and quantitative-statistical analyses of world politics who, however, still identify 
Kennan as one of their intellectual realist forefathers. But such implication is misleading, 
for Kennan (and all the other classical realists) approached world politics rather 
differently. 
This can also be seen when looking at one of the most controversial yet important 
foreign-policy documents of the 20'''-century—i.e. the (in)famous Mr. X article based on 
Kennan's long telegram, 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct' (1947)—where Kennan argues 
for the political strategy of containment vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. There, Kennan derives 
his policy-strategic conclusion from rather different yet perhaps much more revealing and 
fruitful theoretical premises and methodological approaches. Rather than having purely 
focussed on changing structures in the international system, Kennan draws from earlier 
results that derived from his attempts to psycho-analyse the political personality of the 
Soviet Union. Applying Freudian developmental psychology to the Soviet Union, Kennan 
explored the 'childhood of the Russian people', the phase of'adolescent Russia', identified 
its regression, and diagnosed that the Soviet Union and its government suffered from a 
profound 'mental pathology' (Costigliola, 1997:1323). Kennan complements this result 
with another psycho-analytical theory. He argues that the Russian revolutionary 
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movements 'found in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalisation for their own 
instinctive desires' which include the 'yearning for power', a 'phenomenon as old as 
human nature itself (Kennan, 1947:567). Based on his (psycho-)analysis of the Soviet 
Union, Kennan argues that too much faith in negotiations is unwarranted and that the U.S. 
government should implement a 'policy of firm containment' (581). 
That Kennan's realism is, ultimately, based on Freudian-style assumptions about 
human nature is unfortunately often overlooked. 
Lippmann on infantilism and nationalism 
This brings the analysis of the assumptions about human nature of classical realists to 
Walter Lippmann, who had both personal and intellectual links to Freud. Lippmann knew 
Freud; they met at a meeting of the Psychoanalytic Society in Vienna, and he was 
fascinated by him. As Lippmann wrote, 'I cannot help feeling that for his illumination, for 
his steadiness and brilliancy of mind, he may rank among the greatest who have 
contributed to thought' (1915:10). This fascination with Freud and psycho-analysis led to 
Lippmann's path-breaking Preface to Politics (2005[1913]) and it reached such 
dimensions that Harold Laski once lamented that he wished that 'Walter Lippmann would 
forget Freud for a little, just a little' (quoted in Steel 1980:173). But Lippmann did not 
forget Freud. Rather, together with Harold D. Lasswell, he became one of the prime 
importers of Freud to American political thought (Roazen 2003). 
Lippmann emphasises the theoretical and practical significance of human nature in 
international politics throughout his work, and Lippmann's Man shows striking similarities 
to Freudian Man. Lippmann's classical realism is based on two core elements: nationalism 
and Man. International conflicts are driven by nationalist sentiments, and these potentially 
explosive sentiments one holds in favour of one's own political community and in inverse 
sympathy vis-a-vis others are driven by the laws of group psychology that are rooted in the 
nature of Man (Lippmann 2005[1913], 2008[1915]). Lippmann's assumptions about 
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human nature resemble Freud's Man. Lippmann's Man is driven by primary impulses: he 
yearns for pleasure and instinctual satisfaction. These immature drives soon lead to intra-
individual and inter-individual conflicts. Not only is each Man the psychological battle-
ground of his own antagonistic drives. But on a societal level, too, the rivalling and 
profoundly antagonistic instinctual demands interact with the instinctual demands of 
fellow Men. This allows both for cooperation but also causes conflict. The nature of Man, 
Lippmann (2005[1913]) argues quite concisely, is 'a rather shocking affair if you come to 
it with ordinary romantic optimism' (47); and Lippmann, therefore, urges us to come to 
terms with human nature as it is, not as we wish our nature to be. In this regard, 
Lippmann's Preface to Politics is intended as a wake-up call for the political class that it 
must initiate a major overhaul of human regimes and political institutions. These reforms 
must not be based upon idealistic-romantic conceptions, Lippmann argues, but on brute 
facts about Man. Lippmann seems to have derived these facts from Freud. He 
acknowledges that 'The impetus of Freud is perhaps the greatest advance ever made 
towards the understanding and control of human character' (80). 
Against this background, Lippmann faults the 'taboo philosophers' in Preface to 
Politics on two accounts. First, that they have considered the drives of Man as being 
essentially evil, and, secondly, that they have permanently and relentlessly sought to 
outlaw these lusts by which Man is driven. In the wake of his Freudian leanings, Lippmann 
disagrees energetically with such a socio- and politico-philosophical standpoint and argues 
instead that 'the energies of the soul' are 'neither good nor bad themselves'; rather than 
'tabooing our impulses, we must redirect them'; rather than 'trying to crush badness', he 
argues, 'we must turn the power behind it to good account' (54-55). Here, Lippmann 
seems to have found comfort in Freud's socio-philosophical presumption of an inherent 
and profound antagonism between Man and society, but also in Freud's concept of 
sublimation, a defense mechanism that allows Man to transform 'evil' instincts into 
'approved' forms of behaviour. Man is capable of becoming ever more-and-more liberated 
45 
Chapter 2 
from the instinctual demands placed upon him. In Preface to Morals, Lippmann (1929) 
argues that Man must continually attempt to become as liberated as possible from his 
passions. Success or failure in this struggle against his own instincts will determine 
whether Man will be able to lead the good humanistic life or not. 
The critical phase in that struggle, Lippmann argues, thereby agreeing with Freud, is 
'the passage from childhood to maturity' (183). Infantile Man, he writes, does merely as he 
pleases. But mature Man is capable of revising most, if not all, of his 'desires in the light 
of an understanding of reality' (180). To Lippmann, Man therefore ought to make it one of 
his prime goals to develop successfully from infantile to mature Man. He ought to yearn to 
reach full maturity, where, in Freudian terms, the reality principle replaces the pleasure 
principle and where reason (ego) provides a healthy balance between personal desires (id) 
and societal demands (super-ego). This psycho-analytic developmental perspective of 
Man, which, as will be shown below, underlies much of his international-political theory, 
derives from Lippmann's reading of Freud and Sandor Ferenczi, one of Freud's closest 
disciples (176-179). A large proportion of the psychological concepts Lippmann uses in 
his works, including those on international relations, relate back to Freud's theory of the 
unconscious as it is laid out in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud's groundwork 
which Lippmann studied carefully and whose impact he compared with Darwin's Origin of 
Species {SX&Q\, 1980:46). 
From these Freudian assumptions about human nature Lippmann deduces the origins 
of nationalism and how these sentiments arise in political communities, how and in what 
disguises they are being acted out in the international sphere. Nationalism, Lippmann 
(2008[1915]) argues, is rooted in the instinctual configuration of Man and represents one 
of their most basic outlets. From an etymological viewpoint, nationality derives from 
natio, from birth. Without being apologetic, though, Lippmann emphasises that one's own 
nationality means much more to Man than the sober-minded legal-technical 
acknowledgement of being physically bom in this or that country would suggest. 
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Nationality reaches beyond the mere holding of a certain citizenship and passport. Instead, 
to the mass of Men, Lippmann argues, nationality signifies and represents the first 
loyalties, profound impressions, and earliest associations of Men. Nationality and national 
sentiments are, as Lippmann writes, 
a cluster of primitive feelings, absorbed into a man and rooted 
within him long before conscious education begins. The house, 
the street, the meadow and hill upon which he first opened his 
eyes the reactions to family and strangers which remain as types 
of his loves and hates, the earliest sounds which brought fear and 
pleasure— t^hese are the stuff out of which nationality is made. 
(60) 
That Men hold such irrational feelings towards their nation, that they indulge in such 
national sentiments, that nationality is such a powerful force within them, is but a mirror 
image of Men's instinctual struggles within them and vis-a-vis fellow Men. It is such 
grounding of these national sentiments that makes them such a powerful force in the 
relations among political communities, whether they be tribes, states, nations, or empires. 
'This union with the sources of one's birth is', Lippmann argues, 'the most powerful factor 
in all politics' (70). For Men's nationality and sensibility or emotionality towards their 
own political community comes more or less directly from the 'deepest sources' and is the 
'essence of our being which defines us against the background of the world' (66-67). 
Lippmann uses the early instinct theory of Freud and the concept of identification. 
When Lippmann argues that nationalistic or patriotic sentiments represent nothing but 
Men's primordial 'desire to have, to hold, to increase, to fortify whatever can be identified 
with our earliest hates and loves' (70), he seems to suggest that nationalism and patriotism 
are merely the outlets that help gratifying the sexual-instinct which allow Men to satisfy 
their infantile desires. Part of these infantile desires is omnipotence, and by means of 
identifying with others, particularly with large groups and their leaders (that are usually 
perceived as immensely powerful), the mass of Men are capable of realising their desires. 
For Man 'feels instinctively that his own importance is associated with the importance of 
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his group' (69); or more succinctly: 'if the nationality to which we belong is honored, we 
feel honored' (68). In their most intense and extreme forms, such feelings of nationality 
are even capable of transforming a 'group of people into one super-person' where 'the 
group lives' and where individual Man is 'lost in its greater glory' (69). Indulging in 
nationalist and patriotic sentiments towards Man's own and vis-d-vis other political 
communities provides, however, not only the necessary instinctual satisfaction as required 
by Man's sexual-instinct, but also that of the ego-instinct, which longs essentially for self-
preservation. The sensations and symbolisms of nationalism and patriotism are not only 
capable of providing Man with some of the enjoyments of his early infancy, namely, 
feelings of omnipotence, but also with one very profound and primordial desire: security. 
As Lippmann writes in Freudian vein: 'we love the security where we were bom' (61). 
Nationalist and patriotic sentiments do provide such feelings of security and help satisfy 
Man's survival instinct. 
It is such a conception of human nature against which Lippmann's realism ought to 
be understood. Lippmann, for the very same reasons as Morgenthau and Kennan, warns of 
nationalism as one of the most powerful forces in the relations among nations. We are 
being confronted with group psychological forces that have, ultimately, their roots in the 
nature of Man, stemming from an antagonistic instinctual makeup that leaves Man torn 
apart between his instinctual demands and the requirements of civilisation. Nationalism 
represents one of the most primitive, widespread, and popular (in the truest sense of the 
word) outlets in international relations in the eternal struggle of the instincts. 
The discussion of international trade by Lippmann confirms this. It further 
demonstrates how parts of Lippmann's international-political theory have been shaped by 
Freudian assumptions about human nature. Lippmann (2008[1915]) argues—a point still 
worth remembering to-day—that it is almost ftitile to try to neatly disentangle economic 
interests from patriotic or nationalistic sentiments. Contra the homo oeconomicus 
hypothesis, Man is not a one-dimensional actor driven by purely self-interested and 
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economic motives, but is rather a multi-contoured human being whose wants and needs are 
merely transformed (sublimated) infantile desires. As Lippmann argues in Freudian 
fashion, 'the doll house turns into a suburban villa, the dolls are the babies, the leader of 
the gang becomes president of the chamber of commerce' (73). 
Business and trade, both nationally and internationally, must therefore, according to 
Lippmann, be seen in a different light. Both economic activities are intimately connected 
with the deepest (irrational) desires of Man. Consequently, international business and trade 
issues are intrinsically intertwined with matters of national prestige, i.e. mass sentiments 
that have their roots in the instinctual structures of Men. International trade and 
(inter)national prestige motives reinforce each other, and the 'export of bicycles or steel 
rails is no longer the cold-blooded thing it looks like in statistical reports of commerce' 
(76). Surely, trade, does serve economic and material interests, but it serves instinctual 
interests, too. It is the latter element that is the cause of so much of the problems on the 
international sphere. For the inherent emotionalisation of international commerce means 
that 'when trade is attacked, we are attacked' and matters of international trade are, 
therefore, often turning into some sort of 'sporting event with loaded weapons' (76-77). 
Allegedly purely materialistic international commerce and also, of course, some forms of 
economic patriotisms can quite easily transform into an aggressive nationalism, 
particularly in times of crises where we can usually witness 'a swift retreat into our 
[instinctual] origins' (61). 
Lippmann's warning seems as trivial as profound and, in any case, timeless. 
National sentiments cause distrust and hate vis-a-vis 'them' beyond the borders. 'Them' 
are portrayed and seen as potential enemies of 'us', of one's own national identity. 
National autarchy is, therefore, often the prime value; and the nature and roots of 
nationalism accentuate aggressive foreign-policies. 
This then leads eventually to conflicts, crises, and, potentially, wars. When it comes 
to these, Lippmann warns, in a passage similar to Freud's argument in 'Thoughts for the 
49 
Chapter 2 
Times on War and Death' (1915b), that Man's loyalty to his nation is so deep, strong, and 
powerful that it seems to 'survive the breakage of everything else' (2008[1915]:62). When 
his nation is under pressure or attack, Man feels emotionally and physically insecure, his 
life endangered, and he reacts to this existential threat by virtually 'disintegrat[ing] into an 
animal' (62). Yet even if there are no existential physical threats, international relations are 
plagued by instability and conflicts. For since international trade issues are intrinsically 
intertwined with patriotic and nationalistic sentiments, Lippmann argues that 'specific 
disputes over specific trade opportunities become the testing points of national pride' (81). 
By all means should contemporary international-political theorists and foreign-
policy makers, therefore, constantly be reminded of Lippmann's timeless warning that just 
as we are often (irrationally) prepared to fight emotionally and financially costly lawsuits 
for rather trivial sums of money, international relations remains the realm where we are 
constantly being faced with actors that 'will risk war to score a diplomatic victory' (81). 
That political communities broadly follow such behavioural patterns; and that, like in 
Morgenthau's and Kennan's case, almost the entirety of Lippmann's classical realism has 
its roots in profound assumptions about human nature, which show, moreover, striking 
similarities to Freud's theory of human nature, serves as a fruitful and timeless reminder 
and warning in a post-classical realist era, where international actors are seen as black-
boxes or billiard balls. 
Carr on human nature and Freud 
The international-political theory of E.H. Carr is an interesting case when it comes to the 
question of potentially Freudian-style assumptions about human nature. For it is the widely 
held view among those interested in Carr's fascinating and peculiar realism that he is a 
thinker without an underlying conception of human nature at all, be it Freudian or of any 
other provenance (exceptions are Smith 1986; Chong 2007). 
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But this is even intuitively hard to believe, given one of the fundamental truisms of 
political thought: namely, that, to use again Martin Wight's (1991:25) words, 'All political 
theory presupposes some kind of theory about human nature, some basic anthropological 
theory' (also Forbes & Smith 1981; Pennock & Chapman 1977). Surely, Carr (like other 
classical realists) knows all too well that the study of international relations requires its 
own concepts and methodologies. He makes clear in his inaugural lecture that he does not 
'conceive it to be any part of the function of the Wilson Professor to...practise psycho-
analysis' although he does not doubt that Freud had 'profoundly influenced modem 
thought' or 'deny that...psychological maladjustments...are contributory causes of war' 
(1936:846-847). Yet this does not necessarily imply that Carr's realism is not based on 
assumptions about human nature. 
First and foremost, the international-political theory of Carr is based upon a 
particular conception of Man. Already in the early pages of his The Twenty Years' Crisis, 
1919-]939 (2001 [1939]), a classic text on international relations, Carr makes clear that one 
of the reasons why Utopians have failed is precisely because they have made 'unverified 
assumptions about human behaviour' (7). This does, of course, not say specifically what 
his assumptions are, but his disagreement with Utopian thinkers tells us that Carr certainly 
does have a view about the nature of Man. In this regard, it does not seem too speculative 
to suggest that Carr sought, and worked with, a theory of human nature that corresponds to 
one of his central intemational-politico-theoretical tenets, i.e. the balancing of Utopia and 
reality. Carr's Man may also bear some traces of Freud's psychology. For although Carr's 
biography says relatively little about any thorough links to Freud, we do know that the 
young Carr 'had read Freud' and that 'this had had a dramatic effect on his awareness of 
the subconscious world' (Haslam 2000:46). This preoccupation has obviously led Carr to 
acknowledge and defend some of Freud's achievements. 
True, Carr mentions Freud only once in The Twenty Year's Crisis—quotes from 
Freud's Moses and Monotheism (1939) (see Carr, 2001[1939]:85)—but he has always 
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overtly acknowledged Freud's significance for Western thought. This is not an 
insignificant fact, for the history of thought (be it economic, social, political, etc.) has 
known many candidates who were intrigued by Freud but did not dare to admit this 
publicly (e.g. John Maynard Keynes). Thus, although Carr has been warning his 
contemporaries not to take everything that Freud wrote as 'gospel' (2000[1980]:xxi), he 
recognises Freud's achievements in meaningful comparisons: Like Marx, Freud, the 'great 
thinker', has 'added a fresh dimension to reason' (1961:133); and like Darwin, Carr writes, 
Freud 'helped to mould the climate of political opinion' (1951:72). Carr does not doubt 
that Freud had dramatically changed 'the way in which we look at the world' 
(2000[1980]:xxi). In his classic Trevelyan lectures, Carr (1961) singles out two of Freud's 
major impacts. The first concerns theorists' and scientists' need for greater reflexivity. 
Freud has encouraged us, Carr says, to question ourselves, our historical backgrounds, our 
choosing of topics, and our selection and interpretation of facts; Freud reconfirmed that the 
scientist 'has no excuse to think of himself as a detached individual standing outside 
society and outside history' (135). The second achievement of Freud, a somewhat negative 
or disillusioning achievement, concerns the nature and role of motives. Freud's theory of 
human nature, Carr sees correctly, 'has driven the last nail into the coffin of the ancient 
illusion that the motives from which men allege or believe themselves to have acted are in 
fact adequate to explain their actions' (134). 
Yet as if that is not enough recognition for a truly great thinker, Carr goes on to 
publicly jump to Freud's defense against two misleading charges, which are unfortunately 
still widespread today. First, Carr raises the problem of the biological Freud, for Freud's 
theory of human nature has become under increasingly harsh attacks by Marxists, who 
have deplored Freud's (allegedly) purely individualistic and ahistorical viewpoint and who 
have denounced him as a mere liberal-bourgeois reactionary. Here, Carr disagrees by 
rightfully declaring that most of these Marxist charges brought against Freudian Man are 
'valid only in part against Freud himself (133). Regarding a related theme, Carr is even 
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firmer in his defense of Freud. The argument that Freud had enlarged the notion of the 
irrational in human affairs, Carr makes unequivocally clear, is 'totally false'. For such 
criticism 'rests on a crude confusion between recognition of the irrational element in 
human behaviour and a cult of the irrational' (133). 
Rather than blaming Freud, Carr rightly interprets the cult of the irrational as a deep-
seated, ultra-conservative pessimism—which, however, 'does not stem from Freud' (134). 
Freud is not the high-priest of the irrational but a rationalist scientist, who opened up the 
irrational to rational enquiry and who helped us to increase our reflective ability to 
understand and control ourselves and our environment. This, Carr argues, represents not a 
conservative but a 'revolutionary and progressive achievement' (134). Against this broadly 
Freud-friendly background of Carr, it seems well possible that Freud has provided at least 
some sort of small impetus for Carr's intellectual outlook. Indeed, Carr (1951) sounds like 
Freud when he writes: 
To unmask the irrational by stripping from it its hypocritical fig-
leaf of false reason is a salutary and necessary task. But this does 
not entail a panic flight from reason into the anti-rationalism of 
Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky or into the irrationalism of 
Nietzsche; on the contrary, it is an essential part of the movement 
towards understanding and overcoming the irrational. Reason is 
an imperfect instrument: it is good to recognize and study its 
imperfections. (106) 
This brings the discussion now back to Carr's assumptions about human nature as they 
appear in his international-political theory. 
We do get a further impression of how important assumptions about human nature 
are for Carr's realism by going back to The Twenty Years' Crisis. There, again in the early 
pages, Carr (2001 [1939]) introduces the antithesis of Utopia and reality, whose overcoming 
constitutes one of the main pillars of his classical realism, by elaborating on several 
dichotomies: theory/practice, intellectual/bureaucrat, left/right, ethics/politics. But Can-
begins the discussion of the utopia/reality problem of international relations with yet 
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another and perhaps most daring theme of humankind, namely, that of free will versus 
determinism, a timeless problem which dates back to recorded human history and which is, 
after all, one of human nature. Utopians, Carr says, are Kantian voluntarists who believe 
that Men can change the course of history by acts of free will. They are capable of 
conquering nature, which includes conquering human nature. Realists, on the other hand, 
are said to believe in natural laws. They have approached both human history and Man in 
terms of rather strict causalities. 
Carr finds both of these ideal-typical Weltanschauungen wanting, for the 
'characteristic vice of the Utopian is naivety; of the realist, sterility' (12). International-
political theorists must, therefore, Carr suggests, avoid both naivety and sterility. This, 
however, requires the careful balancing of Utopia and reality, which, in turn, requires us to 
find a middle-ground between the pure free will optimism and the pure determinist 
pessimism. It is only such a balancing act that will lead, Carr argues, to 'healthy thought' 
and 'healthy human action' (11). Here, Carr's yearning for the middle-ground suggests 
two things. First, that Carr's realism requires a conception of human nature that is neither 
purely voluntarist nor purely determinist. Secondly, Carr's language, i.e. that he speaks 
explicitly of 'healthy' thought and 'healthy' action, perhaps reveals some psycho-
analytical substructures to his thinking, for his statement seems to imply that failed 
balancing acts would lead consequentially to pathological thoughts and pathological 
human actions. Such reasoning, in turn, is certainly broadly compatible or consistent with 
Freud's argument or the underlying rationale of psycho-analytic psychology, namely, that 
a continual imbalance between instinctual satisfaction (which determinism requires) and 
instinctual renunciation (which voluntarism can provide) causes Men to suffer fierce 
psychological pathologies. Indeed, Carr's assumptions about human nature do seem to 
appear as being at least somewhat reminiscent of Freudian Man. 
Carr conceptualises human nature in the same way as he conceptualises his 
international-political theory. Or, the other way round, which seems more logical as 
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(international-) political theory usually follows a certain conception of Man: he broadly 
conceptualises his realism according to his assumptions about human nature, namely, as a 
predominantly antagonistic affair. On one hand, Carr's Man is egoistical and has a will to 
assert himself among his fellow Men. Yet, on the other (more benign) side, Carr's Man 
displays signs of sociability, including a desire to co-operate with others. Such a 
conception of human nature transcends time and place. In 'every society', Carr argues, 
'these two qualities can be seen at work' (2001[1939]:95) which make the human 
condition a complex and challenging one. For the state, or any other group or political 
community, is essentially 'built up out of these two conflicting aspects of human nature' 
(96) . 
Failing to recognise such Janus-faced psychic makeup of Man is likely to lead, as 
Carr reminds his readers, to disastrous results. Utopians, who want to wish away the 
egoistical side of Man and who prefer to hide behind an admirable but ultimately 
unrealistic belief in Man's earnest moral capacities, will achieve nothing. But crude 
realists, who have often been ridiculing Man's altruistic side to the (almost shameful) 
breaking point and who view all political action in the light of universal egoisms and 
power considerations, are 'just as wide of the mark' (97) . It is one of the basic premises of 
Carr's international-political theory to warn Utopians and realists alike that they must not 
fall prey to too simple conceptions of human nature. Carr argues that although politics— 
either on the domestic or international plane—is inherently bound up with power 
considerations, the 'homo politicus who pursues nothing but power is as unreal a myth as 
the homo oeconomicus who pursues nothing but gain' (97) . Thus, like Morgenthau, 
Kennan and Lippmann—and Freud, too—CJUT rejects crude one-dimensionality, be it on 
positive or negative terms, when it comes to Man and, instead, emphasises the multifaceted 
nature of Man. 
Human nature is essentially characterised by a deep-seated Freudian-style 
antagonism. We always must reckon with the egoistical instincts of Man, but we must also 
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not overlook that Man cannot dispense with fellow Men or any affiliation to any group. 
For Man is, as Carr argues, only capable of thriving in a social context (95). The affiliation 
with groups or political communities such as states ensures that Man's more anti-social 
instincts are being tamed. Group norms regulate the relations among their members. These 
relations are, therefore, mostly peaceful and follow a more or less commonly shared 
morality. Relations among groups, including international relations, are, however, 
significantly different in nature. States remain largely hostile vis-a-vis each other and 
display only very few signs of a shared morality. Carr explains this paradox of peaceful 
societal relations but hostile inter-societal relations in a way which is similar to Freudian 
group psychology and which seems, afiter discussing Morgenthau, Kennan, and Lippmann, 
only all too familiar. 
Man ascribes a different set of moral principles to the state than he does to himself 
and his societal fellows. Yet he does not only not demand the state's adherence to the same 
moral principles, Carr argues, but he 'expects' from the state 'certain kinds of behaviour 
which he would definitely regard as immoral in the individual' (159). This essentially 
derives from Man's ever-present yearning for self-assertion, which leaves him only two 
options. The first is to become so powerful that he is capable of leading the group 
according to his own ends. This is, however, unrealistic. Man is, therefore, only left with 
the option of accepting his particular place in the order of things. But even if he does that, 
he can still be powerful, for he can still find 'compensation for his own lack of power to 
assert himself in the vicarious self-assertion of the group' (159). This psychological 
mechanism is reminiscent of Freud. Carr's Man is capable of overcoming his frustrations 
by means of projection and identification. As Carr argues: 'If we cannot win ourselves, we 
want our side to win. Loyalty to the group comes to be regarded as a cardinal virtue of the 
individual'(159). 
In this light, then, it seems unquestionable that Carr's realism is based upon some 
profound assumptions about human nature. Further, Carr's assumptions about human 
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nature show striking similarities to that of Morgenthau, Kennan, and Lippmann—but also 
to that of Freud. 
Niebuhr's struggle with Freud 
The same applies to Reinhold Niebuhr's assumptions about human nature. Niebuhr's Man, 
too, shows some similarities to Freudian Man. It should be pointed out, however, that this 
section does not argue that Niebuhrian Man is based upon Freud. For Niebuhrian Man is, 
after all, quite clearly some sort of Augustinian-style Christian realist Man (Niebuhr 1941, 
1943; Elie 2007; McKeogh 2007) that corresponds to Niebuhr's Christian realist 
(international-) political theory (Niebuhr 1953; Morgenthau 1962a; Thompson 1975; Lovin 
2008). 
I merely suggest that there are similarities between Niebuhrian Man and Freudian 
Man. This is not a trivial point. For it helps clarifying and elucidating the intellectual 
substructure of classical realism in a potentially interesting and fruitful way: namely, to 
conceive of the assumptions about human nature of several leading 20"'-century classical 
realists in broadly Freudian terms. It was insightfully argued by Michael J. Smith 
(1986:130) that some of the most important classical realists, including Morgenthau, 
Kennan, Lippmann, and Carr, merely adopted Niebuhr's Christian realist assumptions 
about human nature but secularised them to make them fit for their forms of realism. I will, 
however, now show that Niebuhr's assumption about human nature are in some ways 
similar to Freud's. This further supports my argument that Morgenthau, Kennan, 
Lippmann, and Carr did not so much secularise Niebuhr but rather used Freudian human 
nature. Revisiting Niebuhr's intellectual struggle with Freud is a significant endeavour. It 
gains fijrther legitimacy in light of Paul Tillich's (1967:50) remark 'that it is 
[im]possible...to elaborate a Christian doctrine of man...without using the immense 
material brought forth by depth psychology'. 
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Niebuhr had great interest in Freud. He comments on him on a number of occasions 
(Niebuhr 1941, 1956, 1957, 2001 [1932]). Freud was both his ally and enemy. On one 
hand, Niebuhr is convinced of the medical side of psycho-analysis: 
The position of Sigmund Freud as one of the great scientific 
innovators of our era is now generally acknowledged. The 
therapeutic efficacy of his disciplines and discoveries has been 
amply proved. By laying bare the intricate mechanism of the 
self s inner debate with itself, and its labyrinthian depths below 
the level of consciousness, he enlarged or indeed created new 
methods of healing "mental" diseases. (1957:255) 
On the other hand, though, Niebuhr finds Freud's theory of human nature wanting. In 
Nature and Destiny of Man, Niebuhr (1941) argues, in light of his biblical-hebraic 
perspective, that Freudian human nature is too simple, too biological, too Nietzschean. 
Dividing the history of human nature ideas into classical. Biblical, and modem 
perspectives, Niebuhr places Freud in the modem camp. But Niebuhr interprets Freud not 
as a modem rationalist but sees him as a Nietzschean-Rousseauian romanticist. 
Romanticists, Niebuhr argues, have traditionally emphasised Man's affinity to nature, and 
they have made a crucial mistake. For they 'ascribe to the realm of the biological and the 
organic what is clearly a compound of nature and spirit, of biological impulse and rational 
and spiritual freedom' (42). As Niebuhr continues: ' In this interpretation of human 
vitalities in purely biological terms, Freudian psychology is in perfect accord with 
romanticism' (44). Moreover, Niebuhr condemns Freud as an ultra-pessimist. In reference 
to Freud's Civilization and its Discontents (surely no optimistic thesis on Man and the 
human condition), Niebuhr faults Freud for following a form of Nietzschean nihilism on 
the basis that Freud would neither deny disciplinary necessities of political communities or 
civilisation nor find a cure for Man's neurotic aberrations that originate in these 
necessities. Alongside liberalism, Marxism, and fascism, Niebuhr criticises 'Freudianism' 
as essentially not being capable of presenting satisfactory answers and solutions vis-a-vis 
the problems it has discovered and as being unable to 'understand the paradox of human 
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creativity and destructiveness' (55). As Niebuhr has it, Freudianism is one of modernity's 
blind alleys—it is a 'cul-de-sac of pessimism' that 'despairs not of a particular civilization 
or culture but of civilization itself (55-56). 
Thus, Niebuhr recognises Freudian psycho-analysis's medical-therapeutic 
achievements and results but also shows an incredulity towards Freud's theory of human 
nature and human condition. Against such background, Niebuhr argues that in matters 
social and (international-) political, the Christian doctrine of original sin proves to be a far 
better starting-point than Freud. In his essay on Freud, 'Human Creativity and Self-
Concern in Freud's Thought' (1957), Niebuhr writes that Freud does deserve much credit: 
First, because he has provided us with 'the first scientific realist account of human 
behaviour'; secondly, because he has broken radically with the Renaissance and 
Enlightenment optimism that had discredited the Christian doctrine of original sin as being 
too pessimistic, dogmatic, and mythical; and, thirdly, because he has 'shattered' the 
'simple mind-body dualism' of much of Western thought as well as the Kantian notion of 
an 'intelligible and sensible self (256). 
Yet, ultimately, Niebuhr argues, Freud fails. For even though one must acknowledge 
Freud's 'therapeutic efficacy', Freud suffers from 'political irrelevance' (261). The 
problem rests, according to Niebuhr, with Freud's structural theory of the psyche, which 
he thinks to be seriously flawed. For it does not distinguish clearly and sharply enough 
between the ego and the id. Niebuhr rejects the Freudian self as some sort of 'id-ego', 
because it represents an 'ego, which is bedevilled, not by organised and coherent ambitions 
in conflict with other interests and ambitions, but with the anarchy of passions within and 
below the level of selfhood' (264). Thus, to Niebuhr, the Freudian ego is too close to 
nature, to the instincts, to infantile desires; and while the ego relates too much to the 
pleasure principle of the id, the super-ego relates too much to societal demands and 
necessities. Consequently, Niebuhr considers Freud's conception of Man's ego as too 
weak, i.e. as a psychic entity to which Freud has ascribed too little agency in that it is 
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being straitjacketed between society (super-ego) and nature (id). It is such form of 
Freudian naturalism, or, more specifically, the misconstruction of a too bounded ego by 
Freud, that makes Freud's psychology, according to Niebuhr (in stark contrast to the 
Biblical Man and the doctrine of original sin), a rather useless theory of Man for social and 
(international-) political theory (264-265). 
Niebuhr's reading is a harsh reading of Freud—and a potentially awkward one, too. 
It seems rather odd that Niebuhr writes that Freud's theory of Man is essentially unfit for 
social and (international-) political theory and that he therefore discarded it. The history of 
social and (international-) political theory surely does show that quite many social and 
(international-) political theorists—an enumeration would certainly include the Frankfurt 
School theorists as well as consequential thinkers such as Talcott Parsons, Harold D. 
Lasswell, and Hans Kelsen—stood under direct and positive influence of Freud's theory of 
human nature. Further, Niebuhr's critique of Freudian Man seems also unjustified in the 
light of the later Niebuhr's appreciation of neo-Freudian psycho-analytic psychology or 
neo-Freudian Man (Irwin 1975; Halliwell 2005). Niebuhr reviews some of the neo-
Freudians already in Nature and Destiny of Man (1941:45n.l) and does so again later in 
his Freud essay. There, Niebuhr (1957) argues that part of the innovation of the neo-
Freudians, such as Harry Stack Sullivan, Karen Homey, and Erich Fromm, vis-a-vis 
Freud's original description of Man had been that they 'have sought to correct what was 
regarded as a too purely "biological" approach of Freud' by means of opening up Man's 
self to historical and cultural influences (266). The price to pay was, according to Niebuhr, 
however, high. It cost the neo-Freudians to eliminate 'the virtue of the Freud concept of 
the universality of the self-seeking or pleasure seeking inclination of the self (267). 
But Niebuhr seems to have misread the neo-Freudians—including Freud himself. 
Among the various neo-Freudian thinkers, Niebuhr was particularly interested in Erik 
Erikson. Eriksonian ego-psychology, Niebuhr argues, corrects the crude and unhistorical 
biologism of Freud in that it ascribes to the ego a much greater autonomy from both nature 
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(id) and society (super-ego) than Freud. This greater autonomy of the Eriksonian ego or 
such form of human agency helps to make the self more historical and, therefore, relevant 
for social and (international-) political theory. On this point, however, Niebuhr may have 
misunderstood the neo-Freudians, perhaps the result of what John Irwin (1975) calls 
Niebuhr's 'personalized' and 'politicalized' reading of Freud. 
Niebuhr is certainly correct that Erikson's ego-psychology does put lots of emphasis 
on the question of autonomy of the ego (as do other neo-Freudians, too, as well as Adomo 
and Marcuse). The problem with Niebuhr's interpretation is, however, that he seems to 
suggest a dividing line between the biological Freudians and the cultural neo-Freudians 
which just does not exist in such strictness and which is, therefore, unwarranted. For 
neither is Freud as biological (and, therefore, allegedly unhistorical and socially and 
(international-) politically irrelevant) as Niebuhr argues, nor are the neo-Freudians as 
cultural (and self-transcendent and historical and, therefore, allegedly relevant) as he 
obviously wishes them to be. Niebuhr fails to recognise that Freud was, so to speak, the 
very first neo-Freudian. Likewise, he fails to see that the neo-Freudians do not merely 
substitute culture for nature but that they rather seek to integrate both. Coming back 
specifically to Erikson, even an Eriksonian ego can not and, more importantly, does not 
entirely negate both nature and the nature of the id (Irwin, 1975 :247-248). 
That Niebuhr may have at least partially misread both Freud and the neo-Freudians 
regarding a very crucial issue, i.e. that of human agency, seems, however, of great 
significance for our understanding of the intellectual substructure of some key figures of 
classical realism. Surely, neither Niebuhr's recognition of the value of Freudian psycho-
analytic therapy nor his positive interest in the neo-Freudians and the Eriksonian ego-
psychology make Niebuhr something like a Freudian or neo-Freudian, respectively. 
Niebuhr remains, after all, a Christian realist who bases his thought largely on the 
Christian doctrine of the original sin. But there are trajectories in his thought about the 
nature of Man and the human condition that seem broadly similar to or compatible with 
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Freudian lines of argument. This can be seen in Niebuhr's recognition of psycho-analysis 
as an effective treatment method. It would be hard to explain how one can believe in 
psycho-analytic psychology without thereby adopting at least a broadly Freudian human 
nature perspective. The similarities with Freud can also be seen in Niebuhr's assumption 
of and agreement with broadly neo-Freudian perspectives. 
Further, we know from his classic venture into (international-) political theory, 
Moral Man and Immoral Society (2001 [1932]), that Niebuhr read Freud, Jung, and Adler 
very early. There, we do find a very interesting passage which condenses in two sentences 
a line of thought to which other classical realists such as Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, 
and Carr also adhere. As Niebuhr argues, 'The man in the street, with his lust for power 
and prestige thwarted by his own limitations and the necessities of social life, projects his 
ego upon his nation and indulges his anarchic lusts vicariously'; this almost invariably 
leads to the tragic result that the 'nation is at one and the same time a check upon, and a 
final vent for, the expression of individual egoism' (93). 
Such analysis by Niebuhr of how Man's wi l l to power and wil l to assertion as well 
as Man's deeply felt sense of impotence wi l l result, ultimately, in more or less problematic 
group-behavioural patterns on the national and, therefore, intemational level might well be 
explained in terms o f Freudian individual and group psychology. Surely, Freud was not the 
only thinker arguing openly that it is mainly repressed egoistical, power- and recognition-
related motives that cause the intemational dilemma. Niebuhr, for instance, has made such 
an argument based on his Christian realist assumptions about human nature; and 
Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, and Carr have also broadly followed such argumentative 
lineage. But Freud was one of the first who explored the roots of the problem in greater 
depth by secular scientific means. The intemational dilemma is largely the result of 
repressed human instincts which cause, by means of the individual and group 
psychological processes of identification and projection, political communities to behave 
vis-a-vis other communities in ways that seem fairly unimaginable in a domestic context. 
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This suggests that it is possible to—broadly yet superficially—substitute Niebuhr for 
Freud (and vice versa). It is not unlikely that several of 20"'-century classical realists have 
not so much used secularised Niebuhrian assumptions about human nature but instead 
(consciously or not) Freudian assumptions about the nature of Man. This does not include 
Niebuhr himself, but it may include the assumptions of Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, 
and Carr, whose Freudian provenance was already demonstrated. 
Conclusion 
Paying special reference to Freudian psychology, I have argued that both friends and foes 
of realism must revisit and look carefully at the assumptions about human nature that 
underlie the international-political theories of five consequential and timely 20'*'-century 
thinkers. Based on my analysis, I draw the conclusion that some of the widespread 
criticisms which have been put forth against the assumptions about human nature of 20""-
century classical realism seem to be misleading, i f not wrong. Defending these classical 
realists is important in its own right, but it becomes almost a duty in the context of 
increasing attacks against their assumptions about human nature and the recent renaissance 
of classical realism. 
To begin with the increasing pressure put upon classical realism's assumptions about 
human nature, we must remember the fact that these classical realists have used a 
conception of Man as a starting-point for their analytical and normative forays into 
international relations has always been controversial. Waltz warned and criticised 
international-political theorists for committing the 'error of psychologism: the analysis of 
individual behavior used uncritically to explain group phenomena' (2001 [ 1959]:28). Soon 
thereafter, Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style realism was almost dead and structural realist 
international-political theories such as Mearsheimer's influential offensive realism (2001) 
were gaining influence in the field. Yet realism's critics have also taken their shots. Critics 
argued that realist assumptions about human nature were wrong, embarrassing, and biased 
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in favour of destructive anthropologies; that they were scientifically untenable; that they 
portrayed Man as anti-social, fearful, self-interested, and power-driven; that realists' 
pessimistic human nature views had sinister effects on theory construction and foreign-
policy making; and, finally, that these assumptions about human nature were causing 
policies of distrust, promoting paranoia, increasing the probability of international 
violence, and stifling chances for peaceful coexistence. This is strong criticism which has 
not only been directed against classical realists but has also helped diminishing the 
standing of each of these realists as well as of classical realism itself. 
Such criticism must, however, be countered. The argument that these classical 
realists' assumptions about human nature are unsophisticated reflections on Man made by 
pessimists seems grossly unjustified. These realists are not indulging in naive-romantic 
perspectives about Man and the human condition; to paraphrase Lippmann again, the 
nature of Man can be a 'shocking affair'. It is also perhaps legitimate to criticise that Carr, 
for instance, has not made his assumptions about human nature more explicit. Save for 
Niebuhr, all of these realists should have said more about their views on Man in 
appropriate places helping to avoid the impression that they are trying to hide some sort of 
illegitimate influx of assumptions about human nature, particularly in light of these 
assumptions' constitutive roles as starting-points for their respective international-political 
theory. But once one engages with these realists' assumptions in greater depth, the high 
degree of knowledge and reflectivity of Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and 
Niebuhr vis-a-vis the nature of Man and underlying individual and group psychological 
processes constitutive of the human condition emerges quite clearly. 
It is worth remembering that these realists do clearly not portray Man as a merely 
physiological-biological animal that is only driven by power motives. A l l five classical 
realists have constantly remind and warn international-political theorists and foreign-
policy makers about human hubris and Man's inclination to assert himself vis-a-vis his 
fellows. But they were knowledgeable and reflective enough not to commit the error of 
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one-dimensionality when it comes to the nature of Man. Upon closer inspection, critics 
must recognise that these realists surely emphasise Man's longing for assertion, prestige, 
and power, but that they equally recognise that such character traits do merely represent a 
few aspects of Man among several others such as that Man is a deeply social creature 
partly driven by instinctual needs to affiliate with others. 
Further, these realists do not portray Man as a fixed, purely biologically-determined 
animal whose nature must lead to fatalistic pessimism. They are aware of the individual-
psychological and social/political tensions that stem from the eternal struggle between 
Man's instincts and his fragile ego, between some form of slight biological determinism 
and ego autonomy. Surely, Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr believe in 
a universal Man that transcends time and place, and they do reject idealistic notions of 
complete malleability towards perfection. They are, after all, political realists. But these 
realists' assumptions about human nature do not imply any form of crude naturalistic 
determinism. A l l five realists, and especially Niebuhr and Carr, have wrestled with this 
issue and made clear that Man's ego does have a certain degree of autonomy from the 
unconscious demands of the instinctual id and the societal super-ego. Man may not be 
entirely perfectible, but these realists recognise some elements of improvability. Neither 
Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Carr nor Niebuhr are biased in favour of purely 
destructive or aggressive aspects of Man. Their assumptions about human nature have not 
led them to become high-priests of fatalism but rather to become high-priests of (political) 
realism. 
This raises a second point of criticism in need of refutation. Save Niebuhr, who 
never attempted to hide his Christian realist background, Morgenthau, Kennan, Carr, and, 
to a lesser extent, Lippmann were not very outspoken in terms of their assumptions about 
the nature of Man. The same applies to the intellectual origin of their assumptions. This 
has led many IR theorists to believe that these realists' assumptions about human nature 
are merely speculations or introspections. This chapter's analysis of their assumptions 
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about human nature, taken together with its special reference to Freudian psychology, 
helps to rescue these realists from the charge of metaphysical speculations. Regardless of 
whether Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, or Carr (Niebuhr is exempted in light of his 
undoubted Augustinian-style Christian view of Man) were directly influenced by Freud's 
Man or whether we can see 'merely' some striking similarities, the analogies between 
these realists' assumptions and Freud's theory of Man make it hard for critics to simply 
dismiss their human nature thoughts as metaphysical ideas. 
True, the scientific credentials of Freud have always been disputed. Well known is 
Popper's verdict that psycho-analysis is some form of pseudoscience (1 963:34-35) o r 
Eysenck's claim that psycho-analysis is a myth (1961; the major critical voice remains 
Grunbaum 1984; 2007). But we must also point towards Popper's misreading of Freud 
(Grant & Harari 2005) or to neuroscientists who now use neuroimaging techniques such as 
functional magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography to explore the 
neural bases of psycho-analytical theories and concepts (Kandel 2005; Kaplan-Solms & 
Solms 2002). This helps us to understand that despite all legitimate criticism, Freud's 
theory of Man cannot be shmgged o f f as a myth or speculation. This raises again the point 
of crudeness. Even Freud's critics concede that Freud not only revolutionised our 
understanding of mental life, ourselves, others, and the world around us, but that he 
provided us with extraordinarily coherent theories about unconscious psychological 
processes, the structure of the psyche, instinct configurations, and the irrationality of 
human motivation. It is noteworthy for those who seem to be too critical of these realists' 
assumptions about human nature that Nobel laureate Eric Kandel (1999) reminded us only 
ten years ago that Freud's 'psychoanalysis still represents the most coherent and 
intellectually satisfying view of the mind' (505). Thus, to denounce these realists' 
assumptions about human nature as unsophisticated and embarrassing seems misleading. 
Yet revisiting the assumptions about human nature of these classical realists has 
been timely and significant in two further related ways. The first concerns the recent 
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renaissance of classical realism. Whenever we turn to these thinkers for help or inspiration 
in our dealings vis-a-vis some contemporary foreign-policy or international relations 
issues, we must never forget the human nature baggage that they are carrying. These five 
classical realists cannot be taken without all their human nature content. Doing otherwise 
would be oversimplifying their thought, which would then result in the meaninglessness of 
their answers to the problems and issues we asked them for. 
Secondly, the realist tradition is a philosophy with many breaks in its intellectual 
trajectory, but there are also some continuities. An essential part of that continuity is that 
classical realists had been committed to a certain conception of human nature as the 
starting-point of their respective international-political theory for over two centuries when 
Waltz appeared on the scene and attempted to drag realism away from human nature 
towards the concept of international structure. The philosophy of science may agree with 
such a turn of events, but classical realists cannot. For post-classical realism ( i f it deserves 
to be called realism) has robbed realism its core intellectual and philosophical content. 
Classical realists, the true or genuine realists, such as Morgenthau, Kerman, Lippmann, 
Carr, and Niebuhr, have known what has been beautifully noted recently by Paul Elie 
(quoted in Isola 2007): realism is not 'merely pragmatism or enlightened self-interest' but 
derives 'from a grand conception of human nature in history that leads to tough 
conclusions about what's possible in polities'. 
Has post-classical realism forgotten about the intimate politico-theoretical 
relationship between political realism and the concept of human nature? 
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T H E H I D D E N H U M A N N A T U R E A S S U M P T I O N S O F P O S T - C L A S S I C A L 
R E A L I S M 
Introduction 
The last chapter was devoted to classical realism, this chapter deals with post-classical 
realism. Its nature, structure, and arguments must be seen against the background of the 
move away from the concern with human nature towards the concern with billiard balls. 
The transformation from a Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style realism to post-classical 
realism was the outcome of an increasing dissatisfaction with the former's reliance on 
what was seen by the post-classical realists as unscientific or crude human nature 
speculations. Post-classicals set out to supersede the older realism with a newer and more 
scientific realism without human nature. 
Yet, is the concept of human nature really as dead as post-classical realists would 
have us believe in light of their socio-structural but anti-human nature rhetoric? What 
happened to the partly Freudian-style human nature baggage of the classicals? This chapter 
deals with some of the most significant post-classicals. The analysis includes the realist 
liberalism of John Herz, the systemic-scientific realism of Morton A. Kaplan, the two main 
structural realist theories, i.e. the defensive variant of Kenneth N . Waltz as well as John J. 
Mearsheimer's offensive realism, and, last but not least, the latest innovation of post-
classical realism, neoclassical realism. Based on my reading, this chapter concludes that 
the post-classical realist endeavour must be seriously reconsidered. It draws three 
conclusions. 
First, these post-classicals have not been able to free their respective international-
political theories from assumptions about human nature. The concept of human nature is 
not as dead as these post-classicals have claimed. To the contrary, assumptions about 
human nature still play a central role in these post-classical realisms. Secondly, despite 
these post-classicals' apparent 'human nature lie', a closer look at their hidden 
assumptions about human nature suggests that these post-classical realists must be 
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defended. They must be rescued from some of the charges committed to destroying these 
post-classicals' assumptions about human nature and their international-political thought. 
Thirdly, although these post-classicals' assumptions about human nature can be defended, 
their assumptions are by no means as reflective and profound as those of the classicals. 
This is one of the factors that helps understand the politico-theoretical cul-de-sac of the 
post-classical realist project. It reinforces the need to begin looking for potentially fruitful 
ways as to how to deal with the concept of human nature in contemporary realism. 
Herz and the psychological origins of the security dilemma 
John H. Herz's realist liberalism can be regarded as one of the spearheads of post-classical 
realism. He is perhaps even its creator. Putting Herz in the post-classical realist camp may 
raise two objections. The first would argue that Herz is known and appreciated as a 
Kelsen-educated German-Jewish emigre who was, against the backdrop of two world wars 
and realist politico-philosophical convictions, part of a wider post-World War I I group of 
realist thinkers, including Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr, that sought 
to warn policy-makers against their idealistic, Utopian, and legalistic mood. The second 
objection would point to Herz's European-style realist liberalism and argue that it has 
received much attention and appreciation recently precisely because it distances itself from 
Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian human nature theorising, but it is also far too distant from 
contemporary American-style realisms a la Waltz or Mearsheimer (Ashley 1981; Stirk 
2005; Hacke & Puglierin 2007; Puglierin 2008). 
These are certainly valid points, which are not questioned. To guard against 
potential misunderstandings, Herz's intellectual project is surely much closer to classical 
realism than to Waltzian post-classical realism. Yet still, Herz's realist liberalism 
represents the perfect entree into the world of post-classical international-political theory. 
For its intellectual, methodological, and politico-theoretical heart— t^he concept of the 
security dilemma—has eventually become the foundational conceptual framework upon 
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which subsequent generations of post-classical realists have constructed their international-
political theories. Both Waltz's defensive structural realism and Mearsheimer's offensive 
structural realism draw explicitly from Herz's concept of the security dilemma (Waltz 
1979:187; Mearsheimer 2001:35-36; see also Jervis 1978; Glaser 1997; Booth & Wheeler 
2008). 
Post-classical international-political theorists have been attracted to, or perhaps have 
been seduced by, the concept of the security dilemma. First, because the security dilemma 
logic seems to allow an opt-out from the Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian human nature 
theorising, which runs not only counter to the strictures of much of contemporary 
philosophy of the social sciences but also fits i l l with the Anglo-American liberal 
intellectual heritage (Shimko 1992). Secondly, because the Herzian logic seems to allow 
an opt-out from all sorts of speculations about human nature—why bother about the nature 
and behaviour of Man when we can see a virtuously simple sociological logic at work? As 
Herz explains in Political Realism and Political Idealism: Whenever any actors (be they 
Men, groups, or states) are being faced with structurally anarchical conditions, they will be 
quick in realising that they must provide for their own security against external attacks, for 
there is, to use Mearsheimer's (2001) succinct analogy, 'no higher authority to come to 
their rescue when they dial 911' (33). Being aware of their profoundly insecure situation, 
actors seek to acquire the necessary capabilities. Yet even i f power is merely sought for 
largely defensive purposes, i.e. to find and assure security against external attacks, any 
increases in power pose a threat to the security of other actors, for anarchy dictates that 
actors seek relative shares of capabilities. This leads then, however, to the vicious circle of 
security and power competition among the actors; and, in the international realm, we may 
therefore be able to refer to this situation as some sort of Hobbesian international state of 
nature or international homo homini lupus situation (Herz 1951:3). 
This surely is a wonderfiil socio-structural explanation of some basic patterns of 
world politics which claims that it is not the animus dominandi, a human drive, that 
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inclines actors to seek ever more power, but it is the anarchical structure that forces actors 
to acquire power after power. But it is, nevertheless, a half-tmth. For the conceptualisation 
of intemational politics in terms of the security dilemma, too, presumes, as this section 
argues, certain assumptions about human nature, i.e. assumptions that show, moreover, 
some striking similarities to Freud's theory of human nature. In other words: Regardless of 
Herz's (1951) insinuation that 'the condition that concerns us here is not an 
anthropological or biological, but a social one' (3); and regardless of the number of post-
classical realists who have built their post-classical realist projects upon such Herzian 
foundations, the concept of the security dilemma is infused with assumptions about human 
nature. In fact, it seems somewhat remarkable that this has been overlooked or neglected 
by post-classical realist followers of Herz. For a cursory look into Herz's Political Realism 
and Political Idealism would suggest that the concept of the security dilemma is hardly 
conceivable without the concept of human nature: rather illuminatingly, the first chapter 
bears the title 'Psychological Bases'. 
My argument is that these psychological bases are reminiscent of Freudian 
psychology and social philosophy. Before dwelling on these psychological origins of the 
security dilemma, however, 1 wish to come back briefly to the Morgenthau/Herz dividing 
line of contemporary realism. For such a distinction that mns along the axes human 
nature/stmcture or psychology/sociology, respectively, is rather superficial, i f not entirely 
misleading. Just as Morgenthau, who posited that Man is driven both by selfishness and an 
animus dominandi, has recognised that the universal struggle for power and peace among 
nations roots ultimately in anthropological traits but receives its actual form and force by 
historical circumstances, so must Herz (and his post-classical followers) likewise recognise 
that intemational politics cannot be explained by allegedly purely sociological concepts 
such as the security dilemma but must presuppose assumptions about human nature such 
as fear and the urge for survival (Osgood & Tucker 1967:256n.l 1). Amold Wolfers has 
argued along similar lines (1962[1951]) and shown where the genuine disagreement really 
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lies: both make assumptions about human nature, but the Herzians do make 'statesmen and 
people look less vicious than the animus dominandi theory', for what Herz's security 
dilemma theory does is merely to 'substitute tragedy for evil and to replace the "mad 
Caesar"...with the "hysterical Caesar" who, haunted by fear, pursues the will-o'-the-whisp 
of absolute security' (84). 
The argument that that the distinction between Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style 
classical realism and Herzian-style post-classical realism pertains to diverging underlying 
assumptions about human nature rather than to diverging underlying philosophical bases of 
their respective international-political theories opens up fruitful lines of enquiries. This is 
true not only vis-a-vis Herz himself, but in fact vis-a-vis all those who have followed his 
intellectual lead emphasising the concept of the security dilemma. Hence, what is the 
nature of post-classical realism's assumptions about human nature? And what are their 
intellectual origins? Does its nature and origin differ from that of the classicals? 
The literature tells us that Herz's Man derives largely from Hobbes (Wolfers 
1962[1951]:84n.5; Koskenniemi 2001:467). An alternative intellectual lineage is said to be 
Edmund Burke (Herz I959:234n4; Stirk 2005:306nl34). I present, however, a different 
reading and suggest that Herzian Man may perhaps be fruitfully conceived vis-a-vis a 
broadly Freudian psychological understanding. This seems not wide of the mark. Richard 
Ashley (1981) has pointed out, albeit cautiously and without greater elaboration, that 
Herz's Man appears as being 'somewhat reminiscent of an "idealized" Freud' (226). In 
addition, we know that Herz was a student and protegee of Hans Kelsen, who had 
intellectual and personal ties to Freud. More importantly, however, we know from Herz's 
own admissions in his autobiography, Vom Uberleben [Of Survival] (1984:89), that he 
stood under the broader influence of the group psychologies of both Gustave LeBon 
(1896) and also Freud (1921), though Herz may owe slightly more to LeBon than to Freud. 
These are fruitful starting points, but what does Herz say about Man? 
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Man, as Herz sees it in Political Realism and Political Idealism (1951), is a through-
and-through ambivalent being that has a dualistic instinctual-psychological make-up. On 
the one hand, Man is driven by an instinct of self-preservation which inclines him to yearn 
for power. The possession of power is the only means available to ensure a degree of 
security against potential violent death inflicted by fellow Men. It causes the vicious and 
dynamic cycle of intense security and power competition among Men (4). But, on the other 
hand, there is also a more benign side. Man is a thoroughly compassionate being who 
possesses a 'basic feeling of pity...provoked by the observance of the suffering of another 
human being' (6). Such a dualistic-style instinctual structure is obviously wide-spread 
among realists given that classical realists have conceptualised human nature and its 
externalised effects along broadly similar lines, namely conflict versus cooperation versus 
conflict and so forth. Like that of the classical realists, the way Herz conceives of Man and 
his existence seems broadly compatible with Freud's early instinct theory, which posits an 
ego-instinct (survival) and sexual-instinct (Eros). The former pushes Man into conflict, the 
latter demands cooperation. Man is caught in the middle. I f Herzian Man was a purely self-
interested survival seeker, a pure homo homini lupus situation would immediately arise. 
Yet such condition wi l l not materialise. For Man is equally driven by pity and 
compassion. This more benign side does, however, by no means imply the reign of 
psychological peace and tranquillity. The instinctual antagonism and ambivalence cannot 
be wished away and transcends time and place. Instead, Man suffers. Herzian Man is 
perhaps a constant sufferer. The ever-present 'necessity for acting counter to what one's 
basic feeling bids one do must thus lead to an awareness of discrepancy and a feeling of 
uneasiness'—and rather illuminatingly, particularly in the context of a potentially Freudian 
backdrop of Herzian assumptions about human nature, Herz has referred to these feelings 
of uneasiness, which stem from the struggle between the antagonistic instincts, 'bad 
conscience' and 'guilt ' (7). Herz does not depict Man as being a purely rational security 
seeker. To the confrary, Herz recognises as a matter of fact that Man 'is not usually bom or 
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reared as a coolly calculating being' (6). Rather than being a homo oeconomicus, Herz's 
Man is a predominantly instinctual and emotion-driven Man, i.e. a sufferer who suffers 
from his distinctive instinctual-psychological structuring. As Herz, congenial to Freud, 
argues: the 'individual human soul is itself usually the theatre of divergent and often 
antagonistic trends and traits which fight each other, frequently without result, until death 
intervenes to settle the issue or leave it forever unsettled' (8). 
This intra-psychic struggle, however, does not remain confined to Man's psyche. Its 
effects are rather being externalised. Herz argues that it is a basic fact of existence that 
Man 'is bom into a world of fundamental antagonism' (7). The human condition is one of 
intense struggles. These struggles derive, ultimately, from the nature of Man. It is, in fact, 
the dualistic and largely antagonistic instinctual-psychological structure of Man that causes 
not only fierce intra-psychic tensions but also affects the relations among Men and vis-a-
vis their outer social environment (7-8). Herz reminds us insightfully of the social dynamic 
of Man's instinctual-psychological configuration. Specifically, Herz considers it a brutal 
yet nonetheless basic and profound fact of the human condition that Man is 'at the same 
time foe and friend to his fellow man, and that social co-operation and social struggle seem 
to go hand in hand, and to be equally necessary' (3). It is the background of such a 
conception of Man (which seems, moreover, not all too distant from classical realist 
assumptions about human nature) against which Herz warns us that we must not mistake 
group solidarity or 'common social action of men' for some sort of genuine human 
sociality. For these social facts, he argues, do 'merely reflect the transfer of the survival 
struggle to the higher level' (11-12). 
This transfer from Man to the higher level follows a psychological logic which 
seems all too familiar by now. Herz explains it by arguing that it is the natural inclination 
of Man to identify or associate himself with the concerns and interests of ever larger and 
larger social entities, beginning from the familial nucleus over certain social groups to, 
ultimately, nations. Similarly to the classical realists (save Niebuhr), Herz's argument 
74 
Chapter 3 
seems to borrow here from one of the Freudian defense mechanisms—identification. He 
argues that Man, an essentially impotent, anxious, guilt-driven creature, finds his share of 
security in a profoundly insecure environment by means of identifying with either more 
powerful Men or more powerful social entities such as nations. Likewise, and again akin to 
classical realists, Herz recognises the overarching social force of entities such as nations, 
which may otherwise be characterised by atomistic social structures, in times of crises. As 
Herz argues: 
Competition for security and power goes on all the time among 
the individuals and groups that comprise a nation; but a man may 
identify his own interests with that of the nation to which he 
belongs i f it is a question of defending his country as an entirety 
against threats deriving from competing nations, or i f it is a 
question of increasing its power and influence against other 
nations. (12) 
I f Herz's instinctual-psychological assumptions about Man are taken together with how he 
sees them being played out in the various social spheres, including the anarchical 
environment of the relations between nations, it seems misleading, i f not mistaken, to 
conceive of Herz's concept of the security dilemma purely in sociological terms or from 
the viewpoint of a sociological top-down perspective. 
Instead, a picture of Herz's post-classical realism emerges, which is by no means 
purely structural-sociological. It is rather as laden with assumptions about human nature as 
are Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style classical realist international-political theories. The 
concept of the security dilemma, whether vis-a-vis intra-group relations or inter-group 
relations, does not derive from anarchical structures but from a set of assumptions about 
human nature. It cannot be otherwise. How else would Herz (or any other post-classical 
realist) be capable of explaining why such an anarchical international environment has 
arisen in the first place and why anarchy is such a powerful and profound element in 
human history? Anarchy can reinforce anarchy, but anarchy cannot cause anarchy—only 
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Man can cause anarchy. The roots of the security dilemma must, therefore, ultimately be 
found in human nature. 
In this light, a picture of Herzian Man emerges that shares not only some similarities 
with that of the classical realists, but also with Freudian Man. Compared with the 
classicals, Herz is certainly not as outspoken about the nature of Man, but the concept of 
human nature is certainly as significant for his international-political theory as for the 
Morgenthauians/Niebuhrians. In this regard, I wi l l briefly come back to Herz's usage of 
the Freudian notion of guilt. Herz argued that the eternal conflict between the survival 
instinct and the urge for compassion results necessarily in strong feelings of profound 
guilt. He also remarked briefly that he does not overtly concern himself with the 
psychological mechanisms which lead to Man's feelings of guilt. But, most interestingly, 
Herz writes in Political Realism and Political Idealism that he is concerned with Man's 
'types of reactions' to the complexities of guilt (8ff) . With this, Herz has, in fact, elevated 
human psychology or the concept of human nature to the very centre of international-
political theory. He seems to suggest that the various different international-political 
theories that have been put forth in the history of political thought do merely represent or 
mirror various different intellectual efforts to essentially cope with one of the most 
universal and profound of all human sentiments: the guilt that haunts Man. 
Herz is, however, not the sole post-classical whose international-political theory is 
based upon fundamental assumptions about human nature. 
The anthropomorphised international system of Kaplan 
Putting Herz in the post-classical realist camp required some brief explanation. This does 
not apply to Morton A. Kaplan, a prolific writer in the philosophy and science of 
international politics and a pro-active intellectual heavyweight in IR's traditionalist versus 
science debate (Kaplan 1966, 2005[1969]). Kaplan's System and Process in International 
Politics (1957b) has been correctly considered one of the five major theoretical advances 
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in the history of realism (Tellis 1996:4). Kaplan's hyper-scientific post-classical realism 
has, however, failed to live up to its promise. It is infused with assumptions about human 
nature, i.e. Freudian-style assumptions about human nature. 
This argument must be seen against the background that Kaplan has been part of a 
wider American intellectual movement which is, to a very large extent, responsible why 
Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style realism was largely wiped o f f IR's intellectual map. The 
increasing aversion of these post-classicals to human nature-based international-political 
theorising a la Morgenthau and Niebuhr is intimately connected with the behavioural 
revolution that swept through American political science departments in the 1950s and 
60s. Triggered by a profound dissatisfaction with the then-prevailing modes of enquiry, 
research techniques, and research methods, this revoh was a confrontation between two 
different methodological approaches: traditionalism or classical approach versus scientism. 
This intellectual quarrel was initially spearheaded by English-school theorist Hedley Bull 
(see Bull 1966) and post-classical realist Kaplan, respectively. 
Kaplan was a major driving force in the move towards a more scientific and rigorous 
methodological approach in the study of world politics which helped the apparent 
exclusion of the concept of human nature. Contra the classicals, Kaplan argued that 
international-political theorists must pay considerable attention to the philosophy of 
sciences; ought to adopt theories and conceptual frameworks from physics and the social 
sciences; sh ould apply mathematical and statistical analyses; ne ed to focus on proper 
methods of data collection; and must ask what the nature of a theory actually is (Kaplan 
1966, 2005[1969]; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1990:542-543; Vasquez 1998:40). Against this 
philosophy of science background, Kaplan sought to construct a realism that he thought 
would be methodologically far superior to what realism had to offer at a time when 
Morgenthau's Politics among Nations had still been the definitive work for students of 
international relations. In this regard, Kaplan's System and Process in International 
Politics was a 'pathbreaking work'—first, because it provided the theoretical foundation 
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upon which Waltz could later build his systemic-structural realism (Tellis 1996:51, 66) 
and, secondly, because Kaplan attempted to design a realism which, as Robert Keohane 
(1986a) pointed out, did not rely any longer 'on the nature of human beings to account for 
discord and cooperation in world politics, but focused instead on the competitive, anarchic 
nature of world politics as a whole' (13). The latter of these two virtues should, however, 
be taken with a pinch of salt. 
Despite all systemic-scientific rhetoric, Kaplan's post-classical realism has not 
abandoned the age-old practice of making assumptions about human nature in 
international-political theory. In the wake of the groundbreaking works of Viennese 
biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968) and also British psychiatrist W. Ross Ashby 
(1956), Kaplan brought general-systems theory to the study of world politics and 
transformed the then-prevalent methodological-investigative strategies. While classical 
realists approached international politics analytically, Kaplan adopts the method of the 
general-systems theorists and conceives relations among nations synthetically, i.e. to 'go 
beyond the parts and understand how complex systems are organised and how they operate 
as a whole' (Tellis 1996:53). In this light, the basic approach of System and Process in 
International Politics is, according to Kaplan (1966), 'fairly simple'. For, contra 
Morgenthau, who discerns general patterns and principles of international politics, 
Kaplan's theory is concerned with explaining variations: 
I f the number, type, and behavior of nations differ over time, and 
i f their military capabilities, their economic assets, and their 
information also vary over time, then there is some likely 
interconnection between these elements such that different 
structural and behavioral systems can be discerned to operate in 
different periods of history. (8) 
Instead of focusing on the nature, attributes, and behaviour of units—Man or states— 
Kaplan reverses the logic. He first models certain international-political systems, and in a 
second step he then utilises these models in order 'to deduce what the characteristic 
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behavior of the parts must be i f the system itself was to be maintained in a certain 
operating state' (Tellis 1996: 55). Kaplan provides us with a theoretical framework which 
formulates hypotheses that are 'intended to express the types of actions which must 
characterize the system i f it is to remain in equilibrium rather than to predict that any 
individual action wi l l be of such a character' (Kaplan 1957:2). 
Yet this has not prevented Kaplan from consciously or unconsciously smuggling in 
assumptions about human nature, i.e. Freudian-style assumptions about human nature. We 
can see these hidden assumptions quite clearly when we turn to Kaplan's equally hidden 
motivational assumptions about states. In System and Process in International Politics, 
Kaplan examines no less than six actual or potential international-political systems: 
balance-of-power system, loose-bipolar system, tight-bipolar system, universal system, 
hierarchical system, and unit-veto system. The first two of these systems are somewhat 
idealised portrayals of Western 18'''/19*-century and post-World War I I international 
politics, respectively. The latter four international-political systems are purely hypothetical 
(1957:21-53). Kaplan focuses on the balance-of-power system and posits six 'essential 
rules', which are said to 'describe the characteristic behavior of the actors' (23) and keep 
the system in equilibrium. These six rules are: 
1) Act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight. 2) 
Fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase capabilities. 
3) Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor. 
4) Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to 
assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the 
system. 5) Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational 
organizing principles. 6) Permit defeated or constrained essential 
national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners 
or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the 
essential actor classification. Treat all essential actors as 
acceptable role partners (1957:23). 
These six rules as they are formulated by Ka plan h ave, however, come under heavy 
criticism. No other than fellow post-classical realist Waltz has presented us with an 
79 
Chapter 3 
insightful yet devastating critique of Kaplan's international-political theory. Waltz's 
critique wil l help unveil some of Kaplan's hidden assumptions about human nature. 
The essential flaw, according to Waltz, rests with Kaplan's assumption of these six 
essential rules. Waltz points out a theoretical problem which he lays bare by means of 
reformulating them. As Waltz argues, the six rules are, actually, merely three: 
A. Act as cheaply as possible to increase capabilities (Kaplan's 1 
and 2). 
B. Protect yourself against others acting according to rule A 
(Kaplan's 4 and 5). 
C. Act to maintain the number of units essential to the system 
(Kaplan's 3 and 6). (Waltz 1979:52) 
Based on this reformulation. Waltz (1979) virtually demonstrates how Kaplan smuggles in 
state motivational assumptions which pre-determine the outcome of the interactions among 
states. Waltz faults Kaplan for turning a 'dependent variable into an independent one' (52) 
and for still working within the confines of Morgenthauian-style analytical reasoning even 
though his 'vocabulary, borrowed from general-systems theory, has obscured this' (63). 
Waltz faults Kaplan for smuggling in essentially three motivational assumptions: First (A), 
that states are power-maximisers. Secondly (B), that states are security-maximisers. And, 
thirdly (C), that states are compassionate in the sense that they do not drive other states 
into death (52). 
Yet, regardless of whether we agree with the nature and origins of these three state 
motivational assumptions or whether we find them tenable, these assumptions ultimately 
represent a reflection and implicit endorsement of a particular conception of Man. In fact. 
Waltz's revelation that Kaplan obviously conceptualises states not only as power-
maximisers but also considers states as relentlessly yearning for the maximum of security 
and as being essentially compassionate creatures, provides us with one of the keys to 
understanding the hidden assumptions about human nature in Kaplan's allegedly post-
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classical-style international-political theory. For the use of anthropomorphisms, i.e. the 
attribution of human motivations, characteristics, or behaviour to inanimate objects such as 
the state implies ' to treat as known what the properties of the human are' (Johnson 
1998:551). A picture-perfect example of anthropomorphisms has been provided recently 
by Robert Kagan (2008:80): 'Nations are not calculating machines. They have the 
attributes of the humans who create and live in them, the intangible and immeasurable 
human qualities of love, hate, ambition, fear, honor, shame...' (on the use of 
anthropomorphisms in IR, see Escude 1997:23-46; Jackson 2004; Lomas 2005; Wendt 
2005). 
This implies then, however, that Kaplan obviously presumes Man to be not only 
driven by both power and also security concerns, but that he also conceives of Man as 
being essentially compassionate. This demonstrates the great significance of the concept of 
human nature for Kaplan's international-political theory. For were his beliefs about the 
nature of Man significantly different from those assumptions about human nature as these 
obviously are, Kaplan would presume a set of 'essential rules' that looked significantly 
different and he would, therefore, not be capable of explaining state behaviour in a 
balance-of-power system. In short: without his underlying assumptions about human 
nature, his systemic-scientific theory would collapse. 
Besides Kaplan's conceptualisation of the six essential rules and state motivational 
assumptions, we can, however, identify another element in his purportedly human nature-
free realism that illusfrates the high degree to which his realism is infused with 
assumptions about human nature, namely, Kaplan's concept of the international system. 
This wil l also reveal that these assumptions are of Freudian provenance. Somewhat in the 
wake of Waltz's criticism, Ashley Tellis (1996) raised yet another problematic issue vis-a-
vis Kaplan's realism. It relates to a very profound question: Why is it that states which 
comprise the balance-of-power system would feel committed to play by the six essential 
rules that are said to maintain the system's equilibrium? Kaplan resolves this tricky 
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problem with a somewhat animistic trick, namely by 'reifying the universe 
anthropomorphically, that is, treating what is essentially a hypothetical construct for 
purposes of explanation as a true natural entity, a system "invested with purpose, instincts 
and something akin to reason'" (62). Certainly, Kaplan leaves us in no doubts about his 
theory's holistic—and, again, essenfially anthropomorphological—aspect: 
The needs of a system are set by the structure of the system. The 
objectives of a system are set by its needs in its environment as it 
understands that environment. The objectives of a system are 
values for the system. The objectives which, in fact, would satisfy 
the needs of the system are valuable for the system. (Kaplan 
1957:149) 
Kaplan conceptualises the concept of the international system as an essentially quasi-
human entity. He truly anthropomorphises the international system. Analysing Kaplan's 
conception of this quasi-human entity wi l l help us to understand the nature and intellectual 
origins of Kaplan's Man. 
The extent to which Kaplan anthropomorphises the concept of the international 
system and its sub-systems (states) is remarkable, as is the extent to which he 
anthropomorphises the international system along Freudian lines. Kaplan argues that all 
systems, whether personality systems, social systems, or political systems, are constantly 
being confronted with changing conditions within ever changing environments. This 
applies to the international-political system, too. Facing these imponderables, the 
international system employs various regulatory processes by which it 'attempts to 
maintain or to preserve its identity over time' (89). In a highly interesting spin to his 
systemic-scientific international-political theory, Kaplan claims that all these different 
systems are being regulated by essentially identical mechanisms or regulatory processes. 
This not enough, Kaplan also makes explicitly clear that these mechanisms, which are also 
used by the international system, are 'analogs of those used by the individual personality 
system' (97); that 'various psychological mechanisms are isomorphic with mechanisms 
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manifested in the behavior of social organizations' (253); and, last but not least, that any 
'system is motivated as truly as an individual human being' (254). Kaplan really could not 
have been more explicit and revealing about the centrality of the concept of human nature 
within his theory. 
Yet, as i f Kaplan's anthropomorphisation of the concept of the international system 
was not remarkable enough—one must not forget that he constructed his broadly anti-
traditional and pro-scientist international-political theory partly in reaction to 
Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style realism—we cannot but be astonished that Kaplan's 
'mechanisms of regulations' are, in fact, various defense mechanisms taken from Freud's 
psychology. Just as Freud argued that Man's ego employs various defense mechanisms 
when being unable to find instinctual satisfaction, Kaplan argues that the international 
system when being unable to satisfy its needs due to environmental constraints makes use 
of a variety of coping strategies. These include not only the Freudian defense mechanisms 
of sublimation and displacement, but also repression, projection, introjection, 
identification, and isolation (253-270). 
Picking two illustrative examples of how these defense mechanism are being played 
out in the international system, Kaplan argues that the 'Japanese assimilation of American 
political institutions after the close of the war illustrates introjective behavior' in that 
'some goals or values of another system are adopted to ward o f f some threat to the first 
system' (264). Secondly, Kaplan points out that the substitution of the production of 
consumer goods for both capital and/or military goods constitutes a form of displacement 
in that the original 'activity is blocked and the regulatory capacity previously assigned to it 
is [even i f only temporarily] diverted to some other activity' (258-259). Since the theory of 
defense mechanism presupposes, or is an outgrowth of, the psycho-analytic theory of the 
mind, Kaplan's usage of Freudian defense mechanisms implies that he broadly works 
within the framework of Freud's structural theory of the mind, where the ego employs 
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various defense mechanisms in order to soften the effects of the perennial struggle between 
the instinctual id and the societal super-ego. 
We can, however, not only see that Kaplan's systemic-scientific realism relies quite 
heavily on profound assumptions about human nature and that these assumptions are 
Freudian in nature by means of deconstructing his state motivational assumptions (power, 
security, compassion) and his conception of the international system (humanised, defense 
mechanisms) but also by referring to Kaplan's use of psycho-analytic terminology 
throughout System and Process of International Politics. Further, Kaplan's Freudian-style 
beliefs about the nature of Man are also recognisable when turning to his brief but explicit, 
powerful, and revealing remarks about Man. Worth quoting at length, Kaplan argues that 
Man is 
torn between two sets of sometimes conflicting needs which he 
must in some way reconcile...The very stuff of tragedy occurs 
when vital needs of the particular individual are in irreconcilable 
conflict with the needs of society...If a particular man represses 
his most psychological or biological needs, his regulatory 
mechanisms wi l l become pathological. I f he neglects basic social 
needs, he destroys his identity as an actor in society. (279-280) 
Here, Kaplan recognises two basic facts regarding the existence of Man. First, that Man is 
caught in the middle of severe instinctual-psychological struggles between biological 
drives on the one hand and social necessities and requirements on the other. And, 
secondly, Man's ego must become powerful and as autonomous from unconscious 
demands as possible so that it can successfully navigate him carefully through this 
essential battle of the drives which are an ever-present factor in the human condition. 
Man's ego must devise and use various coping strategies which are capable of gratifying 
rather evenly both the id and the super-ego, for otherwise Man wi l l likely suffer from 
neurotic disorders. This is, indeed, Freudian. 
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Kaplan's post-classical realist intellectual project has failed when it comes to the 
question of the concept of human nature. He set out to move beyond 
Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style classical realist international-political theories and to end 
these theories' reliance on (allegedly) unreliable and unscientific notions of human nature. 
But just like the classical realists, as well as Herz, Kaplan presents us with a realist 
international-political theory that is infused with Freudian-style assumptions about human 
nature. This adds weight to Waltz's remark that Kaplan's theory was broadly 
Morgenthauian cloaked in general-systems theory language. 
Yet, has Waltz succeeded in moving beyond human nature-based international-
political theorising where Herz and Kaplan failed? 
Waltz's structural realism and its conception of human nature 
Kenneth N . Waltz's defensive structural realism is perhaps the most interesting case when 
it comes to the question whether the concept of human nature is dead in post-classical 
realism. In analogy to Morgenthau, Waltz has been, as Randall Schweller (1998) rightly 
noted, the 'father of structural realism' (2). With the ascent of Waltz, i.e. his now classic 
works Man, the State, and War (2001 [1959]) and Theory of International Politics (1979), 
the human nature-based theorising of the classicals has received its harshest critic. Waltz 
and his heirs argue that the nature of how the international system is structured determines 
the general patterns of state behaviour. The concept of structure has replaced the concept 
of Man. This section argues, however, that Waltz's structural realism is still infused with, 
and based upon a, certain set of assumptions about human nature. It reveals some actual 
and potential points of contacts between Waltz and Freud, albeit without claiming that the 
assumptions about human nature of Waltz are, in fact, necessarily consciously derived 
from Freud. 
My argument must be seen against the background of post-classical realism's raison 
d'etre to move realism beyond its traditional politico-philosophical roots: human nature. 
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First to the rhetoric of Waltz—and then to the reality. Waltz has argued forcefiilly 
throughout the decades that international politics cannot be sufficiently explained by 
making references to the nature of Man (or the nature of states). Rather, international 
outcomes must be deduced from the nature of the international-political system. In Man, 
the State, and War (2001 [1959]), a pathbreaking work which introduced the levels-of-
analysis problem in IR and provided an analytical framework for IR theories (for 
alternative frameworks, see Smith 1995), Waltz presents us with the 'three images'. Waltz 
lumps together first-image theorists who hypothesise the causes of war in the individual or 
Man, such as Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Spinoza, and St. Augustine (16-41); second-image 
theorists who ascribe explanatory power to attributes of states, i.e. liberals and Marxists 
(80-158); and, last but not least, third-image theorists, such as Rousseau and Thucydides, 
who argue that neither the nature of Man nor attributes of the state, but rather the 
constraining and permissive effects of the international-political system cause the 
historical occurrences of war (159-186). Waltz's conclusion is unambiguous. The first 
image fails, for it amounts to nothing more than 'the simple statement that man's nature is 
such that sometimes he fights and sometimes he does not' (29). The second image is 
equally flawed, for political history has proven that both 'good' and 'bad' states have been 
fighting wars (122). Instead, Waltz argues for the third image and introduces the division 
of labour between theories of foreign policy and theories of international politics. As he 
argues: 'The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first 
and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy' (238). 
It is against such human nature sceptical background that Waltz's Theory of 
International Politics (1979) constructs a quasi-economic, parsimonious, systemic-
structural, and, above all, human nature-free post-classical realist theory of international 
politics. Reiterating the fallacies and weak points of both first and second image 
explanations, which he now lumps together as mere 'reductionist theories'. Waltz argues 
that 'we are led to suspect that reductionist explanations of international politics are 
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insufficient and that analytic approaches must give way to systemic ones' (37, 18-37). 
What may be interpreted as Waltz's problem with, or disdain for, the concept of human 
nature in international-political theory, it seems noteworthy that, in contrast to his earlier 
Man, the State, and War, Waltz does not even mention first image theories. Waltz then 
goes on to tear apart the systemic international-political theories of Richard Rosecrance 
(1963), Stanley Hoffmann (1959; 1965), and, in particular, Morton A. Kaplan (1957b) who 
he charges with being, ultimately, blatantly reductionist, too. To gain theoretical advance 
and progress. Waltz (1979) argues that a true and genuine systems approach to 
international politics can only be successful ' i f structural effects are clearly defined and 
displayed' (58, 38-59). 
This does not require international-political theorists to engage in acts of 
speculations about the nature of Man. It rather requires that the concept of the structure of 
the international-political system be neatly defined and clearly conceptualised. Waltz 
argues that the structures of political systems, whether national or international, are to be 
defined along three dimensions or layers. First, the ordering principle. Structural questions 
are. Waltz writes, 'questions about the arrangement of the parts of the system' (88). While 
units are hierarchically arranged in domestic-political systems, the ordering principle in 
international-political systems is markedly different, namely: anarchic. 'Formally, each is 
the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey' (88, 88-
93). Waltz treats the ordering principle as a quasi-constant variable. The second dimension 
of the international-political system's structure, i.e. the character of the units, derives from 
the ordering principle. While hierarchic ordering principles imply the functional 
differentiation o f the system's units, the units of the international-political system cannot 
be differentiated according to their functions. The ordering principle of anarchy 'entails 
relations of coordination among system's units, and that implies their sameness'; Waltz 
argues that as 'long as anarchy endures, states remain like units' (93). States differ 
politically, economically, culturally, but they all face the same task in an anarchical 
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international setting: to provide for their own security. Therefore, international structures 
vary, argues Waltz, only 'through a change of organizing principle or, failing that, through 
variations in the capabilities of units' (93, 93-97). This, then, leaves only the distribution 
of capabilities among the international-political system's units as the (one) independent 
variable. The following picture of Waltz's human nature-freed structural realism emerges. 
The international-political system is anarchically ordered. States are like-units 
because they must perform similar functions, i.e. defending themselves against external 
threats. States are distinguished solely 'by their greater or lesser capabilities for 
performing similar tasks', and since history has shown the effects of distinctions of 
capabilities between great powers and small states, Waltz (1979) discriminates 'between 
international-political systems only according to the number of their great powers' (97). 
Capabilities are thought of in terms of power; and what seems like a unit-level, 
reductionist variable is, in fact, a structural variable. Waltz is not interested in the 
capabilities of the units in isolation but with the distribution of capabilities or power within 
the whole of the international-political system. The third layer that defines an 
international-political structure is a 'system-wide concept', and following the analogy with 
economic theory, which greatly influenced Waltz's international-political theory (1979; 
1986:339; 1990:21-24; 1998:384), Waltz (1979) declares: 'Market structure is defined by 
counting firms; international-political structure, by counting states' (98-99). Where 
economic theory predicts economic outcomes based on market structures (monopolistic, 
oligopolistic, polypolistic, as Weberian ideal-types). Waltz's post-classical realism 
predicts international outcomes based on the structures of international-political systems: 
unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. Waltz's theory is elegant, parsimonious, non-reductionist, 
and systemic-structural. The concept of human nature is replaced by the concept of the 
international structure. 
So much for the rhetoric. A renewed analysis suggests that Waltz's structural 
realism is infused quite heavily with assumptions about human nature. We get a first and 
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thorough impression by looking at Waltz's assumptions about the motives of states. Jack 
Donnelly (2000) has convincingly shown that, contrary to Waltz's own admissions of 
abstracting from any state motives (such as a state animus dominandi), his structural 
neorealism is, in fact, being built upon a very fundamental state-motivational 
assumption—namely: survival. As Waltz writes: ' I built structural theory on the 
assumption that survival is the goal of states' (1997:913); states are 'unitary actors with a 
single motive—^the wish to survive' (1996:54); ' I assume that states seek to ensure their 
survival' (1979:91). Clearly, Waltz does not explicitly ascribe the survival motive to the 
nature of Man. 
But all forms of anthropomorphological language provide the reader of Waltz's 
structural realism with an insight into the assumptions about human nature that are in-built 
in his international-political theory. Waltzian Man seems to be a survival-seeker. This is 
substantially not a very controversial proposition. From the viewpoint of a certain degree 
of sensitivity towards anthropomorphisms, however, it is remarkable when Waltz (1979) 
argues that states are 'unitary actors who, at a minimum seek their own preservation and, 
at a maximum, drive for universal domination' (118). Or, furthermore, when he (1993) 
writes about the need for recognition and pride: 
Yet when a country receives less attention and respect and gets its 
way less often that it feels it should, international inhibitions 
about be-coming a great power are likely to turn into public 
criticisms of the government for not taking its proper place in the 
world. Pride knows no nationality (66). 
Waltz is not only apparently contradicting himself twice. In a first instance. Waltz does 
make unit-level assumptions (survival motive); and, secondly. Waltz does make more than 
one unit-level assumption (survival, plus domination, pride), which provoked Jack 
Donnelly (2000) to speak of neorealism's 'structural dodge' (51). But Waltz appears to put 
forth a view of human nature which seems fairly reminiscent of Morgenthau's conception 
of human nature. 
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On the one hand, Waltzian Man wants to preserve his life. This derives from the 
survival motive. On the other hand, however, Waltzian Man also seems to be driven by 
more acquisitive motives, namely, by drives for universal domination as well as for 
recognition and pride. This, in turn, represents the universal trait which Morgenthau calls 
the animus dominandi or the drive to self-assertion. Thus, like most of the classical 
realists, but Morgenthau in particular. Waltz does not only allow for some rather 
substantial assumptions about human nature, which exert a constitutive influence on his 
analytical and normative international-political theory, but Waltz seems, moreover, to 
conceive of Man as being driven by two primary impulses: the drive to self-preservation 
and the drive to self-assertion. Waltz's structural realism bears the traces of a dualistic 
drive structure which seems to square fairly well within the assumptions about human 
nature of earlier realists. This seems remarkable for two reasons. First, because Waltz has 
gone to great length in Man, the State, and War and Theory of International Politics to 
disconnect international-political theory from the tutelage of human nature. Secondly, 
because Waltz (2001 [1959]) denounces Morgenthau's assumption of an universal animus 
dominandi as being a mere normative assertion which 'one may accept or reject according 
to his inclination' (37). 
Waltz is no optimist when it comes to human nature. But it seems questionable that 
Waltz is, as Piki Ish-Shalom (2006:454-460) argues, a thorough human nature 
conservative. Further, it seems misleading to argue that Waltz follows in Augustinian 
footsteps, as Freyberg-Inan (2004:10,73) does by referring to Waltz's (2001 [1959]) words 
that 'our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. The root of all evil is man, 
and thus he is himself the root of the specific evil, war' (3). Here, Waltz merely 
summarises the position of first-image pessimists and it can, therefore, not be inferred that 
Waltz is an Augustinian on the human nature question. 
It seems too far-fetched to conceive Waltz as an Augustinian or to place him firmly 
in the genuinely conservative camp, partially because Waltz simply seems to be too 
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unreflective on the human nature issue. But we can discern some points of contact with 
what he termed first-image pessimists. Waltz (1986) reveals frankly that behind his distrust 
of hegemonic power and preference for balanced power lies Niebuhr's 'dim view of 
human nature' (341). Waltz is, however, fairly revealing—albeit more implicitly—about 
his human nature leanings in his treatment of first-image theorists in Man, the State, and 
War. There, Waltz (2001 [1959]) shows that he is deeply aware of 'man's passion and 
irrationality' (36). C antra first-image optimists, he acknowledges that first-image 
pessimists 'have expertly dismantled the air castles of the optimists' (39). Waltz credits the 
first-image pessimists for providing 'a valuable warning, all too frequently ignored in 
modem history, against expecting too much from the application of reason to social and 
political problems' (40). This does, of course, not automatically turn Waltz into an 
Augustinian or ultra-conservative. But it certainly helps make the point that Waltz has not 
successfully finished the project of disconnecting the concern with human nature from the 
study of international politics. It helps ftirther understand that it is not too wide of the mark 
to suggest that Waltz's assumptions about the nature of Man—however unreflective these 
may appear to be—do broadly and nicely f i t with the assumptions of those classical and 
post-classical realists discussed thus far. Waltzian Man wants to preserve his life and seeks 
to assert himself vis-a-vis his fellows, mainly by means of striving for domination, 
recognition, and pride. 
This raises the question whether there are any implicit or explicit intellectual links 
between Waltz's allegedly human nature-purified post-classical realism and Freud's theory 
of human nature. According to my reading, it seems far-fetched to speak of such an 
intellectual influence comparable with the intellectual relationships between Freud and the 
classical and post-classical realists presented thus far. But, nevertheless, we can see some 
points of contact between Waltz and Freud. The argument that Freud's theory of human 
nature plays at least some role in Waltz's international-political theory may seem, prima 
facie, peculiar. For Waltz quotes and refers to Freud only rarely. He does not even mention 
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Freud in Theory of International Politics (1979). Waltz refers to him only once in Foreign 
Policy and Democratic Politics (1967:309), and quotes Freud only in three footnotes and 
in one epigraph in Man, the State, and War (2001 [1959]:69, 71,187). 
Yet, quantity of quotations and references is not a reliable indicator of a potential 
intellectual influence, however large or small such influence or resemblances may be. This 
requires, therefore, an analytical account of Waltz's comments on Freud. It reveals that 
Waltz seems to turn to Freud for argumentative assistance regarding three timeless 
international-political themes. 
The first issue concerns the widely-held belief that authoritarian governments do 
enjoy a strategic and profound advantage over its democratic counterparts when it comes 
to the political task of formulating and executing foreign-policies. In Foreign Policy and 
Democratic Politics (1967), this belief is rejected as mere myth. Though Waltz rejects this 
widespread hypothesis on many grounds, one of his main arguments against it seems 
particularly interesting. For it is purely psychological. Waltz (1967) argues that it is a 
popular myth that authoritarian governments and their rulers or leaders are capable of, or 
perhaps better equipped, to ensure the unity of (foreign) policy, because 'the ruler is prey 
to the ills of the mind, perhaps the more so as his power approaches the absolute'—this. 
Waltz argues, is a basic fact of the human condition, a psychological fact which is now 
fully known with the 'advent of Freud' (309). 
Waltz makes further use of Freudian insights when it comes to the question of the 
feasibility of how to reduce international conflicts and violence according to the logic of 
first image-optimists. Waltz makes clear that he finds the analytical and prescriptive 
accounts of the causes of war as well as the causes of, and preconditions for, peace of most 
of the first-image psychologists wanting and weak. First image-optimists. Waltz (2001 
[1959]) argues, are 'naive' (43) and 'idle dreamers' (76). Even i f it was possible to 
eradicate, reduce, or divert the more aggressive of the human drives through either some 
effective large-scale and global-wide forms of humanistic education or through altering 
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socio-economic and political injustices around the globe, it would. Waltz argues, 'take 
generations before our efforts would affect the course of international relations' (70). In 
order to strengthen his argument. Waltz quotes from Freud's 'Why War?' where Freud 
(1933b) warned us that the philosophical and practical socio-politico strategy of waiting or 
hoping for Man to go through significant alterations of his psycho-instinctual configuration 
would remind him of the 'ugly picture, of mills which grind so slowly that, before the flour 
is ready, men are dead of hunger' (213; quoted in Waltz (2001 [1959]: 71n65). 
Yet, thirdly, it is on another occasion in Man, the State, and War where Waltz's 
explicit usage of Freud is not only most eminent but also perhaps most striking and 
revealing. Waltz's scepticism of first and second image explanations of international 
politics and normative ideas in this regard is well-known. Equally well-known is one of the 
central tenets of his structural post-classical realism: that we must never fail to recognise 
that as long as the structural condition of international anarchy prevails, states must always 
be prepared to use military force in order to protect themselves and to help prevent the 
occurrence of war (187, 238). In other words: however the nature of Man or the nature of 
states may actually be—if there is anarchy, prepare for conflict. Waltz quotes, once again, 
from Freud's 'Why War?' and uses him as the epigraph of the chapter which does not deal 
with the first image but, rather, with the implications of the third image (see 
2001 [1959]: 187). Freud (1933b) appears with his argument that 'so long as there are 
nations and empires, each prepared callously to exterminate its rival, all alike must be 
equipped for war' (214). 
I have presented these three points of contact between Waltz and Freud for three 
reasons. First, to demonstrate that, like all the other classical and post-classical realists 
discussed here. Waltz, too, has obviously read and used Freud in his international-political 
theory, even though to a significantly lesser degree. Secondly, to show that, even though 
the Waltz-Freud connection is significantly thinner than previous realists' intellectual 
relationships with Freud, Freud seems to be part of Waltz's intellectual assumptions about 
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the nature of Man and its consequences and limitations vis-a-vis the international domain. 
And, thirdly, to set the stage for putting forth a more speculative argument. The argument 
in question, which concludes this section, is that Waltz's whole intellectual project may 
have been the—conscious or unconscious—consequences of an underlying Freudian 
understanding of Man. 
The starting point is a genuine sense of slight puzzlement that Waltz does not give 
pride of place to one of the most important thinkers of Western civilisation in his Man, the 
State, and War, a classic work that discusses and tears apart dozens of first-image 
theorists, mostly philosophers, psychologists, and behaviouralists. One reason for such 
omission may be that Waltz simply forgot about Freud; another that Waltz found Freud 
unworthy of discussion. Both reasons seem unlikely. Waltz has surely read and has surely 
used Freud. This points to an alternative reason. Rather than loathing Freud, Waltz may 
have built his post-classical realism against the background of the ascent of Freud. True, 
Waltz does not discuss Freud in the first-image chapters of Man, the State, and War nor 
anywhere else. This suggests a potential indifference of Waltz towards Freud. But this 
seems questionable. First, because Waltz draws from Freud on other significant occasions. 
Secondly, Waltz possibly knew that Freud simply does not f i t the picture that Waltz 
attempts to paint of the 'naive' and 'dreaming' first-image optimists. Waltz may not have 
been capable of doing otherwise than not discussing Freud, for Freud actually seems to 
have been one of the most valuable intellectual allies in Waltz's endeavour to move 
realism away from the first image to the third image. It seems as though Freud is a 
particularly powerful ally for Waltz in that it is none other than Freud whose assumptions 
about human nature triggered the Waltzian conclusion that the first and second image 
approach may be a dead end for international-political theorists. 
Waltz conceptualises Man as an essentially passionate and irrational creature. Man 
has. Waltz (1990) argues, not only 'many motives' (27), but Man is, moreover, largely 
determined by an essentially dualistic drive structure. Man lives largely by the drive to 
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self-preservation and the drive to self-assertion. Surely, Waltz may have been influenced 
regarding these assumptions by a number of sources. But, based on the aforementioned 
points of contacts between him and Freud, it is not unlikely that one of the sources is 
Freud. Yet, be that as it may for now, for the significance of the assumptions about human 
nature derives from their consequences. It is the 'assumption of a fixed human nature, in 
terms of which all else must be understood'. Waltz (2001 [1959]) argues, that makes it 
imperative 'to shift attention away from human nature' (41 (original emphasis)). It seems 
that it is exactly his assumption about the largely irrational nature of Man that leads Waltz 
(1979:68-69) to realise the following dilemma: 'How can a theory of international politics, 
which has to comprehend behavior that is indeterminate, possibly be constructed?' 
This question is, ultimately, a question of the locus of rationality. The logic of Waltz 
on this point is, in its essence, the logic of Freud's structural theory of psyche. Like Freud, 
Waltz derives the rationality of the actors from the nature of the structures, i.e. from the 
structural conditions that consfrain the behaviour of the actors exposed to such structure. 
Waltz (1979) argues that the structural constraints do affect unit behaviour—whether in 
international politics or ' in societies of all sorts' (74)—^through, essentially, two 
mechanisms: through socialisation and competition. These two 'pervasive' and 
'fiindamental processes' (74) exert a powerful and constraining influence upon the actors 
in that they must 'accommodate their ways to the socially most acceptable and successful 
practices'(77). In light of Waltz's line of argument, we can see that Waltz's notion of 
rationality is not attached to the actor. Actors may act rationally without being rational. 
Waltz's logic does neither imply nor presume some sort of nicely calculating and utility-
maximising homo oeconomicus, but it simply presumes that some actors, however 
irrational they may be, are capable of coping more effectively with the constraints of the 
overarching structure than others (76-77). 
This allows us, then, to re-consider Waltz's socio-structural endeavour. We can 
approach it from a perhaps peculiar perspective: from Freudian psychology. Without 
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claiming that Waltz consciously borrowed from Freud, it seems striking how similar 
Waltz's structural logic and Freud's structural theory of the psyche ar e. The primary 
difference is that it is raised to a different level. Just as Freud argues that the rationality of 
both Man as well as the group does not and cannot be derived from a bundle of irrational 
drives (id). Waltz seems in line with Freud that some significant top-down influences must 
be at work. These influences are powerful or constraining enough to make both Man as 
well as the group rational. Just as Freud argues that those incapable of properly adapting to 
the demands of the super-ego are going to be punished by the system (cultural norms). 
Waltz argues that the international-political system is going to punish those states that do 
not comply with the prevailing international-political principles. The punishment of the 
Freudian system involves feelings of guilt and neuroses. In Waltz's theory, the sanctions 
are war and death. The forms of punishment are different; the general logic of constraining 
influences is the same. 
The result is that, upon closer inspection. Waltz's post-classical realism is infiised 
with assumptions about human nature and that these assumptions of self-preservation, self-
assertion (in the forms of recognition and pride), and irrationality are a central ingredient 
of an allegedly human nature-purified international-political theory. As regards the 
question of a Freudian intellectual influence upon Waltz, this case seems more ambiguous 
than the cases of earlier classical and post-classical realists. We can discern, contextualise, 
and comprehend several points of contacts between Waltz and Freud, but the case for some 
sort of profound intellectual influence comparable to other realists can hardly be made. 
Waltz appears too unreflective on the conception of human nature. 
Offensive structural realism: Mearsheimer and human nature 
John J. Mearsheimer is equally hostile to the concept of human nature in realism. But 
digging a little more deeply, we see that Mearsheimer, too, cannot escape relying on some 
rather profound assumptions about human nature. As was the case with Waltz, these 
96 
Chapter 3 
assumptions seem to be much less reflective than those of the classicals and of Herz and 
Kaplan. 
Mearsheimer's realism (2001) is both Morgenthauian and Waltzian. He argues that 
'great powers seek to maximize their share of world power' with 'hegemony as their final 
goal'(29). At the same time, Mearsheimer's offensive realism is Waltzian in that the locus 
of the power drive of states is the nature or prevailing structure of the international system. 
Mearsheimer argues that 'Structural factors such as anarchy and the distribution of 
power...are what matter most for explaining international polities'; offensive structural 
realism 'pays little attention to individuals or domestic political considerations such as 
ideology' and 'tends to treat states like black boxes or billiard balls' (10-11). On the other 
hand, however, Mearsheimer (2002) argues on one occasion that 'the aim of states is to be 
the biggest and baddest dude on the block. Because i f you're the biggest and baddest dude 
on the block, then it is highly unlikely that any other state wi l l challenge you, simply 
because you're so powerful' (2). This raises the question whether Mearsheimer's words 
are merely the result of some innocent and colloquial language. Or, alternatively, whether 
Mearsheimer's post-classical realism is also infused with some anthropomorphological 
projections and/or direct assumptions about human nature. This section argues that 
Mearsheimer's structural realism does bear traces of assumptions about human nature, 
albeit these assumptions can hardly be traced to any intellectual source. 
Mearsheimer is silent regarding the appropriate place of the concept of human 
nature in international-political theory. Unlike Waltz, Mearsheimer barely scratches the 
surface of this complex issue, perhaps reckoning that Waltz had already said all there was 
to say. In any case, despite his impressive presentation of offensive structural realism, 
Mearsheimer's remarks about the role of the concept of human nature are rather meagre. 
Mearsheimer (2001) acknowledges the variety of contemporary realist international-
political theories and presents us with his ov^ broad typology. He distinguishes between 
his own offensive structural realism. Waltz's defensive structural realism, and—what he. 
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misleadingly, labels—human nature realism (which stands largely synonymously for 
classical realism). This latter version of realism, Mearsheimer argues, has its roots largely 
in Morgenthau. Recognising its influence from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, human 
nature realism is, according to Mearsheimer, 'based on the simple assumptions that states 
are led by human beings who have a "wi l l to power" hardwired into them at birth' (19). 
Mearsheimer is sceptical of the international-political theory of Morgenthau. It is not 
so much the question for how much power states seek; here, he agrees with Morgenthau. 
But it is the question why states do want power that causes so much of the disagreement 
with so-called human nature realists. This disagreement seems to involve the concept of 
human nature. Offensive structural realism 'reject[s] Morgenthau's claim that states are 
naturally endowed with type A personalities' (Mearsheimer 2001:21). It seems striking 
how Mearsheimer can seriously lump together Morgenthauian Man and Type A 
personalities—as i f Morgenthau's assumption of a Freudian-style theory of human nature 
has got anything to do with what psychologists unearthed as heart-disease prone 
individuals displaying behavioral patterns of extreme ambition, competitiveness, 
impatience, anger, and hostility (Friedman & Rosenman 1974). This carelessness may only 
further prove how unreflective post-classicals, including Mearsheimer, have become vis-a-
vis the concept of human nature, especially when it comes to understanding how classical 
realists approached and used different conceptions of human nature. But Mearsheimer's 
sloppiness on that point leads to a very significant question. Based on Mearsheimer's brief 
treatment of Morgenthau's assumptions about human nature (however misunderstood these 
are), we may wonder whether Mearsheimer's move to the structure is the result of a 
profound disagreement with Morgenthauian classical realists over human nature. This 
seems, prima facie, to be the case, but it is, ultimately, wrong. For Mearsheimer's realism 
is built upon assumptions about human nature that f i t in the overall realist picture. 
As with all post-classicals, the tension in Mearsheimer's realism arises from its 
claim to be a structural international-political theory. The independent variable is the 
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disfribution of capabilities across the international system. Mearsheimer (2001) argues that 
the 'structure of the international system, not the particular characteristics of individual 
great powers, causes them to think and act offensively and to seek hegemony' (53). This 
signifies not only the main difference between offensive structural realism and its 
Waltzian-style defensive counterpart, but also the potential pseudo-structuralism of 
Mearsheimer's allegedly human nature-freed international-political theory. Mearsheimer 
agrees with Randall Schweller (1996) that defensive realism suffers from a 'status-quo 
bias'. This is a major r i f t between offensive and defensive realists. It pertains not only to 
the empirical-analytical but also to the normative realm. Jeffrey Taliaferro (2000-01) 
points out quite rightly that, given their analytical differences, offensive and defensive 
realists draw very different theoretical and policy conclusions when it comes to the 
question of the feasibility of mutually beneficial patterns of cooperation among states in an 
anarchic world and 'generate radically different prescriptions for military doctrine, foreign 
economic policy, military intervention, and crisis management' (130). 
Despite these analytical and normative differences, Mearsheimerian and Waltzian 
realism do enjoy a rather intimate tete-a-tete regarding the locus of explaining 
international-political outcomes. Mearsheimer (2007) argues that 'For structural realists, 
human nature [and 'particular characteristics of individual great powers'] has little to do 
with why states want power. Instead, it is the structure or architecture of the international 
system that forces states to pursue power' (72; also Mearsheimer 1994-95:9n20; 2001:10, 
17, 21). This helps understand my allegation that Mearsheimer's realism may be a 
theoretical cul-de-sac. In light of defensive structural realism, it seems rather peculiar as to 
why allegedly like-units would display rather different behavioural patterns when being 
exposed to similar structural anarchical conditions. It seems odd why state A would long 
for a considerable amount of power while state B would seek the largest share of power 
possible when both are subject to essentially the same structural environment. This 
seeming paradox can only be explained by examining the theoretical assumptions inbuilt 
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into Mearsheimer's realism. Since these assumptions must be unit-level assumptions, it 
can be shown that Mearsheimer's international-political theory is, despite different claims, 
infiised with assumptions about human nature. 
The allegedly structural realism of Mearsheimer is based upon profound theoretical 
assumptions. That great powers seek hegemony (rather than the status quo or appropriate 
shares or surpluses of power) derives from, as Mearsheimer (2001) argues, 'five 
assumptions about the international system' (29). In addition, Mearsheimer places a central 
value on these assumptions. 'Sound theories', he argues, 'are based on sound assumptions' 
(30), by which he means that they provide a 'reasonably accurate representation of. . . l ife in 
the international system' (30). These two self-declared facts help provide a first glimpse of 
how significant and foundational these assumptions are. For even though Mearsheimer's 
explicitness about these assumptions is to be valued, Mearsheimer is misleading in so far 
as only one of these assumptions is of a structural nature. 
Mearsheimer's first assumption is that the international-political system is ordered 
anarchically. Mearsheimer (2001) calls this the '911 problem' (32). Anarchy does not 
imply constant chaos, disorder or war but merely the absence of a centralised international 
authority. This assumption does not by itself reveal much about potentially hidden 
assumptions about human nature. But this changes i f we look more closely at how he 
assesses the future of anarchy. In short, Mearsheimer sees a bright ftiture for anarchy. 
Mearsheimer argues that 'both nationalism and the existing states in western Europe 
appear to be alive and well ' (366). Even i f states were to disappear from our maps, other 
political entities such as city-states, cults, empires, tribes, gangs, or feudal principalities 
would emerge as the primary units of the international system (365). The European Union, 
too, often hailed as role model how states are capable of transferring their legal, economic, 
and cultural loyalties to larger governmental institutions beyond their boundaries, merely 
reflects, as Mearsheimer argues, the dynamics of the security and balance-of-power logic 
in an anarchical world. For such transformation of political communities results less from 
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transformed human consciousnesses but simply from artificially suppressed security and 
balance-of-power concerns thanks to America's role as the European pacifier (366; also 
Mearsheimer 1990). Mearsheimer argues without hesitation: 'anarchy looks like it will be 
with us for a long time' (365). The first and primary reason for this is nationalism and 
national sentiments. This reveals the first facet of Mearsheimer's assumptions about 
human nature. For i f the group, whether in the form of fribes, city-states, or nation-states, 
seems to be an almost natural entity in human history, this means that Mearsheimer is 
obviously holding the view that Man is a group animal. More specifically, Mearsheimerian 
Man seems to be a deeply sociable creature that longs for group but he is rather unsociable 
vis-a-vis members of the out-group. In light of all aforementioned classical and post-
classical realist assumptions about human nature, such conception of human nature is only 
all to familiar. 
Mearsheimer's offensive structural realism, however, displays further assumptions 
about human nature. These can be unearthed by examining the other 'bedrock 
assumptions' of his theory (30). Like Waltz, Mearsheimer emphasises that states seek, 
above all, to survive in the international-political system. Survival, as Mearsheimer (2001) 
argues, is 'the primary goal of great powers' (31). States 'seek to maintain their territorial 
integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order' (31, also 46-48). This is 
tantamount to saying that the primary goal of Man is to preserve his life. Presuming an 
innate drive to self-preservation is a significant assumption about human nature. For 
although Mearsheimer argues that states 'can and do pursue other goals, of course', they 
do make survival and, therefore, security 'their most important objective' (31). But the fact 
that Mearsheimerian Man seems to be a group animal and that Man is driven by concerns 
for his self-preservation does not explain sufficiently the causes of the intense security 
competition among states. Mearsheimer, therefore, adds two further assumptions: thirdly, 
that great powers 'inherently possess some offensive military capabilities' (30) and, 
fourthly, that states can 'never be certain about other states' intentions' (31). 
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The third assumption appears almost ultra-pessimistic though it is not entirely 
unjustified. Mearsheimer (2001) argues that states, regardless of their actual capabilities in 
terms of military, technology, or economic power, cannot avoid possessing offensive or 
aggressive capabilities. Mearsheimer does not merely refer to the basic but timeless 
argument that every weapon, even i f designed for defensive purposes, could be used for 
offensive endeavours. Rather, Mearsheimer raises this point to the, in the true sense of the 
word, 'naked' level. He argues that even i f there were no weapons, Men 'could still use 
their feet and hands to attack the population of another state'—an argument to which he 
somewhat menacingly adds: 'After all, for every neck, there are two hands to choke it ' 
(31). It would be, however, misleading to conclude that Mearsheimer proposes a 
conception of Man that considers human beings as inherently violent. Mearsheimer argues 
explicitly that in order to arrive at a picture of world affairs where great powers compete 
offensively for power, all of the five assumptions must be cumulatively present (29). 
Still, we cannot gloss over the fact that Mearsheimer argues that Man is not a saint. 
This raises Mearsheimer's fourth assumption: that states continually worry about the 
intentions of other states. Mearsheimer (2001) argues that 
no state can be sure that another state wi l l not use its offensive 
military capability to attack the first state. This is not to say that 
states have necessarily hostile intentions. Indeed, all of the states 
in the system may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be 
sure of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine 
with 100 percent certainty. There are many possible causes of 
aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not 
motivated by one of them. (31) 
This seems confusing. It now appears that Mearsheimer suggests that the international-
political dilemma is primarily one of interpreting each others' intentions. Mearsheimer 
argues that unveiling the real intentions of other actors is hardly possible. But 
Mearsheimer recognises that this sort of uncertainty-dilemma alone cannot sufficiently 
explain why the international-political system displays broad patterns of offensive realist 
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state-behaviour. He therefore makes yet another significant—hidden and often over-
looked—assumption. Mearsheimer concedes that the problem lies with the nature of the 
states. States may be treated as billiard balls, but they are problematic political entities 
made up of problematic individuals. 
Mearsheimer concedes that besides strategic security concerns, non-security factors 
play a significant role in world politics. He argues that 'Security concerns alone cannot 
cause great powers to act aggressively. The possibility that at least one state might be 
motivated by non-security calculations is a necessary condition for offensive realism' 
(200I:31n8). Mearsheimer (1994-95:20) raises two non-security motivations. One is 
economical, the other psychological. Regarding the former, Mearsheimer approves the 
argument of strategic frade theorists that states must assist domestic firms in gaining 
comparative competitive advantages over foreign firms to ensure national economic 
prosperity. The second non-security reason why Mearsheimer finds liberal institutionalist 
theories about absolute gains unpersuasive relates to the nature of Man. He argues that we 
must recognise 'a psychological logic, which portrays individuals as caring about how well 
they do (or their state does) in a cooperative agreement, not for material reasons, but 
because it is human nature to compare one's progress with that of others' (20). From that 
perspective, it wi l l come as no surprise that Mearsheimer does, indeed, raise the question 
of human nature in Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Mearsheimer could not be more 
explicit about his general view of Man when he quotes Herbert Butterfield's well-known 
argument that 'Wars would hardly be likely to occur i f all men were Christian saints' 
(quoted in Mearsheimer 2001:31n8). 
This brings us to the f i f th assumption. It concerns the question of rationality. 
Mearsheimer (2001) argues that 'great powers are rational actors'; states 'think 
strategically', they 'consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is 
likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other 
states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival' (31). At first sight, this seems to 
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contradict his other claim regarding the intentions of states, i.e. that intentions 'can change 
quickly, so a state's intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next' (31). But it does 
not. Like other realists, Mearsheimer does not portray the state as a soberly-minded and 
purely rationally calculating homo oeconomicus. Instead, Mearsheimer seems to follow the 
somewhat thin notion of rationality of Waltz's international-political theory that sees the 
rationality of actors not as an innate quality of political entities but rather as the 
consequence of the (anarchical) structure of the international-political system. It is the 
international-political system, Mearsheimer (1995) argues, which 'forces states to behave 
according to the dictates of realism, or risk destruction' (91). Mearsheimer treats states as 
rational actors—and, at the same time, he does not. States are rational but not really. For 
although they may act rationally, they do so because the nature of the international-
political system taught them so in order to avoid death. Mearsheimer does not presume a 
bottom-up notion of rationality. His notion is a top-down rationality that pulls states in the 
direction of maximising power. This shows that Mearsheimer is incapable of avoiding 
profound unit-level assumptions, i.e. assumptions that are all related, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to the nature of Man. 
Mearsheimer's Man seems to fit nicely with how classical and post-classical realists 
have conceptualised human nature. Above all, Man is a group animal and wants to 
preserve his life. This does not preclude other motives. Indeed, Man has many motives. 
Securing survival remains Man's primary concern and it is this drive to self-preservation 
that causes the profound fear of death. As Mearsheimer (2001) writes succinctly: 'Great 
powers fear each other' (32). This profound fear leads to the perennial longing for the 
maximum amount of power. Consequently, Mearsheimer does not allow for much change 
in world politics. This suggests that there must be some sort of residue of assumptions 
about human nature that is so profound that it works against the idea of transformation. 
This residue seems to lie in Mearsheimer's arguments that nationalism is a quasi-constant 
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in world affairs and that we have to reckon with a problematic Man that is driven by 
concerns of self-preservation. 
Mearsheimer may be right in his claims about the nature of Man. His views sit well 
with realism. Yet still, given that Mearsheimer claims to have written a structural realism 
which does not rely on assumptions about human nature and given that these assumptions 
are profoundly significant in that they provide the theoretical backdrop against which the 
actual theory is built, Mearsheimer should have been more explicit and outspoken 
regarding his assumptions about human nature. Unfortunately, these assumptions are 
unreflective and do not allow for any conclusion regarding their intellectual source. 
The longing for prestige: Neoclassical realism and its human nature 
This section concerns itself with neoclassical realism. It represents the latest theoretical 
development of realism. Neoclassical realism sees itself as the legitimate heir to classical 
realism and represents the outgrowth of a generation of realists who have become 
increasingly dissatisfied with Waltzian-style accounts of international politics. 
Neoclassical realists retain the emphasis of structural realists on international-
political anarchy, balance-of-power considerations, and systemic constraints. But they 
argue that any empirical analysis of international politics must not leave aside the 
significance of both first image and second image variables. Although neoclassical realists 
conceptualise the international-political system as the realm where 'flesh-and-blood 
officials actually make foreign policy decisions' (Taliaferro 2006:40) and although they 
consider the relations among nations as, to use Schweller's (2003) words, merely 'politics 
writ large' (347), neoclassical realism differs significantly from its classical realist 
ancestors. Neoclassical realists would not presume a distinct conception of human nature 
as their starting point when theorising about international politics. 
This, however, does not imply that neoclassical realism has been purified of the 
concept of human nature. Neoclassical realism i s infused with assumptions about the 
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nature of Man. These assumptions are not only broadly akin to the assumptions of the 
classicals and post-classicals, but they are, moreover, quite fundamental to neoclassical 
international-political theory. This can be shown by examining more closely one of the 
core concepts of neoclassical realism: prestige. 
The notion that the relations among nations are not only characterised as a profound 
struggle for power and security as well as peace, but that international politics is equally a 
struggle for prestige is not the invention of the neoclassical realists. The longing for 
prestige has been a classical realist cornerstone since the birth of realism. Whether we look 
at Thucydides and his motivational (human nature) assumptions of the relentless striving 
for security, self-interest, and honour; or at Machiavelli's triad of (human nature) 
assumptions of security, liberty, and glory; or at Hobbes's tripartite (human nature) 
motivational scheme of competition, diffidence, and glory—we can identify clearly one 
particular and recurrent theme that seems to have been an underlying motivational (human 
nature) assumptions: namely, the prestige motive or, specifically, the 'individual or 
collective desire for public recognition of eminence as an end in itself (Markey 
1999:126). 
The prestige motive has not only been of great concern to these realist political 
philosophers. 20"'-century classical realists, too, recognise that the longing for prestige is 
an inherent and significant force in international politics. Morgenthau (1967[1948]) notes 
rightly that 'Actually, the policy of prestige, however exaggerated and absurd its uses may 
have been at times, is as intrinsic an element of the relations between nations as the desire 
for prestige is of the relations between individuals' (69). Man is driven to pocket as much 
prestige and reputation as possible, longs for the tribute which fellow Men may pay to him 
in light of his own moral goodness, educational intelligence, and 
physiological/psychological force or power. And so are states. The main purpose of the 
policy of prestige is, following the same internal logic yet raised to a different level, to 
'impress other nations with the power one's own nation actually possesses, or with the 
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power it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses' (70). In the wake of 
classical realism, neoclassical realism also recognises the force of the prestige motive 
among the actors of the international-political system. 
Against the background of neoclassical realism's general uneasiness vis-a-vis purely 
structural accounts of international politics, these neoclassical realists fault structural 
realism regarding a crucial theme: namely, the role and nature of state-motivational 
assumptions. Waltz had said that he built his defensive structural realism on the single 
unit-level assumption that states want to survive. In a critical reply, however, Randall 
Schweller (1996) points out that there is no direct causal pathway that would link the 
supposed survival motive with the intense security competition among states. He argues 
that 'What triggers security dilemmas under anarchy is the possibility of predatory states 
existing among the ranks of the units the system comprises. Anarchy and self-preservation 
alone are not sufficient to explain the war of all against all ' (91). The point is that these so-
called predatory states are, obviously, not only driven by brute security concerns but that 
they equally have and follow revisionist or non-security goals. Thus, Schweller argues that 
structural realists, who conceptualise the state as mere security maximiser, fail to recognise 
that states often behave aggressively towards each other not because of the dictates of the 
security dilemma but because of non-security dilemma related matters such as simple 
greed, longing for cultural hegemony, interpretations of divine right, following a manifest 
destiny, and striving for revenge (115). 
Such neoclassical realist line of argument is not original. The idea that states are 
merely security maximisers has never had many followers. The recognition of the 
neoclassical realists that states are both security maximisers but that they are also driven 
by expansionist non-security aims has been prominent. It is reminiscent of the general 
classification put forth by several classical realists who distinguish between status-quo 
powers and imperialistic powers (Morgenthau 1967[1948]), between status-quo states and 
revolutionary states (Kissinger 1964), between status-quo states and revisionist states 
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(Wolfers 1962[1959]), or between 'haves' and 'have-nots' (Carr 2001 [1939]). These state 
typologies, as well as the fact that neoclassical realists seem to recognise the significance 
of state-motivational assumptions, are part and parcel of the task of unearthing and 
identifying potentially hidden assumptions about human nature in neoclassical realism. For 
these state-motivational assumptions seem to suggest that neoclassical realists share an 
understanding with classical realists that states are largely irrational entities. This, in turn, 
reveals a great deal about their understanding of human nature. 
Compared with Waltz's state-motivational assumptions, neoclassicals have a 
different but perhaps much more realistic conception of states. The state seems to be a 
largely irrational entity, one that places a high value and significance on matters of 
prestige. Randall Schweller (1996) argues convincingly that Waltz's insistent defensive-
realist assumption that states would not strive for any additional increments or shares of 
power and profit as soon as they realise such behaviour would compromise their security 
situation, is unconvincing. The point of criticism is that Waltz does, in fact, privilege 
security concerns over power maximising concerns. Such an assumption contradicts the 
historical record: 
History is replete with examples of states whose first concern was 
to maximize...their power; who risked their security to improve, 
not maintain, their positions in the system. Alexander the Great, 
Rome, the Arabs in the seventh and eighth centuries, Charles V, 
Philip I I , Napoleon I , and Hitler all lusted for universal empire 
and waged all-or-nothing, apocalyptic wars to attain it. (107) 
This argument is significant. Schweller (1996) suggests that both in the theory and practice 
of international politics, we must reckon with 'very hungry states' that are, just as 
'terminally i l l patients' often are, very willing to 'take great risk—even i f losing the 
gamble means extinction—to improve their condition, which they consider intolerable' 
(107). 
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Yet the condition which states do often consider intolerable and which they, 
therefore, seek to change by whatever means possible is not necessarily a predominantly 
material condition such as the lack of security or the lack of a prospering economy. 
Instead, the path of revisionism is often related to the distribution of prestige among the 
actors of the international-political system. Gilpin (1981) argues that the international-
political system is partly governed by a 'hierarchy of prestige' (30) and that 'prestige, 
rather than power, is the everyday currency of international relations' (31). States that have 
their share of prestige recognised by others do enjoy a greater amount of international 
bargaining and power leverage compared to those that can lay little claim to hold any 
significant amount of prestige. Thus, it is the ensuing hierarchy of prestige that leads to 
dynamic and often dangerous international-political processes because the actual and 
potential order of the international-political system is now at stake. It is the discrepancy 
between the actual hierarchy of prestige among states and the actual distribution of 
military and economic power within the international-political system which can, as Gilpin 
points out, cause the governance or order of the current international-political system 'to 
break down as perceptions catch up with realities of power' (33). 
Neoclassical realists would largely agree with Gilpin's take on the role of prestige in 
international politics. But we must, nevertheless, recognise a significant distinction which 
helps us to understand the nature of the hidden assumptions about human nature of the 
neoclassicals. In light of Gilpin's account of the prestige motive, Markey (1999) has 
pointed out quite rightly that Gilpin's understanding of prestige in international politics is 
somewhat 'instrumental' (126n2), for Gilpin seems to suggest, to use Markey's words, that 
'states pursue prestige so as to demonstrate their power rather than as an end in itself 
(128). But neoclassical realists have, in the wake of their classical realist ancestors, a very 
different understanding of the notion of prestige as a driving force in international politics. 
Neoclassical realists recognise that states do not long for prestige as merely a means 
to an end (e.g. security), but, rather, as an end itself This is an important distinction, for it 
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demonstrates that the state, as neoclassicals have it, is not the mere, cold-blooded security 
and power maximiser, but, instead, a somewhat irrational entity, which sometimes acts 
against all the reasonable dictates of the international-political system. This tells us a great 
deal about the obvious supposed existence and nature of the neoclassical Man. According 
to neoclassical realists, it is simply a historical fact of international-political life that states 
are not only driven by security concerns but that they are—equally, i f not often even to a 
greater degree—driven by concerns relating to their prestige. In other words: like Men, 
states do long not only for security but also for recognition and respect (Markey 1999; 
Schweller 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001; Taliaferro 2001, 2004, 2006; Wohlforth 1993). 
This continual pursuit of prestige is, as Markey (1999) argues always relative, perpetual, 
social, and, last but not least, irrational. It is relative in that the pursuit of prestige among 
states is a zero-sum game (157); it is perpetual in that the 'thirst for prestige' is essentially 
limitless (158); and it is social or socially constructed in that the drive for prestige comes 
in varying degrees of rigour (161). 
Yet, above all, the longing and thirst for prestige is, predominantly, irrational. Just 
as Man strives for prestige vis-a-vis his fellows and often displays patterns of behaviour 
which appear, from a material rationalist standpoint, entirely irrational in that he is 
sometimes even tempted to compromise on his primordial drive to live by means of 
consciously choosing death, the behaviour and actions of states are often similarly difficult 
to grasp—particularly when states follow strategies that run counter to any sensible and 
prudent politico-economical risk or net-loss/gain assessments (Markey 1999:159, 166). 
Here, as regards the theme of largely irrational actions of states, Schweller (1996) makes 
essentially the same point and argues convincingly that the purely structural and security-
based explanations of much of structural realism fail badly when international-political 
theorists and foreign-policy makers have to deal with, for instance, the Iran-Iraq crisis of 
the 1980s: 
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Iran fought not for survival but for total victory in a Holy War 
against the infidels. In the eyes of Shi'ite fundamentalists, God 
demands Holy Wars and, in such wars, sanctions the gratification 
of aggression without guilt. Since the infidel, too, benefits fi-om 
his own death, war is not only a blessing for the world and all 
nations: it is a form of cultural therapy. (107-108) 
Surely, Schweller's example of Ayatollah Khomeini, whose decision to continue fighting 
against Iraq in 1985 when chances for victory were extremely thin, does not perfectly 
capture the problem of prestige in international politics, for this conflict has also been 
fought over long-standing religious-theological rivalry. But the longing for prestige, i.e. 
for recognition and respect, rarely appears in complete isolation. In any case, the 
significance of this Khomeini example derives from the fact that perhaps most outside 
observer would agree that, from a strictly rational point of view, Khomeini's decision to 
fight on was rather nonsensical, i f not irrational, in light of the hard facts. But besides the 
fact that Schweller, too, recognises the problem for international-political theorists and 
foreign-policy makers that we must reckon with states that appear to be essentially 
irrational in their behaviour, it is striking to see how neoclassicals incorporate what 
structural realists would call 'reductionist' arguments, which in turn, reveal a great deal 
about their hidden assumptions about human nature. 
In order to rationalise a seemingly irrational decision by Khomeini to continue 
fighting in light of a rather unpromising situation or, more, generally to rationalise the 
whole notion of war, Schweller (1996:108n61) turns to psycho-analytic material. 
Specifically, he turns to psycho-analyst Vamik Volkan's insightful book. The Need to 
Have Enemies and Allies (Volkan 1988), which argues that war is some sort of collective 
therapy. Yet by doing so, Schweller makes, implicitly or explicitly, particular assumptions 
about human nature. For the fact that war is to be seen as a form of group psychological 
therapy (and not merely as the rational Clausewitzian continuation of politics by other 
means due to structural balance-of-power constraints) is based on the assumption that Man 
is almost of necessity inclined to define as enemies those Men belonging to the out-group. 
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Such group psychological dynamics are based on a particular set of psycho-analytic 
assumptions about the nature of Man, which, in turn, relate back to Freud (Volkan 1988; 
also Volkan 2004; Volkan et al. 1990; Volkan et al. 1991). 
This does not imply that neoclassical realists are hidden Freudians. They may be or 
they may not; it is, in any case, hard to decipher. As in the case of Waltz and Mearsheimer, 
these post-classical realists have presented us with intriguing international-political 
theories. But when it comes to the concept of human nature, neoclassical realists appear to 
be a rather unreflective group of international-political theorists, whose claims to be 
legitimate heirs to classical realists seem questionable. Despite their unreflectiveness 
(which is particularly apparent in comparison with the classical realists), a picture of the 
neoclassical Man emerges. 
Neoclassical Man is not a one-dimensional creature that merely seeks survival. The 
drive to self-preservation is, of course, a significant motivational assumption about human 
nature. Yet, alone, it cannot entirely explain why states often behave rather differently than 
the Waltzian defensive structural realist logic would suggest. Expansionist state behaviour 
cannot derive from a mere survival concern. Instead, both states and Men are driven by 
multiple motivational forces. As Schweller (1996) notes: 'The general point is that 
interests, values, ideology, and strategic beliefs are...just as important as imbalances of 
power or threat in determining how states choose sides and why they wage war' (108). 
These interests, values, ideologies, and beliefs are, however, not always of purely 
materialistic rational origin. On the contrary, they derive from a mixture of concerns for 
security and concerns regarding honour and glory as well as prestige, recognition, and 
respect. But prestige, i.e. the drive for collective recognition, is conceptually not too far 
wide of the mark of what Morgenthau refers to as the instinct of self-assertion. As was the 
case with the classical realists, the fact that states place such a high value on prestige is, 
ultimately, the result of assumed instinctual configurations which explain not only why 
Man longs for security and assertion (prestige, recognition, honour, glory) but also why 
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these concerns are then raised to a different level, the level of the state. Once again, it all is 
rooted in Man, in the nature of Man. 
It can be argued, then, that the neoclassical Man fits rather nicely with how classical 
and post-classical realists have conceptualised human nature. Al l in all, neoclassical Man 
is neither a utility maximising homo oeconomicus nor inherently aggressive or sadistic. 
Instead, neoclassical realists portray Man as driven both by concerns for his own self-
preservation and, at the same time, by concerns for prestige or self-assertion. They seem to 
recognise that Man's inclination to survival is not sacrosanct and is often overridden by 
impulse discharges that seem, prima facie, irrational. This is a significant turn of events. 
The notion of the Waltzian Man, who is a somewhat sober-minded security maximiser, has 
been left behind. Instead, neoclassicals returned to a more realist(ic) set of assumptions 
about human nature more akin to what the classical realists had said about the nature of 
Man long ago. 
Conclusion 
In the wake of reinterpreting the assumptions about human nature of several leading 
classicals, my reading of the post-classicals suggests that we must seriously reconsider 
their intellectual project(s). This implies both criticism and sympathetic defense. First, 
these post-classicals are infused with assumptions about human nature. Secondly, despite 
their 'human nature lie', these post-classicals can be defended against some human nature-
related criticism. Thirdly, one cannot but be struck by these post-classicals' degree of 
unreflectiveness vis-a-vis the concept of human nature. This has helped to put 
contemporary realism into a rather unpleasant politico-theoretical situation. 
The post-classical realist project to free realism from the tutelage of the concept of 
human nature has failed. A l l of the most prominent post-classicals possess such a 
conception. Virtually all post-classicals smuggle in some assumptions about the nature of 
Man. This is odd, particularly given that these post-classicals have blamed and denounced 
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the classicals as i f they were a bunch of pre-scientific and crude psew^/o-intemational-
political storytellers—let us recall Waltz who once said rather snappishly that 'what 
Morgenthau did was translate [Friedrich] Meinecke from German to English' (Waltz 
1998:386). 
Post-classical realism is still dominated by underlying assumptions about human 
nature. These assumptions are, as was the case with some of the classicals, partly inspired 
by Freudian psychology. Despite all their intellectual, politico-theoretical, and philosophy-
of-science efforts, post-classical realists fail to live up to their promise to leave behind the 
days of Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style theorising about world politics. This is true of 
Herz's realist liberalism. Herz does not present us with an international-political theory 
where it is irrelevant whether Man is naturally peaceful or cooperative or aggressive or 
domineering. Herz does make his arguments by means of the concept of the security 
dilemma, which is, prima facie, a predominantly socio-structural concept. But if one takes 
a closer look, it is easily recognisable that Herz cannot avoid making assumptions about 
the nature of Man. Without human nature, he cannot explain the existence and dynamics of 
the security dilemma, both societal and international, in the first place. The security 
dilemma does not derive from ejc/ra-human international-political structures but rather 
from the nature of Man. I f Herzian Man was not some sort of Freudian-style ambivalent 
group animal that is driven by both self-preservation and other-regard, the international-
political scene could not be explained in terms of a dynamic and profound cycle of intense 
security and power competition among the actors. 
The systemic-scientific international-political theory of Kaplan, too, cannot avoid 
making assumptions about the nature of Man. Kaplan smuggles in a set of state-
motivational assumptions (power maximising, security maximising, compassion) which 
are, after all, assumptions about the nature of Man. Besides, Kaplan anthropomorphises the 
concept of the international-political system and ascribes to it human qualities. These are 
taken from Freud. Freud does now begin to fall out of the picture among post-classicals. 
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The concept of human nature, however, does not. The defensive structural realism of 
Waltz does equally work with profound state-motivational assumptions. Taken together 
with his other, though rare, thin, and indirect, comments about the nature of Man, a picture 
emerges of a Waltzian international-political theory which is by no means fireed from the 
concept of human nature. The picture emerges of a Waltzian Man who, not entirely unlike 
Morgenthau's Man, is far from being a homo oeconomiciis-style creature. Instead, it is 
driven predominantly by both self-preservation as well as self-assertion (recognition, 
pride). 
Mearsheimer's realism is also built upon assumptions about human nature. 
Mearsheimerian Man is a group animal that places utmost value on his longing for self-
preservation and is not only more fearful than Waltz's but also strives somewhat 
frantically for the maximum share of power. I f not in terms of modified assumptions about 
the nature of Man, Mearsheimer could not explain why state A longs for a reasonable 
amount of power but state B for a maximum share of power, given that they are both 
exposed to the same international-political structural conditions. The neoclassical Man fits 
with how both classical and post-classical realists conceptualise the nature of Man. Part of 
the neoclassical assumption about human nature is that Man is neither a mere utility 
maximiser nor inherently sadistic or violent but an irrational creature concerned with self-
preservation and also prestige (self-assertion) vis-a-vis his fellows. 
These post-classical realists reveal profound assumptions about human nature. Their 
international-political theories make use of assumptions about the nature of Man which are 
not essentially the same as those made by the classicals. But they also make assumptions 
which, they argue, would and should not appear in realism any longer. Despite their 
'human nature lie' , these post-classicals must be rescued from some of the charges that 
have been brought against them by critics outside of realism. Similar counterarguments 
that already saved most of the classical realists apply—even though, to a lesser degree— 
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when it comes to the assumptions about human nature of post-classical realists. T he 
popular charges by critics must be refuted as false attacks. 
The common charge that post-classicals share a tendency to overemphasise Man's 
longing for power after power seems misleading. Power does play an important role. These 
realists surely emphasise that Man does seek power, either as means to an overarching end 
(survival) or in the form of a profound longing for prestige, which comes very close to the 
classical realism-style innate drive to self-assertion. One must not overlook, however, that 
all these realists, from Herz to the neoclassicals, do share an understanding of human 
nature which does not consider Man to be some sort of homo oeconomicus-style one-
dimensional Lasswellian homo politicus who seeks nothing but power. Instead, all these 
realists (and Herz in particular) share the view that Man is driven by a great variety of 
physiological-psychological forces which are, moreover, often inherently conflictual vis-a-
vis each other. Prominent among those forces is the innate inclination to affiliate with 
fellow Men and form and enter groups. This ultimately leads to the in-group/out-group 
dynamics of much of international relations. 
The second prominent criticism also needs qualification. Post-classicals are being 
confronted with the charge that they rely on an image of Man that is utterly oversimplified 
and unsophisticated. This is only partially correct. We should discriminate carefully 
between the earlier and later post-classicals. When we look at Mearsheimer, part of the 
criticism is not entirely unjustified. What he offers us is, in comparison with the classical 
realists, an extremely thin account of human nature which does not really go much beyond 
the mere quoting of Butterfield's assertion that Man has never been a saint. The critics 
must not lump together Mearsheimer with Herz or Kaplan. In contrast to the later post-
classical realists, Herz and Kaplan are very reflective when it came to the nature of Man 
and the human condition. Herz, in particular, offers us a fairly lengthy treatment of the 
psychological bases of the security dilemma, i.e. of the assumptions about human nature 
that inform his international-political theory. In this sense, Herz's approach is reminiscent 
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of how classicals approached international-political theorising. No other post-classical 
realist is as careful, open, and reflective vis-a-vis the nature of Man as is Herz. 
The need for discriminating between the earlier and later post-classical realists is 
also warranted when it comes to the charge that these realists' assumptions about human 
nature are not only one-dimensional but also the product of purely metaphysical 
speculations. A l l these post-classicals make assumptions about the nature of Man that 
infuse their respective international-political theories. Yet only the assumptions of Herz 
and Kaplan can be considered as being attributable to an intellectual source. This source is 
Freudian psychology and it helps to defend them from the charge of metaphysical 
speculation. This changes when we turn to Waltz, Mearsheimer, and the neoclassicals. 
Their assumptions about human nature are much harder, i f not impossible, to defend. Their 
assumptions about the nature of Man seem to appear to be too implicit, too scattered, too 
unsystematic. This raises and helps understand the third implication of this chapter's 
reading of post-classical realism. 
Several leading post-classical realist international-political theories are built upon 
some very profound assumptions about the nature of Man. These post-classicals' 
assumptions about human nature have become increasingly unreflective. But this must not 
distract our attention away from recognising one very fundamental dilemma of post-
classical realism. This has put the whole of contemporary realism in a somewhat awkward 
politico-theoretical position: namely, that post-classical realists have allowed themselves 
to smuggle in assumptions about human nature against the background of their explicit 
politico-theoretical aim to free realism from the Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian tutelage of 
human nature. The profound failure of post-classical realism means that the concept of 
human nature is not dead in contemporary realism. This may delight those who have 
always been critical of realism. The fact that contemporary realism is still heavily reliant 
upon assumptions about human nature provides them with easy politico-theoretical 
ammunition helping them repeat the same old intellectual story of how mistaken realism is 
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to draw the wrong politico-theoretical conclusions from false human nature premises about 
human nature. 
We must deal with contemporary realism's theoretical cul-de-sac and must, 
therefore, focus on the natural follow-up question that derives from the results and 
arguments of the two preceding chapters. I reinterpreted the assumptions about human 
nature of classical realism. I unearthed the largely hidden assumptions about human nature 
of post-classical realism. I defended both classical and post-classical realist assumptions 
about human nature against what I regard as unwarranted criticism. Taking together my 
readings of classical and post-classical realists, I argued that the concept of human nature 
is alive and kicking in contemporary realism. This raises the normative follow-up question: 
i f human nature is not dead, ought it to be dead? 
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H U M A N N A T U R E C R I T I C I S M A N D I T S V I C E S 
Introduction 
The analytical and argumentative focus of the thesis now shifts to the ought-question. The 
preceding two chapters argued that the concept of human nature is not dead. Regardless of 
whether we examine classical realism or post-classical realism, these realists make use of 
profound assumptions about human nature. Based on my reading, emphasising the 
intellectual influence of Freudian psychology upon these realists, I have defended both 
classical as well as post-classical realists against unsubstantiated criticism. 
Unearthing the 'human nature lie' of the post-classicals has helped to bring to light 
some profound tensions between its rhetoric and the reality. It helped to put contemporary 
realism in a potentially uncomfortable intellectual position vis-a-vis its critics. This is an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs and raises a question which the post-classical realists thought 
they had already decided in the negative a long time ago. Does realism require the concept 
of human nature? 
The question whether the concept of human nature ought to be dead in realism is 
significant in its own right. But it turns into a pressing concern i f we consider the nature 
and implicafions of the widespread neglect of the human nature baggage of classical 
realism as well as the 'human nature lie' of the post-classical realists. This is the broader 
context against which the analyses and arguments of the next two chapters must be seen. 
Specifically, realism has manoeuvred itself into a position where it must now choose sides 
between two Weberian ideal-typical politico-theoretical positions. Either realists re-design 
their international-political theories in such a way that they do not rely any longer on 
certain assumptions about human nature. This implies purifying realism of the concept of 
human nature and transforming it into a purely structural-sociological or truly post-
classical realist body of international-political theories. 
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The ideal-typical alternative is that realists consider carefully the option of re-
constructing their respective international-political theories in a way which proactively 
allows for the incorporation and foundational importance of profound assumptions about 
the nature of Man. This would infuse realism with more rather than less assumptions about 
human nature and take it back to classical realism-style international-political theory. Both 
the present chapter, 'Human Nature Criticism and its Vices', as well as Chapter 5, 'The 
Virtues of Freudian Human Nature', present powerful arguments in favour of the human 
nature-friendly alternative. 
This chapter marks the first step towards the overarching argument that the concept 
of human nature ought not to be dead in realism. I argue that there is nothing inherently 
wrong in applying the concept of human nature to international-political theorising. In 
contrast to the next chapter, the argument presented is largely of negative analytical-
argumentative nature. It accomplishes its task by means of criticising those critical of 
human nature. This requires an analytical account of the various sets of criticism that have 
been levelled against the admissibility of the concept of human nature in (international-) 
political theory. To this end, I present, in the next section, what I refer to as the six sins of 
human nature. These sins have been among the most powerful arguments against the 
concept of human nature. 
Yet this does not imply that human nature-sympathetic international-political 
theorists must agree with these human nature critics. I argue that these six sins of human 
nature must be taken with a pinch of salt. Most of the concerns of the human nature critics 
are perfectly legitimate. But their criticisms are far too weak and unconvincing to be really 
capable of deciding the ought-question. The subsequent section is concerned with 
critiquing the human nature critics. I argue that much of human nature criticism is 
unconvincing because it fails to recognise the hidden complexities of the concept of human 
nature in the realm of the (international-) political. This complexity does not allow the 
critics to decide the human nature question. 
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I then continue with the task of critiquing the critics and take issue with what is 
referred to as the hidden omnipresence of human nature. I argue that virtually all human 
nature-critical Weltanschauungen are also based upon some conceptions about the nature 
of Man. Thus, in light of the six sins of human nature which are subjected to increasing 
criticism, this chapter concludes that current human nature criticism cannot decide the 
ought-question against the human nature-sympathetics and that it looks as though it is 
impossible to construct international-political theories purified of the concept of human 
nature. This is a first step in the right direction. I wi l l , however, also point out that in order 
to decide the ought-question in favour of the concept of human nature, additional 
arguments are required. 
The six sins of human nature 
This section deals with the criticism of the concept of human nature in political 
thought, whether domestic or international. It identifies and presents what may be regarded 
as the six most powerful sins of the concept of human nature. This is a necessary task. 
First, because the resulting criticism wil l provide the analytical backdrop against which the 
next two sections wi l l present what are considered to be the most striking vices of such 
human nature criticism. Secondly, because international-political theorists have not really 
devoted much attention to the allegedly negative and problematic dimension of the concept 
of human nature. On the one hand, it was not really an issue that had received a great deal 
of attention in the pre-Herzian/Waltzian era, for regardless how far we go back in the 
history of realist (international-) political theory, the concept of human nature was some 
sort of quasi-natural element of realist international-political theorising since ancient 
Greece. And, on the other hand, the concept of human nature was not a question of great 
concern among post-classical realists either. For when Herz and Waltz began to move 
realism away from human nature towards a structural-sociological mode of reasoning, the 
following generations of post-classical realists seem to have all too readily accepted the 
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rather thin arguments against human nature that were brought forward. In the wake of this 
rising anti-human nature mood of the early days of post-classical realism, it seems that 
these realists have embarked on their projects of constructing (allegedly) human nature-
purified international-political theories without any greater reflection about the functions, 
virtues, and vices of what they considered to be an antiquated concept of a bygone pre-
scientific era. 
This is, however, a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs. For the neglect of the 
concept of human nature has stifled a proper debate as to whether assumptions about 
human nature ought to be made or be admissible in realism. That such debate seems more 
pressing than ever before, given the continuing omnipresence of assumptions about human 
nature in realism, has been pointed out above. Such debate has been avoided thus far. Yet 
this does not mean that any argument in favour of the concept of human nature in realist 
international-political theorising is a straightforward matter. For despite the absence of any 
thorough engagement with the concept of human nature, any argument which seems to be 
pro human nature seems to be on the defensive from the very beginning and arouses all 
sorts of suspicions. And even though these Pavlovian hostile reactions can be shown to be, 
ultimately, simply unfounded and unjustified, the question whether realism ought to be 
based upon some profound assumptions about the nature of Man must be approached 
against the background of a predominantly hostile intellectual scenery. 
This widespread scepticism against the concept of human nature, then, dictates or 
predetermines the analytical and argumentative approach for answering the ought-
question. It seems that the initial, essential task of any argument that calls for a positive 
and proactive role for assumptions about human nature in realism must be to come to 
terms with the sets of criticisms, suspicions, and even fears which have been raised against 
the marriage of human nature and (international-) political theory. This requires an 
analytical account of such human nature criticism. While the next two sections are devoted 
to the task of jumping to the defense of the concept of human nature by carrying out the 
122 
Chapter 4 
appropriate counter-criticisms, the remainder of this section is concerned with identifying 
such sets of criticisms of the concept of human nature (there are surprisingly few books 
devoted to the concept of human nature in matters political, but useful are Pennock & 
Chapman 1977; Forbes & Smith 1981; Berry 1986; Budziszewski 1986; Jorke 2005; Thies 
2007). 
Human nature critics almost always point out that the theories or conceptions of 
human nature which are used in (international-) political theories are often simply too 
unscientific and, consequently, futile as the philosophical starting point for the respective 
(international-) political theory. This sort of standard criticism—i.e. the critique of 
metaphysical speculation—is a prominent argumentative weapon often used by natural and 
life scientists. It is often raised against both social-scientific and humanistic-philosophical 
(international-) political theories, and the metaphysical speculation argument is enjoying 
ever greater popularity in light of the ascent of the neurosciences. 
The critics' line of the argument is, in fact, fairly straightforward. What do we gain, 
these critics say, from turning, let's say, to Rousseau's philosophy of history (1997[1755]: 
part I)? Why ought we to care in the 21^' century when an 18*-century Rousseau tells us 
that Man is driven by amour-proprel Where is the scientific evidence that amour-propre 
was really the product of the historical loss of self-sufficiency? Or that savage man 
wandered the forests alone and nourished himself; was without any foresight, curiosity, 
education, reason, nor any contact; was completely independent and only concerned with 
his self-preservation; envisioned only the most basic needs, showed pity and compassion 
for the sufferings of others and had no desire to harm them whatsoever? These critics deny 
that such Rousseauian account of Man and his history counts as a proper theory of human 
nature; at the most, they may regard it as interesting generalisations about the nature of 
Man which are based largely on observation and introspection—not more, not less. The 
same criticism would apply to Aristotle and his essentialist view of Man as a zoon 
politikon, to arbitrarily pick another landmark of Western philosophy. 
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Quite naturally perhaps, contemporary natural and life scientists are fairly sceptical 
when philosophers and (international-) political theorists establish analytical and/or 
normative links to something as complex as the nature of Man. This form of profound 
scepticism towards, or outright rejection of, what is deemed to be purely metaphysical 
speculations has received a great impetus from the philosophy of the Vienna Circle. 
According to its 1929 manifesto, 'The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna 
Circle' (n.A. 1973[1929]), the members of the Vienna Circle called for a scientific world-
conception that aims at 'removing the metaphysical and theological debris of millennia' 
(317); their empiricism and positivism rejects classical metaphysics and 'knows no 
unconditionally valid knowledge derived from pure reason, no "synthetic judgments a 
priori" or of the kind that lie at the basis of Kantian epistemology and even more of all 
pres- and post-Kantian ontology and metaphysics' (308). Herbert Feigl, one of the 
protagonists, has summed up the Vienna Circle's position quite well when he wrote that 
we 'were deeply imbued with the conviction that we had found a "philosophy to end all 
philosophies'" (Feigl 1981 [1969]:57). 
The project of the 'philosophy to end all philosophies' does help understand the 
contemporary wariness against the alleged human nature speculations of philosophers, 
theologians, and (international-) political theorists such as Morgenthau or Niebuhr. True, 
we can see that there is much disagreement within these contemporary and predominantly 
anti-metaphysical, empiricist-positivist, natural-scientific circles of natural and life 
scientists. Debates are ongoing whether the question of the nature of Man may be best 
answered by focusing on genes, molecules, or neurons, i.e. the various approaches of the 
biological, physical, and neurosciences, respectively. But still, in light of their anxiety of 
too much metaphysical speculation when it comes to the nature of Man, these critics are 
united in their strong opposition against, for instance, Rousseauian or Aristotelian-style 
philosophical approaches to human nature. 
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The same scepticism has been applied to most of the classical realists, too. As shown 
above, critics of both non-realist and post-classical realists provenance have been all too 
ready to raise the accusation that these classical realist assumptions about human nature 
are too vague and too speculative. On that point, Niebuhr and Morgenthau have suffered 
the most. Steve Smith (1981) has argued that Morgenthau 'merely asserts [his theory of 
Man] as correct' (167). Scott Burchill (2001) writes that 'Morgenthau's realism was based 
on a priori assumptions about human nature' (82). Realists, too, have faulted Niebuhr and 
Morgenthau for relying less on science and more on theology and metaphysics, 
respectively (Thayer 2000:125). In light of these alleged shortcomings, these realists have 
either turned to Darwinian-biological evolutionary theory (Thayer 2004) or to the 
neurosciences (Rosen 2005) in search of a more scientific grounding of the realist analysis 
and understanding of world politics. I defended several of the leading classical and post-
classical realist international-political theories against such charge in the two previous 
chapters, but the argumentative strategy of these critics remains a powerful force to be 
reckoned with when it comes to the question of the admissibility and significance of the 
concept of human nature in (intemational)political thought. 
While the metaphysical speculation argument takes issue with what is regarded as 
the more or less antiquated human nature wisdom of Western philosophy and calls for a 
more rigorous and scientific approach to the nature of Man, the second major criticism 
against the analytical and normative usage of assumptions about human nature in 
(international-) political theory—i.e. the charge of ideological mystification—represents a 
much more radical attack. We can certainly agree with J. Roland Pennock (1977) that 'as 
long as men have speculated about the nature of politics, it has been common to relate it to 
the nature of man' and that although different thinkers 'focused upon the differences 
among kinds of human nature, whether of gold, of silver, or of bronze', there was hardly 
any dispute that one could identify a 'common substratum' (1). This has, however, 
changed dramatically. Largely thanks to the ascent of postmodern thought and its 
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ideological mystification argument, the focus of the human nature debate has been shifted 
away from the question of whether Man is, to use Pennock's metaphor, of gold, silver, or 
bronze, towards more prior and basic questions. Is there something like a human nature at 
all, a 'common substratum'? Is it really sensible to talk about and use the concept of 
human nature? Postmodern theorists answer these questions in the negative. 
This form of radical criticism must be seen against the nature of the Enlightenment 
project. The thinkers of the Enlightenment, in particular, argued that transcendental 
political and social principles must, ultimately, be based on a sound knowledge of the 
nature of Man. In other words: the wider intellectual project was based on the dictum that 
the sound conception of human nature provides the sound foundation for sound 
(international-) political theory. He nee, in light of what Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard 
(2001 [1979]) called postmodern theorists' 'incredulity toward metanarratives' (xxiv), it 
comes as no big surprise that these postmodernists are deeply suspicious vis-a-vis 
universal theories of human nature which claim to provide the foundation for 
(international-) political theorising and vis-a-vis the very idea of a nature of Man. 
These postmodernists do not see the concept of human nature as a mere 
philosophical basis for (international-) political theorising. Instead, they present the fierce 
counter-argument that 'under the guise of a benevolent concern for the good of all 
humankind, the real purpose of the human nature myth is to impose one particular set of 
male Eurocentric values on to the rest of the world' (Wells & McFadden 2006:2). As 
Michel Foucault (1977) argues in Nietzschean manner that 'nothing in man, not even his 
body, is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding 
other men' (153). Thus, neither can postmodernists see or recognise a common and 
universal substratum of Man, nor can they allow the (Westernised) concept of human 
nature to become the basis for (international-) political theory. The argument advanced by 
Richard Rorty contra the foundationalist philosophers such as Plato, Aquinas, or Kant, is 
of similar origin and radicalism. Rorty (1998b) recognises as one of the most 'important 
126 
Chapter 4 
intellectual advance[s]' of 20"" century philosophy that 'we are much less inclined than our 
ancestors were to take "theories of human nature" seriously' and that 'we are much less 
inclined to pose the ontological question "What are we?"'. For, as he argues, 'we have 
come to see that the main lesson of both history and anthropology is our extraordinary 
malleability'; as a result, we were 'coming to think of ourselves as the flexible, protean, 
self-shaping animal rather than as the rational animal or the cruel animal' (169-170). 
The postmodern criticism against the advocates of assumptions about human nature 
in (international-) political theory is, to some extent, shared by feminist theorists. Like 
postmodern thought, feminism has become an increasingly rich and diverse body of 
thought. However, feminist theorists share a strong sense of opposition against naturalistic 
theories of gender differences (Levitas 1981:116-117). Based upon such common core, 
feminists fiercely reject—albeit not necessarily from a postmodern point of view and with 
varying degrees of radicalism—what they conceive as a dangerous conservative 
ethnocentric Western white male universalism. Feminists criticise this dangerous form of 
androcentric human nature universalism which is characteristic, as they readily point out, 
of so much of contemporary international-political theory, particularly of realism (Tickner 
& Sjoberg 2007). On the whole, then, feminist thought shares the conviction with 
postmodern theorists that there is no such thing as a transcendental nature of Man. They 
argue that the assumption of such a theory of human nature represents nothing but a 
'damaging form of ideological mystification' (Wells & McFadden 2006:2) as well as an 
attempt by the powerful to silence dissident voices, be it philosophical-theoretical or 
practical-political. For there seems to be no easier line of argument or easier excuse than 
referring to, or hiding behind, the nature of Man in light of all earthly evils, injustices, and 
wrongdoings. 
Equally hostile and powerfiil arguments against the foundational role of assumptions 
about human nature in the domain of the (international-) political are raised by a third 
group of human nature critics. Representing the third sin of the concept of human nature, 
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these critics put forth what may be called the do gmatic ahistoricism argument. Their 
critical argument against the concept of human nature is rather straightforward. Even i f it 
was possible, in light of the aforementioned two major sets of criticisms, to unearth and 
identify the ultimate essence of humans and their physiological-psychological makeup to a 
sufficiently high degree of certainty, such a theory would, nevertheless, be more or less 
worthless. For although it would provide us with a theory of the nature of Man, such a 
theory would not be capable of answering whether the wide range of actions of Man are, 
ultimately, purely determined by such nature. Put differently: these critics argue that Man 
is a thoroughly historical creature which is shaped by the currently prevailing modes of 
production and social-environmental circumstances. 
This line of argument has its roots in Marxian historical materialism. It is not only 
an extremely powerful argumentative strategy, but it has risen to exceptional prominence 
and popularity among students of human nature (life sciences), social scientists, and social 
and (international-) political theorists, particularly since the late 1960s. The question of the 
degree to which Man is a purely natural animal or is capable of being nurtured—as 
embodied in the nature-nurture or naturalist-culturalist debate—has become a central 
component to the culture wars and has stirred up much controversy. It lurks in the 
background of virtually all contemporary social and political issues, whether we talk about 
the nature and prospects of international politics, the educational system, or the criminal 
justice system. The nature-nurture controversy has helped to unearth—often entirely 
justified—^that the purely naturalist position is often insufficient as it fails to recognise how 
history and historico-material constraints have shaped the course of human and social life. 
Further, it has helped to show that pure naturalists are often inclined towards conservative 
social and (international-) political theory. Feminist theorists have traditionally been very 
active and loud voices in the nature-nurture debate, but so, too, have been the neo-Marxist 
critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. 
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The criticism of the concept of human nature vis-a-vis social and (international-) 
political theory draws fi-om a crucial notion of Karl Marx. Often seen as some sort of 
'optimistic' conception of Man (as opposed to the 'pessimistic' conception of 
conservatism as well as realism), Marx conceives Man as an essentially social creature. 
This is part and parcel of Marxian materialistic philosophy of history and must be seen in 
light of Marx's anti-naturalistic argument. Put forth forcefully in the sixth thesis of the 
Theses on Feuerbach, Marx (1994[1845]-b) argues that 'the essence of man is no 
abstraction inhering in each single individual' but that in 'its actuality it is the ensemble of 
social relationships' (100). Marx strictly denies the idea of a universal, transcendent nature 
or essence of Man. Instead, he argues, that what may appear as instinctively or naturally or 
biologically is, in fact, largely socially determined. Thus, human conduct is, therefore, not 
only contingent from society to society and from epoch to epoch, but it is, moreover, and 
most importantly: principally alterable. As Marx (2005[1847]) famously proclaims: 'the 
whole of history is nothing but a continual transformation of human nature' (160). 
In light of Marx's groundwork, culturalists have, therefore, begun to argue quite 
fiercely that societal conditions and societal malfunctions must not be deduced directly 
from something like a fixed human nature. Rather, human, social, and, of course, 
international-political conduct must always be seen and interpreted against their respective 
historical contexts as well as their structural and material conditions in which these 
conducts take place. As Adam Ferguson (1809[1767]) writes felicitously: 'nations stumble 
upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of 
any human design' (199). Reversing this logic or denying the essential foundations of 
Marxian philosophy of history has, according to Horkheimer and Habermas, dramatic— 
and conservative—effects. 
Writing in the wake of earlier warnings against the blind naturalisation of Man (see, 
e.g., Lukacs 1968[1923]:83-222), Horkheimer also criticises the widespread and 
essentially ahistorical approach towards Man and his human condition of much 
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contemporary philosophy and social and (international-) political theory. Concerned with 
its social and political effects, in his 'Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Anthropologic' 
[Notes on philosophical anthropology], Horkheimer (1988[1935]) argues forcefully that 
these ahistorical interpretations of Man are simply intellectual misconstructions. These are 
dangerous misconstructions, for they help to stifle social and (international-) political 
progress. 'The attempt to comprehend men as fixed or nascent entity is vain', he writes, for 
'the human character is engulfed in the course of history'. Against such human nature 
sceptical background, Horkheimer demands that the age-old and almost knee-jerk reaction 
against any possible alteration of historical structure and processes 'must, at last, be 
silenced' (275 (my translations)). 
Habermas fully agrees with Horkheimer's criticism of the conservative inclinations 
and consequences of much of human nature-based social and (international-) political 
theory. He also thinks that human nature-based theorising often confiises causes and 
effects. Yet Habermas emphasises another significant point of concern. In his essay 
'Philosophische Anthropologic' [Philosophical anthropology], Habermas (1973[1958]) 
raises the problem of the inherent element of structural power of theories and assumptions 
about human nature. I f these theories and assumptions continue to put so much emphasis 
on the allegedly fixed, constant and universal, then these human nature theorists will 
continue to produce nothing but some sort of sorry (international-) political theory that wil l 
be nothing more than a rather simple 'dogma with political consequences, which is so 
much the worse, where it appears with the claim of being a value-free science' (108 (my 
translation)). According to Habermas, we must always remind ourselves that it is not only 
Man who is a historical creature. Our theories, conceptions, and assumptions about Man, 
too, are historical, in the sense that these have emanated from particular historical 
conditions which, in turn, represent a particular set of historical interests (110). I f we do 
not recognise the historical element of human nature-based theorising, we simply 
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perpetuate the existing; we perpetuate the existing, based upon wrong premises, namely, 
the assumption of a universal concept of human nature. 
Such argument by the neo-Marxian critical theorists from the Frankfurt School, i.e. 
the dogmatic ahistoricism argument, which is almost as radical as that of the 
postmodernists, brings us to the fourth prominent objection vis-a-vis the concept of human 
nature in (international-) political theory. This fourth sin of human nature—the argument 
of objectified determinist essentialism—is largely put forth by existential philosopher 
Jean-Paul Sartre. It represents, in many respects, a radicalisation of the criticism of 
postmodernists as well as neo-Marxists. On the other hand, however, its line of argument 
is the complete converse of the metaphysical speculation argument. This latter criticism by 
most of the natural and life scientists stated that the assumptions about human nature of 
much of (international-) political theory are often simply too vague. They argued that the 
only reliable sources in relation to the nature of Man are provided by the biological, 
physical, and neurosciences and that (international-) political theorists should turn to these 
sciences rather than relying on theological speculations, philosophical observations or 
introspections. For this would put their respective (international-) political theories upon 
firmer, because more scientific, grounds. On that point, existentialists disagree. 
Existentialists are opposed to the corresponding claims by these natural and life 
scientists to scientific objectivity and universalism as well as to their methodological 
approach. Existentialists claim that the sciences treat Man as a mere object of study. This 
largely external and objectified approach towards Man, they argue, is wrong, for it has 
degrading effects. Humans are considered to be just too complex. What defines us as 
humans can, therefore, not be comprehended through the mere technicalised study of outer 
and physiological characteristics. Instead, our defining features must be sought within each 
of us. This suggested turn from the external to the internal perspective comes side by side 
with the existentialists' strong belief in Man's complexity, subjectivity, and, ultimately, 
freedom from any form of physiological and psychological determinism. The existential 
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philosophy of Sartre is a case in point here. Even though both Martin Heidegger 
(1962[1927]) as well as Hannah Arendt (1958) have made similarly strong claims as 
regards the essentially anti-essential 'nature' of Man, it is Sartre 'who gives the now 
"classic" argument here' (Berry 1986:122). Largely contra the Platonic-Aristotelian 
essentialist conception of human nature, Sartre argues that there is no such thing as an 
objectified nature of Man. It is, therefore, virtually meaningless to speak of theories of 
human nature. Man simply has no essence. As Sartre (1975[1946]) says: 'man first of all 
exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards' (349). 
According to Sartre and the existentialists, we cannot say that Man is of gold, silver, 
or bronze. Such statements are entirely meaningless, for 'Man is nothing else but that 
which he makes of himself (349). This represents, then, perhaps, the most radical of all 
human nature criticisms. Man is neither solely driven by his 'nature', nor can the nature of 
Man ever be an excuse for the darker sides of human and social existence. For Man is 
essentially and in the strongest possible sense: free. Man is free from nature. Neither can 
we identify any universal givens, nor recognise any universal oughts or wants. It is worth 
quoting Sartre (1975 [1946]) at length here: 
Man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not 
create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment 
that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything 
he does. The existentialist does not believe in the power of 
passion. He wi l l never regard a grand passion as a destructive 
torrent upon which a man is swept into certain actions as by fate, 
and which, therefore, is an excuse for them. He thinks that man is 
responsible for his passion. (353) 
Thus, in the wake of the postmodernists as well as the neo-Marxian critical theorists, the 
existentialists also display an utmost sense of scepticism towards the concept of human 
nature, especially in the realm of the social and (international-) political. But their 
criticism—the objectified determinist essentialism argument—is perhaps more radical, 
because it does not only reject the Platonian-Aristotelian essentialist human nature 
132 
Chapter 4 
viewpoint but also the crude and apologetic determinism of much conservative 
(international-) political theory. Further, when it comes to the question of Man, 
existentialists are characterised by being deeply imbued with a profound belief in the 
freedom of Man, i.e. the fi-eedom from nature and the freedom from God. 
This brings us to the last two critical arguments against the application of the 
concept of human nature in (international-) political theory which now complete the list of 
the six sins of human nature—to, fifth, the naturalistic fallacy argument and to, sixth, the 
rationalistic fallacy argument. These two sets of criticisms sit, so to speak, on top of all 
other criticisms. For regardless of whether we argue from a scientist, postmodern, feminist, 
neo-Marxian, or existentialist standpoint, all those sceptical of the concept of human 
nature may subscribe to these fallacies in order to keep the concept of human nature as far 
away as possible from (international-) political theorising. 
The first of these two criticisms—the naturalistic fallacy (or w-OMgl?/-fallacy)—goes 
back to David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature (1948[1739-40]) as well as to G.E. 
Moore, who actually coined the term in his Principia Ethica (1993[1903]). It is, however, 
Hume who provides us with the very first description of this fallacy. It is worth quoting 
Hume in fu l l length here, for his argument has become a truly consequential statement in 
Western philosophy. In fact, it has become one of the cornerstones of much of Kant's and 
post-Kantian moral philosophy. As Hume (1948[ 1739-40]) famously argues: 
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In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I 
have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in 
the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a god, 
or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a 
sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations 
of propositions is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
connected with an ought or ought not. This change is 
imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For as 
this ought or ought not expresses some new relation or 
affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and 
explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given for 
what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can 
be a deduction from others which are entirely different from it. 
(43) 
The point that Hume raises, which also relates significantly to the concept of human nature 
in (international-) political theory, is rather straightforward. The basic argument is that 
even though it is often done, it is logically inadmissible to deduce an OMg/z/-proposition 
from an w-premise. For instance, the historical denial of universal suffrage (an ought) 
cannot be justified by, or deduced from, making any references to the biological or 
physical inequalities between the genders (the is). Or, in terms of international relations, 
the fact that Man is a Hobbesian lupus does by no means imply that we ought to act 
according to Hobbes's classical description of the state of nature as being a bellum omnium 
contra omnes. Consequently, i f we strictly follow the naturalistic fallacy argument of 
Hume and Moore, this implies that any politico-theoretical or politico-practical ought-
propositions that have been made on the basis of some set of w-facts regarding the nature 
of Man are futile and meaningless. It would not make any difference at all, i f we were even 
capable of showing that these w-claims are both epistemologically and ontologically valid. 
For an ought cannot derive from an is, regardless how valid the w-fact may be. 
The naturalistic fallacy provides some sort of handy argumentative help when it 
comes to the human nature question. It does not need to engage with some of the most 
pressing questions regarding the concept of human nature, such as the nature-nurture 
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debate, because it can simply dismiss the concept of human nature on these grounds. More 
or less the same applies to the last but not least major point of criticism. The rationalistic 
fallacy argument represents an equally strong point of attack, but it, too, does not need to 
get involved too much with the tricky questions surrounding the nature of Man. Instead, it 
provides the ultimate argumentative bludgeon. It accuses human nature theorists of giving 
us merely post-hoc rationalisations in light of their respective (international-) political 
theories. 
This line of argumentative strategy has often been used to tear apart social contract 
theories. Social contract-based (international-) political theory always follows more or less 
the same argumentative structure, i.e. follows what Wolfgang Kersting (1992) has rightly 
called, the 'argumentative triad' (144). The nature of the political community is being 
deduced from a particular nature and type of social contract, which is, in turn, being 
deduced from a particular assumption about a state of nature. But this state of nature is, in 
turn, being deduced from a particular set of assumptions about human nature. And i f we 
add to that triad the international dimension, i.e. i f we add to that triad that as, for instance, 
in Hobbes's case, the nature and limits of the international system are being deduced from 
the political communities which inhabit the system, it wi l l become clear that more often 
than not, international-political theory, be it of Hobbesian provenance or not, derives— 
ultimately—from merely one major but controversial source: the nature of Man. 
These rationalistic fallacy critics, however, argue now that those human nature 
theorists, be it social contract theorists or others, do not actually deduce their respective 
(international-) political theory from assumptions about the nature of Man. Rather, these 
critics accuse those theorists that they manufacture their assumptions about the nature of 
Man according to their respective desired (international-) politico-theoretical outcome. In 
other words: adherents of the rationalistic fallacy argument point out what they regard as 
some form of inadmissible logical circularity. They accuse the human nature theorists of 
not choosing their respective theories or conceptions of Man according to epistemological 
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or ontological criteria and validity but, instead, merely according to what may work best in 
order to ensure the desired outcome and ensure politico-theoretical coherence and 
compatibility. 
Yet, we may ask then: How would these critics know whether human nature 
theorists merely make use of some post-hoc rationalisations? Don't they commit similar 
sins? Don't they also use the concept of human nature? These questions and points of 
scepticism towards the rationalistic fallacy argument signify the end of this section but 
also the analytical task of the next. For such critical counter-questions must be raised vis-
a-vis the rationalist fallacy argument. But, surely, critical questions must also be raised vis-
a-vis the entire catalogue of the six sins of human nature. Whether it be the scientists' 
metaphysical speculation argument, the postmodern and feminist charge of ideological 
mystification, the neo-Marxian critical theorist criticism of dogmatic ahistoricism, the 
existentialist objectified determinist essentialism argument, or, lastly, the concerns over 
the naturalistic as well as rationalistic fallacies—the human nature critics have raised and 
voiced exceptionally harsh sets of criticisms against the concept of human nature in 
(international-) political theory. These are the six major critical philosophical and politico-
theoretical hurdles that any argument in favour of a positive role of assumptions about 
human nature in international-political theory must reckon with—and must be capable to 
overcome. In the next two sections, I wi l l argue that this is possible. 
Critiquing the critics I: The hidden complexity of human nature 
Thanks to these powerful sets of criticisms (the six sins of human nature), arguments in 
favour of the concept of human nature in (international-) political theory have been largely 
on the defensive. The fierce scientific and philosophical exchanges in the nature-nurture or 
naturalist-culturalist debate provide ample proof (Pinker 2002). This anti-human nature 
mood also affected the fate of classical realism. Morgenthau and Niebuhr in particular had 
eventually come under increasing pressure, not only from rival philosophical and politico-
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theoretical positions, especially from the various strands of critical theory, but also from 
Waltzian-styie post-classical realism. Of course, against the background of such a mood of 
the age, arguments such as Morgenthau's (1967[1948]) that 'Human nature, in which the 
laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, 
India, and Greece endeavoured to discover these laws' (4) have been met with great 
scepticism. 
Such human nature arguments have come to be regarded as increasingly 
anachronistic in a post-Watsonian era, which put strong analytical emphasis and normative 
preference of culture over nature and where the (in)famous words of John B. Watson 
(1998[1924]), the father of behaviourism, have become a central argumentative component 
of the culturalists' psychological and socio-political manifesto: 
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own 
specified world to bring them up in and I ' l l guarantee to take any 
one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I 
might select-doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even 
beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, 
tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors. (82) 
As a consequence, Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style international-political theory began to 
lose its appeal. Partly because of its (alleged) conservative implications. Partly because of 
the deep suspicions vis-a-vis any natural or purely biological conceptions of human nature, 
i.e. concerns that have seemed quite legitimate in light of both the eugenicist experiments 
of many Western European countries and, above all, given the horrendous eugenicist Nazi 
policies of Hitler Germany. As Wells and McFadden (2006) succinctly point out: these 
widespread and thorough concerns have meant that scientific investigations into the nature 
of Man had been declining in the post-World War I I years, for 'Behavioural biologists 
retreated into the forest to study chimpanzees, ants, or monkeys, and the field of study of 
human behaviour was left to anthropologists and sociologists' (15). 
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Quite naturally, neither sociologists nor anthropologists have been big fans of the 
concept of human nature. Sociologists have, naturally, favoured sociological explanations 
for human behaviour. They have always warned against crude psychologism; and much of 
contemporary sociology, such as the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, has been 
emphasising societal effects upon human actions. Likewise, anthropologists have turned to 
structural explanations, too, and were, moreover, joined by behavioural psychologists 
close to Watson and radical behaviourist B.F. Skinner (1957; 1976[1948]), who, as 
Pennock (1977) points out, 'provided abundant evidence of human variety, feeding the 
mouths of both ethical and political relativism' and helped create an intellectual climate 
where 'nurture has taken over' (8). It comes, therefore, hardly as a surprise that human 
nature-based classical realism eventually fell out of the picture, particularly i f we take into 
consideration the wider cultural-societal and socio-political climate of the 1970s, i.e. the 
aftermath of the unpopular Vietnam War, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and 
the oil shock (Mearsheimer 2001:19n32). Thus, shifting moods in both theory and practice 
has led to a situation, where, as Peter Coming (1977) rightly remarks, 'the mere mention 
of the term "human nature" evokes deep suspicion in some circles' (20)—this still applies 
today. 
Yet these Pavlovian hostile reactions towards the concept of human nature in the 
realm of (international-) political theory are not always justified. It is the task of this and 
the next section to defend the concept of human nature in light of its alleged sinister nature 
and effects. In this section, I argue that whether we emphasise the vices of assumptions 
about human nature over the virtues (or vice versa) depends largely on how we 
conceptualise the politico-theoretical relationship between assumptions about human 
nature and (international-) political theories. More specifically, I argue that the potential 
strength and validity or weakness and fallibility of the six sins of assumptions about 
human nature derive, in the first instance, from largely two questions: First, from the 
significance or place-value that is ascribed to these assumptions about human nature 
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within (international-) political theories. Secondly, from the specific understanding and 
meaning of the very term human nature. This wil l help understand that the concept of 
human nature is a complex affair but defensible. 
To begin with the first question, the degree of significance or place-value which may 
be ascribed to assumptions about human nature within (international-) political theories 
has not only been different across the various (international-) political theories but also 
been contested. Still, despite these differences, the history of Western (political) 
philosophy has shown four ideal-typical approaches when it comes to the significance or 
place-value question. The first group comprises some of the most influential 20*-century 
existentialists, neo-Marxian critical theorists, and postmodern philosophers, such as 
Heidegger and Sartre, Horkheimer and Habermas, and Foucault and Rorty, respectively. 
As mentioned above, they have argued fiercely that any intimate relationship between the 
concept of human nature and social and (international-) political theory is, for various 
reasons, meaningless, damaging, and dangerous—the fear of ideological mystification 
looms particular large—and must, therefore, be avoided. 
Exactly the opposite opinion has been held by several of the most important Western 
philosophers. 1 S^-century philosophy, in particular, was attracted to the concept of human 
nature. Both the study and usage of the concept of human nature had become, as Edward 
Keene (2005) points out, 'such a hallmark of eighteenth-century thinking about politics 
and society that it almost seems to have been impossible for a scholar in that period to try 
and analyse anything without first saying what "human nature" was' (138, see also 134-
159). Here, Hume, the political realist (Lang 2007b), is a case in point. Hume argues for a 
science of Man which, he wishes, should become the single foundational source for all 
scientific and philosophical subjects, including (international-) political theory (Hume 
1948[ 1739-40], 2000[1748], 1985[1758]; also Biro 1993). Hume's position is perhaps 
rather extreme and may seem (unfortunately) anachronistic today, but it was also held by 
Ludwig Feuerbach, who, in his Principles of the Philosophy of the Future (1986[1843]), 
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argued for a 'new philosophy' that 'makes man—with the inclusion of nature as the 
foundation of man— t^he unique, universal and highest object of philosophy' and that 
'makes anthropology, with the inclusion of physiology, the universal science' (§54:70). 
Feuerbach emphasised that 'Art, religion, philosophy, and science are only manifestations 
or revelations of the true human essence' (§55:70). 
In light of these polar politico-theoretical positions, we must, however, not forget 
that international-political theorists may follow two other approaches when it comes to the 
question of the concept of human nature. The history of (political) philosophy has shown 
that in-between these two ideal-typical poles—i.e. 20*-century anti-human nature versus 
Humean-style human nature theorising—two middle-positions do exist. The first of these 
more moderate approaches is perhaps best represented by Kant. Theorising about the 
social and (international-) political must not be grounded solely in this or that conception 
of Man. On the other hand, though, it is recognised that we cannot wholly dispense with 
making references to human nature either. Leo Strauss (1989) rightly remarks that with the 
ascent of Kant 'reason replaces nature' (92). Kant almost radicalised the belief in reason 
and rejected any conceptions of morality that is grounded in natural law, the pursuit of 
happiness, or religion. As Kant (2002[1785]) argues, ' i t is clear that all moral concepts 
have their seat and origin in reason completely a priori' (II.xx). But, despite the widely 
professed Kantian autonomy from nature, one must not forget Kant's great interest in 
human nature (see his anthropology lectures, Kant 2006[1798]). Nor must we disregard 
that Kant put great emphasis on the question of the nature of Man in matters politico-
philosophical (including the relations among nations) and how it works as the backdrop for 
both possibilities but also dangers and limits. Well-known—but often, unfortunately, 
neglected—are his politico-anthropological remarks in particularly the ninth propositions 
of his 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose' (1991 [1784]). There 
Kant argues that Man's 'unsocial sociability' is 'obviously rooted in human nature' 
(rV:44) and puts forth the famous crooked timber thesis: 'Nothing straight can be 
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constructed from such warped wood as that which man is made o f (VI:46). Hegel with his 
philosophy of spirit and history is another spearhead of such group of (political) 
philosophers who, like Kant, have drawn some inferences from, and have taken into 
account, certain assumptions about human nature but have, however, not allowed, at the 
same time, their (international-) political theory to become a slave of the concept of human 
nature. 
The adherents of the second middle-position are equally less extreme than the 
almost radical views on each of the poles. But in contrast to the Kantian or Hegelian 
human nature position, these (international-) political theorists have argued that 
assumptions about human nature must certainly be a constitutive or central component of 
any (international-) political theory. Hobbes's (international-) political theory is perhaps an 
archetypical exemplar. Like Kant, Hobbes not only pays fu l l attention to human nature, as 
his De Homine (1972[1658]), which probably represents his fullest views on the subject, 
suggests. Moreover, Hobbes was forced by his own methodological-philosophical 
premises to make Man the central concern of his whole (international-) political theory. 
Hobbes's Leviathan (1996[1651]) is a case in point. Contra the then-prevailing 
Aristotelian natural explanations, Hobbes sought to manufacture the ideal and proper state 
by means of applying the Galilean resoluto-compositive method, i.e. by resolving the 
political association into its components, which are, ultimately, the individuals. Influenced 
by the then-prevailing natural science revolution on the Continent and believing that a 
thing is best known from its constituting parts, Hobbes argued that it is imperative to 
analyse or resolve the whole into its components, then reveal the nature and causes of its 
properties and relations among them, and, once the causes and relations are discovered, 
recompose the parts into a whole (xlvi:458). As Hobbes writes: 'to describe the Nature of 
this Artificiall man [commonwealth], I wi l l consider First, the Matter thereof, and the 
Artificer; both which is Man' (introduction: 10). 
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These four ideal-typical politico-theoretical responses to the significance or place-
value question have, unfortunately, often been overlooked when the human nature question 
vis-a-vis (international-) political theory is being raised. This has led to rather unreflective 
criticism. Either critics have lumped together all human nature-sympathetic (international-) 
political theorists and confronted them with the six sins of human nature. Or, alternatively, 
showing at least some sense of greater reflectivity, critics have discriminated between 
these various human nature positions and have established a respective and seemingly 
straightforward hierarchy of criticism according to the following logic: the less human 
nature, the better; the more human nature, the worse the sins. Consequently, existentialists, 
critical theorists, and postmodernists, who all share the conviction that assumptions about 
human nature are useless, dangerous, and wholly dispensable, are the politico-theoretical 
angels. Those like Hume and Feuerbach, who have argued that the concept of human 
nature is central to any meaningful and serious (international-) political theory, are the 
politico-theoretical devils. And the two more moderate positions sandwiched in-between 
the angels and the devils are criticised according to their respective degrees of significance 
and centrality of the concept of human nature. 
But that would be far too simple. The power and validity of the criticism towards the 
usage of assumptions about human nature in (international-) political theory is also 
dependent on the question how the concept of human nature is being conceptualised. In 
other words: the criticisms, suspicions, and fears levelled against assumptions about 
human nature must take into consideration what is actually meant by 'human nature'. 
Surely, the history of (international-) political theory has shown that the concept of human 
nature is a malleable and flexible concept. But still, we can establish some sort of ideal-
typical order. 
In this regard, we must carefully distinguish between two dimensions. The first 
concerns the fact that Western (international-) political theorists have spoken of human 
nature in terms of either its actuality or, alternatively, its potentiality. Some, as Hobbes, 
142 
Chapter 4 
Burke, or also Freud, have thought of and used human nature in a descriptive sense. They 
have attempted to reveal the recurring and essential about human nature. Their respective 
(international-) political theories must be read in terms of their human nature conceptions 
which, they believed, are empirical descriptions of what human beings actually are like in 
the sense of what the entirety of humankind can be shown to have in common, either in 
terms of instincts or drives, interests, or needs. Others, such as Marx and critical theorists 
(especially Marcuse) have, instead, focused on Man's potentialities. In contradistinction, 
they have used in their respective (international-) political theories what they believed Man 
may ideally become, either in terms of capacities or possibilities (Chapman 1977:295-297; 
Duncan 1981:6; Gaus 2000:60-66). On this first level, speaking of human nature can thus 
either refer to the actuality or the potentiality of the nature of Man. 
There is, however, a second dimension to how the concept of human nature has 
traditionally been used. This second level refers broadly to the free-will versus 
determinism problem. Bhikuk Parekh (1997) brings the variety of the meanings of human 
nature to the point: 
Some...take a mechanical (whereas others take a teleological) 
view of nature. For some what is natural must be unchanging; 
others think that it can be modified within certain limits. For 
some, again, to say that a particular tendency is natural to human 
beings is to say that it determines them to behave in a relevant 
way. Others take a weaker view of nature and think that the 
tendency in question only disposes or inclines them to behave in 
a certain manner. (15) 
There is nothing to add, save that it is vital that we distinguish carefully between 
(international-) political theories that are based upon rather deterministic assumptions 
about human nature and between those that may presuppose a nature of Man which allows 
for a great autonomy from the instincts and passions. 
This, then, signifies that we must be careful or on alert vis-a-vis much human nature 
criticism. From a purely descriptive point of view, the history of philosophy and 
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(international-) political theory has revealed a great variety of different understandings and 
meanings of the concept of human nature. Some have referred to the actuality of Man, 
others to his potentialities. By the same token, some think of human nature in terms of 
some sort of purely bio-physiological action determinism. Others have assumed certain 
instincts or drives and passions, but still have believed in a greater degree of autonomy of 
the rational. Thus, i f we now add the question of the significance of place-value of the 
concept of human nature to the present question of how the concept of human nature is 
conceptualised, our approach towards the question of the (in)admissibility of the concept 
of human nature in (international-) political theory may begin to change. It may not change 
to the point where we deny the validity of some of the human nature criticisms but it may 
change our attitude towards the need of a renewed debate within international-political 
theory as regards the concept of human nature. It may become more sympathetic for at 
least two reasons. 
First, because it should be obvious that i f one were to test the entirety of the history 
of Western (international-) political theory for its respective assumptions about human 
nature, the result could be presented as a rather huge tableau or multi-dimensional matrix 
which runs along three axes—namely: first, the degree of significance or place-value of 
human nature; secondly, the first level of human nature conception, i.e. actuality versus 
potentiality; thirdly, its second level, i.e. the degree of determinism versus free-will. Such 
a matrix would reveal that (international-) political theorists have used assumptions about 
human nature in immensely different ways and styles as well as with immensely different 
politico-theoretical foci and aims. 
Secondly, these multifaceted occurrences of assumptions about human nature in 
(international-) political theory imply, in turn, that international-political theorists, whether 
critical, neutral or agnostic on human nature, ought to be attentive vis-a-vis much human 
nature criticism. For some sort of one-size-fits-all human nature criticism wil l most likely 
start from wrong premises and wi l l , consequently, most likely produce unwarranted 
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results. Such a matrix does not yet exist; and respective research into the most important 
classical and contemporary international-political theories would surely produce extremely 
interesting results. This lies, of course, beyond the research tasks and questions of the 
present thesis. Yet still, I have emphasised that we must recognise the different degrees of 
place-values of assumptions about human nature as well as the different first- and second-
level conceptualisations of the concept of human nature, for it provides a fruitfti l analytical 
background against which the six sins of human nature can be tested. In other words, it 
furthers my argument of this chapter that some of the alleged sins of human nature must be 
taken with a pinch of salt—partly because, as this section argues, the concept of human 
nature proves to be a much more complex affair when applied in (international-) political 
theory than often allowed for by the critics. 
The naturalistic fallacy or w-owgAz-fallacy is a case in point. Even though it is often 
part of the crusade against the concept of human nature, it is a rather weak point of 
criticism and, ultimately, incapable of deciding the ought-question in the negative 
direction. The first reason is that the proposition that an ought cannot have any basis 
whatsoever in an w-premise—which implies in the domain of the international-political 
that we must not draw any politico-theoretical oug/ir-conclusions from /s-facts about the 
nature of Man, regardless of how valid these w-claims may be epistemologically and 
ontologically—is by no means uncontroversial. John Searle (1969) developed the counter-
concept of the 'naturalistic fallacy fallacy [sic]' which Searle claims to be the 'fallacy of 
supposing that it is logically impossible for any set of statements of the kind usually called 
descriptive to entail a statement of the kind usually called evaluative' (132, see 132-136; 
also Rand 1964; Anderson 1974; Kolnai 1980). But even i f we continued to adhere to the 
is-ought fallacy, found it convincing, and appreciated its concerns (as this thesis does), its 
use as a politico-theoretical weapon against assumptions about human nature in 
(international-) political theory would still be rather limited. For the is-ought-faW&cy may 
surely be capable of hitting its target on occasions, but it cannot provide any convincing 
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argument against the usage of assumptions about human nature in international-political 
theories per se. This can be derived from the causa Hume. 
On the one hand, Hume is the intellectual father of the is-ought fallacy. But, on the 
other hand, Hume is, as mentioned earlier, the spearhead of a philosophical position that 
has argued that the science of Man or the concept of human nature ought to be the single 
foundational source for all the sciences and philosophies, including (international-) 
political theory. Hume's view belongs to the most extreme view with regard to the 
significance and place-value of assumptions about human nature. There is no doubt that 
Hume's conception of Man and the politico-theoretical significance he ascribes to 
assumptions about human nature has been anathema to those (such as neo-Marxian critical 
theorists and postmodernists) who have wished to free (international-) political theory 
from the concept of human nature. As Hume (2000[1748]) writes: 
Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that 
history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its 
chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles 
of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of 
circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials 
from which we may form our observations and become 
acquainted with the regular springs of human action and 
behaviour. (64) 
Perhaps equally controversial in the eyes of the human nature critics, Hume (1985[1758]) 
argues that Man's essentially self-interested nature must necessarily lead to the 'political 
maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave' (42). These are strong claims, surely 
not to everybody's liking. 
But it does not really matter how good or bad, realistic or idealistic, naturalist or 
culturalist, optimist or pessimist, determinist or autonomous the assumptions about human 
nature of Hume may be. The fact that Hume is the father of the is-ought fallacy but also, at 
the same time, one of Western philosophy's leading spokespersons arguing for the 
strongest possible role for human nature in (political) philosophy demonstrates simply but 
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forcefiilly that there is no quasi-automatic philosophical or logical linkage between the 
Humean fallacy and the use of assumptions about human nature in (international-) political 
theory. Surely, i f proponents of assumptions about human nature do commit the is-ought 
sin (and, for the sake of completeness, Hume is believed to have done so (Sturgeon 2001)), 
the criticism of committing the is-ought fallacy certainly discredit those (international-) 
political theories that base the ought on the is. But it can certainly not discredit the entire 
politico-theoretical position, which considers the usage of assumptions about human nature 
as being a priori f rui tful , essential, and indispensable, per se. The is-ought fallacy 
argument can certainly catch those that have fallen prey to it, but it can, of course, not 
unreflectively be applied to all human nature-informed (international-) political theories: 
namely, not to those that strictly distinguish between a human nature-based is and an 
politico-philosophical ought. Consequently, the w-OMgA/-fallacy argument seems overrated 
and ineffective; and it can, therefore, safely be discarded. 
Still, I wi l l continue picking on the popular is-ought fallacy, particularly by turning 
very briefly to Kant and then Kelsen. This seems entirely justified as these two 
illuminating figures signify and help understand another point of criticism to be levelled 
against those sceptical and critical of assumptions about human nature in (international-) 
political theory: namely, that these critics themselves are, like the post-classical realists, 
not as human nature-freed as they would have us believe. As argued above, together with 
Hegel but contra Hume and Feuerbach, Kant belongs to those who argue that the concept 
of human nature is a necessary, even though rather peripheral, additivum to (international-) 
political theory. Yet, in the wake of Hume, Kant is, at the same time, one of the perhaps 
most fervent advocates of a strict separation between the is and the ought. Thus, Kant is 
just another example that the /s-oug/7/-fallacy argument does not necessarily imply that one 
has to pursue a hostile position with regards to assumptions about human nature in 
(international-) political theory. 
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The same applies to Hans Kelsen. Kant's radicalism regarding the is-ought question 
finds its equivalent in the neo-Kantian legal and state philosophy of Kelsen (see Kelsen 
1967[1934]; 1999[1945]; Klug 1964). Founder of the Viennese school of law, Kelsen 
presents us with a pure science of law. His pure theory of law and state is a theory of 
positive law and attempts, as Kelsen (1934:477) says, to 'answer the question. What is the 
law? but not the question. What ought it to be?' At the same time, Kelsen's pure theory of 
law and state attempted to purify jurisprudence from all 'foreign elements' such as 
psychology, sociology, biology, and ethics. Though Kelsen (1967[1934]) acknowledges 
that one might be somewhat seduced to incorporate all these elements into a theory of law 
since all these disciplines 'deal with subject matters that are closely connected with law' 
(1), Kelsen, nevertheless, argues that 
The Pure Theory of Law undertakes to delimit the cognition of 
law against these disciplines, not because it ignores or denies the 
connection, but because it wishes to avoid uncritical mixture of 
methodologically different disciplines (methodological 
syncretism) which obscures the essence of the science of law and 
obliterates the limits imposed upon it by the nature of its subject 
matter. (1) 
A l l well and good. The pure theory of law's object of cognition is the norm, an ought-
proposition. The law (and the state) is a system of norms, where norms are 'the meaning of 
acts of wi l l that are directed toward the conduct of others' and that only 'human acts of 
w i l l ' and not the wi l l of God or any natural law qualify as 'legal norms' (Kelsen 
1986[1964]: 111). But one must not overlook that that even though Kelsen's pure theory of 
law and state is freed from any anthropological or psychological grounding, this does not 
imply that Kelsen dispensed with making assumption about the nature of Man in his 
thought, namely, to be more precise, in his: (international-) political theory. 
Kelsen must not only be read from a jurisprudential angle. This would be a 
significant undervaluation of Kelsen's oeuvre and do injustice to one of the greatest 
democracy theorists, particularly to his political theory of pluralist democracy (see Kelsen 
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1955; 1957; also Dreier 1990). It is, however, exactly this political theory of democracy 
that is, ultimately, based upon some rather profound assumptions about the nature of Man. 
Though usually considered an idealist (Bull 1986), Kelsen thinks of politics largely in 
terms of power and the struggle for power. Like Nietzsche, Freud, and Weber as well as 
other political realists such as Morgenthau, Kelsen recognises that Man, his behaviour, 
political actions, and the (international-) political itself cannot be understood without the 
element of power in human relations. Like these realists, Kelsen knows that the ubiquitous 
struggle for power cannot be dissociated, ultimately, fi-om the nature of Man, which he 
largely understands in terms of drives (Ooyen 2003 :§4). 
At least on two occasions in his criticisms of Marxism (Kelsen 1920, 1923) Kelsen 
argues that we must not neglect the fact that we are being confronted with indestructible 
drives that fuel Man's desire to dominate his fellows and that it is not capitalism that 
corrupts Man but that capitalism is merely the outgrowth of an inherently conflictual drive-
structure that wishes to gratify its desires and interests. The fact that Kelsen stood under 
the heavy influence of Freud—both personal but also intellectual (Kelsen 1922; Jabloner 
1998)—only adds to the picture of a Kelsen whose political thought is not only based upon 
some profound recognition of power realism but also upon an overt conception of Man 
which emphasises a Freudian-style irrational drive-structure. Thus, none other than Kelsen, 
a neo-Kantian par excellence who is also an adherent to the is-ought fallacy, did not 
refrain from the use of assumptions about human nature. Again, there is no automatic 
connection between the Humean fallacy and the use of assumptions about human nature in 
(international-) political theory. 
I have, however, put some emphasis on Kelsen predominantly for a different reason: 
namely, because Kelsen does not only help put the naturalistic (or is-ought) fallacy 
argument in its proper perspective, but he proves to be an elegant bridge to the question of 
the next section. Coming back to Kelsen's assumptions about human nature, one may 
respond and argue that Kelsen's case is a peculiar one. One could argue that we must 
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carefully distinguish between Kelsen's purified legal and state philosophy, which refrains 
from presuming assumptions about human nature, and Kelsen's (international-) political 
theory, which is based upon some profound (Freudian-style) assumptions about human 
nature. Indeed, such an argument could not be more legitimate or correct. But I did not 
raise the causa Kelsen in order to denounce Kelsen's pure theory of law and state or to re-
interpret it as being grounded upon a certain conception of human nature. Far from it; I 
have raised and brought Kelsen into the discussion exactly because of this apparent 
dualistic freatment of the concept of human nature. The very same Kelsen, whose elegant 
and truly consequential pure theory of law and state, which has proved to be so utterly 
sceptical of and fiercely unwilling to allow any form of human nature reasoning into 
matters legal, obviously skipped his reservations against the influx of assumptions about 
human nature as soon as it got to matters (international-) political. This tells us that it may 
somehow be i mpossible or unavoidable to theorise about the (international-) political 
without using the concept of human nature and without presupposing certain assumptions 
about the nature of Man. 
I wi l l now argue that this seems to be the case. 
Critiquing the critics II: The hidden omnipresence of human nature 
This section continues with the task of critiquing the human nature critics. I argue that, 
although it may not be truly impossible, it seems virtually impossible to theorise the 
international-political without any underlying conception of human nature. 
I f Kant, the great apostle of human autonomy from nature as well as the a priori, 
cannot but recognise the natural unsocial sociability and crookedness of Man; i f Kelsen, 
the great apostle of the purification of law from all foreign elements, including natural law 
and human nature, cannot but recognise in his (international-) political theory that Man is 
driven by certain Freudian-style instincts which aim for the gratification of power 
interests; and i f Kant and Kelsen, both great apostles of the strict separation of the is and 
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the ought, do use the concept of human nature as part of their respective (international-) 
political theory, then, the hypothesis that some of the fervent critics of the concept of 
human nature in (international-) political theory may also not have been capable of 
avoiding such assumptions about human nature seems not too wide of the mark. This line 
of enquiry wi l l lead to the argument that neither neo-Marxian critical theorists, nor post-
modernists, nor feminists are as human nature-purified as they would have us believe. This 
implies that these human nature critics are caught in essentially the same traps which they 
have set for the human nature-sinners, including realists. 
I begin with neo-Marxian critical theorists. They have argued fiercely that Man is a 
historical creature shaped by prevailing modes of production and social circumstances. 
They have criticised purely naturalistic explanations, and their dogmatic ahistoricism 
argument has also been levelled against the assumptions about human nature of realists. 
Their human nature criticism provokes, however, a three-fold response. First, the 
assumptions about human nature of realism are not of necessity ahistorical. Here, 
Rousseau— t^he realist (Hoffmann & Fidler 1991; Doyle 1997)—is a case in point. In fact, 
Rousseau faulted the then-prevailing conceptions of human nature proclaimed by both 
realists and non-realists, but he took greatest offence at Hobbes's account of Man. As 
Rousseau (1997[1755]) argued: 'all of them, continually speaking of need, greed, 
oppression, desires, and pride transferred to the state of Nature ideas they had taken from 
society; They spoke of Savage Man and depicted Civil man' (Exordium: 132). In complete 
contradistinction to Hobbes's bellum omnium contra omnes and Machiavelli's state of 
licence, Rousseau portrays the state of nature as more benign. He argues that the non-
societal state of nature was, in fact, 'the most conducive to Peace and the best suited to 
Mankind' (part 1:151) because Man's increasing self-love {amour-propre)—i.e. the 
relational sentiment that 'inspires men with all the evils they do one another' (Rousseau's 
Notes, n. xv)—is not an inherent characteristic of pre-societal Man. Instead, savage Man, 
Rousseau argues, enjoyed environmental circumstances where physical inequalities did not 
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matter. Roaming through the woods, the noble savage possessed neither foresight, 
curiosity, education, nor reason; he was completely independent, only concerned with his 
self-preservation, showed pity, compassion towards the suffering of his fellow savages, 
and had no desire to harm them. Savage man was a noble man and was by nature peaceful 
but, obviously, malleable (part. I ) ; and based on that (historicist) conception of human 
nature, Rousseau's (international-) political theory carries with it one very important 
message succinctly put in his Confessions (1918[c. 1770]): 'Madmen! know that all your 
evils proceed from yourselves!' (bk. viii:280). 
The example of Rousseau signifies and raises, then, a second and third reason why 
the neo-Marxian dogmatic ahistoricism argument requires some qualification. A historical 
materialist conception of politics and society does not imply that no assumptions about 
human nature are being made. On this point, Marx himself is revealing. Surely, Marxian 
Man differs from the classical and post-classical realist Man. But upon closer inspection, it 
seems unquestionable that Marxian (international-) political theory is as profoundly 
informed by assumptions about human nature as is realism or, as wil l be argued below, any 
other international-political theory. True, Marx (1994[1845]-a) faults the human nature 
essentialists, particularly Feuerbach, that they speak of 'Man' rather than 'real historical 
men' (113). True, Marx presents us with a methodological approach which requires we 
start from 'real premises', namely, of 'men, not in any fantastic isolation and fixation, but 
in their real, empirically perceptible process of development under certain conditions' 
(112). It is also true that Marx's thinking is characterised by the following general credo: 
'Do not let us go back to a fictitious primordial condition...Such a primordial condition 
explains nothing; it merely pushes the question away into a grey nebulous distance' (Marx 
1986[1844]:36-37). 
But this does not save Marx from criticism. His arguments do not, and must not, 
belie the fact that we can identify a universal and fixed nature of Man in Marx's thought. 
In fact, Ian Forbes (1981) points out that Marx never claimed that 'human nature did not 
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exist' (25). Be that as it may; the significant point is that Marxian Man bears, of course, 
natural characteristics. These surface in Marx's writings, as Norman Geras (1983) 
unearthed, under the disguise of 'natural needs', 'physically indispensable means of 
subsistence', and 'physical needs'; and these essential or natural needs, which are 
constitutive elements of Marxian Man's socio-historical existence, are no fewer than: 
Food, clothing, shelter, fiiel, rest and sleep; hygiene, 'healthy 
maintenance of the body', fresh air and sunlight; intellectual 
requirements, social intercourse, sexual needs in so far as they are 
presupposed by 'relations between the sexes'; the needs of 
support specific to infancy, old age and incapacity, and the need 
for a safe and healthy working environment ('space, light, air and 
protection against the dangerous or the unhealthy concomitants of 
the production process'—otherwise the 'five senses...pay the 
penalty'). (83; also on Marxian Man, see Fromm 1961; Seve 
1978; Sayers 1998) 
Further, in this wake, we must not forget that, together with Aristotle, Marx represents 'the 
pole of political thought which assumes that man is naturally social' (Masters 1977:91). 
Thus, Marx's conception of human nature may not be Hobbesian. But being even 
somewhat reminiscent of Rousseau's philosophy of history where the conventional 
Hobbesian logic of a warlike state of nature vis-a-vis a peaceful state of society is 
essentially reversed, it can hardly be denied that Marx, too, used the concept of human 
nature, presumed certain assumptions about the nature of Man, and derived these 
assumptions from, and modelled these around, his prior ideas about the nature of Man. 
Yet Marx is not an isolated case. It does not surprise us that neo-Marxian critical 
theorists, who have been so sceptical vis-a-vis the admissibility of assumptions about 
human nature in (international-) political theory, could also not avoid the concept of 
human nature. In fact, it was the amalgamation of Marx and Freud which has become one 
of the constitutive philosophical and methodological cornerstones of neo-Marxian critical 
theorists. But what other element lies behind this philosophical mixture of Marx/Freud 
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than the amalgamation of Marxian historical materialism and Freudian human nature? We 
know that since the early days of the Frankfurt School, Horkheimer has, as Martin Jay 
(1973) points out, argued 'for the urgency of a psychological supplement to Marxist 
theory' (100). We also know that such psychological supplement was provided by Freud's 
psycho-analytic theory of Man. As Horkheimer made clear in a letter to Leo Lowenthal 
who had requested advice on how to respond to the question about the Institute of Social 
Research's attitude towards Freud: 
I think you should be simply positive. We really are deeply 
indebted to Freud and his first collaborators. His thought is one of 
the Bildungsmachte [foundation stones] [sic] without which our 
own philosophy would not be what it is. I have anew realized his 
grandeur during the last weeks, (quoted in Jay 1973:102) 
Thus, be it Horkheimer, Adomo, Fromm, Pollack, Lowenthal, Marcuse, or second 
generation critical theorists such as Habermas—all of these neo-Marxian critical theorists 
have shown to have more or less strong intellectual links to Freudian socio-political but 
also to his psycho-analytic-psychological thought. Though Marcuse turned to Freud 
relatively late (Arato & Gebhardt 1978:388-389), he somewhat spearheads these theorists. 
His Eros and Civilisation (1972[1955]) still represents one of the most intriguing yet 
controversial interpretation of Freud to date. 
1 do not wish to imply, however, that there has been a consensus among these neo-
Marxian critical theorists as to how they should read and go about Freud; or that these 
theorists' intellectual relationships to Freud have been unproblematic, uncontroversial, or 
set in stone. This would not be correct. For the historiography of the Frankfurt School has 
shown that sharpest debates were being fought over Freud. These disputes have helped to 
divide the Frankfurt School into orthodox Freudians, such as Marcuse, and revisionist 
Freudians, such as Fromm, and led, eventually, even to the split with Fromm (Jay 1973:86-
112; Geoghegan 1981; Wiggershaus 1994:265-273; Stirk 2000:76-92). I am adding these 
Freud quarrels here, for they help underscore the argument that neo-Marxian critical 
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theorists, too, use as sumptions about human nature i n their respective (international-) 
political theories. They cannot fully escape the natural-instinctual Man. They have not 
only consciously chosen Freud's theory of human nature as one of their philosophical 
cornerstones. They have also, by turning to Freud, taken aboard the biological Freud, i.e. a 
theory of Man which, ultimately, puts great emphasis on the biological-physiological 
make-up of Man. But i f we add to this all the disputes, debates, twists and turns as regards 
Freud and human psychology that have taken place, we must re-consider these neo-
Marxian critical theorists. It not only demonstrates just how significant and central the 
theme of human nature has actually been to their (international-) political theories. But it 
also reveals how misleading and iniquitous their criticism of the concept of human nature 
is. As the old proverb by George Herbert goes: 'Whose house is of glasse, must not throw 
stones at one another!' 
The same line of criticism applies to postmodernists, feminists, and existentialists. 
Their human nature critical arguments—particularly their ideological mystification and 
objectified determinist essentialism argument, both representing the most radical attacks 
on the positive role of assumptions about human nature in (international-) political 
theory—must be revised significantly. They have also not succeeded where others have 
failed: namely, to purify (international-) political theory from the concept of human nature. 
To begin with the postmodernists and existentialists, Rorty and Sartre have proved 
to be loud voices in the philosophical and politico-theoretical struggle of human nature 
critics against the concept of human nature. But upon closer analysis, both Rorty's 
pragmatism and Sartre's existentialism cannot escape the legitimate allegation that they 
presuppose certain assumptions about human nature. In Sartre's case, we can see this in his 
later works where he moved into a Marxist historical materialist direction and put more 
and more emphasis on the importance of both the physiological and psychological needs 
that humans have (Rose 2003; Stevenson & Haberman 2004:192-195). In Rorty's case (the 
same argument also applies to Sartre), we can see this embedded in his idea that we are 
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extraordinarily malleable and free human beings. Even i f this anti-determinist stance was 
correct, it would not rescue him, for Man could not be malleable and free i f it was not 
apparently assumed that nature has allowed for such malleability and freedom in the first 
_place. Both pragmatist and existentialist thought eschew the very term 'human nature' but 
in both cases, the concept of human nature 'is dispensed with in name only' and 'the 
concept remains' (Berry 1986:122-131). As with neo-Marxian critical theorists, it is not 
the question whether the whole system of Rorty's pragmatism or Sartre's existentialism is 
convincing. The important point is that both cannot avoid making assumptions about 
human nature. 
On that score, feminists also fail. True, as with all philosophical Weltanschauungen, 
there is not one feminism, but a diverse body of theoretical positions which are somewhat 
bound together by an overarching shared theme. Yet, it is now known that virtually all 
forms of contemporary feminist (international-) political theory—be it liberal feminism, 
traditional Marxist feminism, radical feminism, socialist feminism, constructivist 
feminism, feminist poststructuralism, or postcolonial feminism—follow a politico-
theoretical pattern of thought comparable to other (international-) political theories such as 
realism. Feminists themselves have identified the conceptions of human nature that 
underlie their respective theories. They have traced how these assumptions interact with 
their criticism of really-existing societies and how these assumptions inform their demand 
for social and political change (Levitas 1981; Jaggar 1983; Cahill 1997). These 
assumptions about human nature are, naturally, of a broader feminist-philosophical 
provenance. Humans are less naturalistic than socially-constructed. They may be, but, 
again: the assumption of malleability represents, ultimately, not more and not less than an 
assumption about the nature of human beings. 
In light of these counter-criticisms offered thus far, I wish to emphasise that my 
argumentative strategy vis-a-vis neo-Marxian critical theorists, postmodernists, 
existentialists, and feminists regarding the question of assumptions about human nature in 
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international-political theory does by no means intend to make a mockery of these major 
and consequential strands of Western philosophy. I do presume—when it comes to the 
question of human nature—that any reasonable mind agrees with Rorty (1999) that 
'notions like "the homosexual" and "the Negro" and "the female" are best seen not as 
inevitable classifications of human beings but rather as inventions that have done more 
harm than good'. It seems unquestionable that Rorty is both empirically and normatively 
absolutely right. 
It seems, however, equally unquestionable that these critics have—despite being so 
overtly critical of assumptions about human nature in (international-) political theory—not 
been capable of avoiding fundamental assumptions about the nature of Man. Instead, these 
human nature critics have let these assumptions profoundly inform their respective 
(international-) political theories. It is, of course, true that these theorists do prefer 
historicism over ahistoricism, prefer culture or nurture over nature, and prefer free-will 
over strict determinism. But, as was pointed out above, the conception of human nature is 
not fixed to purely naturalistic-determinist theories about Man. Rather, when we speak of 
human nature, we may refer to both historicist and cultural or environmentalist accounts of 
Man as well as to purely and crudely biological-physiological human nature theories. Yet 
even i f one were to reply and demonstrate that these human nature critics did not really 
talk about 'human nature' in the crude sense, but have, instead, referred merely to some 
sort of theory of the 'human being' which emphasises the cultural over the natural; and 
that to accuse these critics of adhering to the concept of human nature is, therefore, merely 
the result of an ingenious rhetorical hocus-pocus over the meaning of a term—even this 
could not seriously challenge, damage, or change the argument that these critics, too, have 
made fundamental assumptions about the nature of Man. 
I presume that no serious person who has written on the subject of the nature of Man 
has ever denied that environmental or cultural circumstances shape Man and his human 
and social relations throughout his historical existence. Thus, the crucial debate revolves 
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around the question of the respective degrees of Man's autonomy from his primordial 
nature. Some allow for greater autonomy, others for less. But we can not, and must not, 
deny or forget that there is, ultimately, always a nature to be reckoned with. As renowned 
experimental psychologist Pinker (2002) argues: 'culture is crucial, but culture could not 
exist without mental faculties that allows humans to create and learn culture to begin with' 
(viii-ix). In other words: it, ultimately, all comes down to nature. There simply cannot exist 
purely cultural or historicist or environmentalist conceptions of Man which are not, 
ultimately, grounded in nature. Theories and assumptions about human nature are, 
ultimately, always and of necessity theories and assumptions about the biological-
physiological nature of Man. Needless to say, this applies to classical realist and post-
classical realist as well as to neo-Marxian critical theorist, postmodern, existentialist, and 
feminist (or any other philosophical or politico-theoretical) assumptions about human 
nature; this applies regardless of the varying degrees of human malleability, perfectibility, 
improvability these respective theories may presume. Thus, any assumption or statement 
about Man and his behaviour, about his human and social existence is, ultimately, an 
assumption or statement about the nature of Man. 
The implications of the argument that some of the fiercest and most outspoken 
critics of assumptions about human nature in (international-) political theory have also 
made extensive use of the concept of human nature are far-reaching. First, the argument 
adds to the view that it is impossible to construct (international-) political theories that can 
do without assumptions about human nature. Consequently, it further underscores the 
importance of the question whether the concept of human nature ought to be dead in 
realism. The same applies to the second and perhaps more immediate implication of so-
called human nature-critical but human nature-infused philosophies and (international-) 
political theories. Human nature critics are now being confronted with the same traps and 
criticisms that they laid out for their allegedly human nature-obsessed opponents, i.e. for 
the human nature sinners to which particularly classical realists have often been added. 
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The second implication is rather harsh. It is a real gift to those more sympathetic to 
the idea of human nature in international-political theory. It means that neo-Marxian 
critical theorists, postmodernists, existentialists, and also feminists wi l l have to face the 
charge that their sets of criticisms are virtually worthless. The fact that these human nature 
critics are, so to speak, also human nature sinners puts the 'older' and more 'prominent' 
generation of human nature sinners—among them the classical realists—in the 
comfortable position of raising two straightforward arguments. First, that it seems not 
immediately clear why the human nature critics' allegedly human nature-purified 
(international-) political theories should in any significant ways be intellectually and 
methodologically superior, given that they, too, make use of the concept of human nature. 
And, secondly, that is not immediately clear why the six sins of human nature should not 
equally apply to these human nature critics. This does by no means imply that classical 
realism-inspired international-political theorists should gloss over all the sets of criticisms. 
They should certainly not, for the concept of human nature remains a complex concept that 
requires great care. But they must proactively turn the tables on the human nature critics. 
They have all the legitimacy to press hard the human nature critics and demand thorough 
explanations from them as to why they believe that they have not fallen prey to the six sins 
of human nature. How can the human nature critics prove that they do not commit the 
crime of the rationalistic fallacy? Do their assumptions about human nature not also serve 
politico-theoretical as well as practical-political interests and purposes? Do they not also 
presuppose a universalistic conception of Man, be it a Marxian homo faber or Rorty's 
flexible, protean, self-shaping animal? Why is their universalism unproblematic? How do 
they know that Man is of gold and not of bronze? How can they epistemologically 
disentangle the natural from the cultural? And so forth. 
Such questions would form a long list. But these questions must be addressed. And, 
leaving aside the question of the burden of proof—does it lie with those pro-actively 
presuming assumptions about human nature or with those discontented with the 
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concept?—these critical questions must ideally be addressed by both parties. We are now 
being faced with a situation where assumptions about human nature are still being made in 
international-political theory and where these assumptions exert a powerful influence on 
various international-political theories, but where, at the same time, the concept of human 
nature and its nature, function, role, effects, and complexity does, by no means, receive the 
appropriate attention from contemporary IR theorists. Further, this situation is 
characterised by the fact that the concept of human nature surfaces when it seems 
expedient, for it is thought to provide the effective means to help execute the final 
argumentative stab in the back of a disliked theory: namely, by claiming that the relevant 
set of assumptions about human nature in question is simply wrong. Unless one is content 
with such hollow pseudo debates—where often one accuses the other of being either too 
rosy or too fatalistic when it comes to human nature—which hamper the progress and 
utility of international-political theories, some delicate questions as regards the concept of 
human nature in international-political theory must be raised and debated. 
The alternative to raising the human nature question anew and to putting it back to 
the centre of contemporary international-political theory would be the immediate 
pursuance of another intellectual-scientific project, perhaps best entitled as 'perfecting the 
Waltzians'. The renewed task would be to construct an international-political theory that is 
truly purified from any implicit or explicit assumptions about human nature. This would 
imply that questions regarding the concept of human nature could be neglected and that we 
could focus on counting missiles, tracing international cash flows, unearthing foreign-
policy ideologies, etc. Surely, the present debate has shown that international-political 
theorists have perhaps the means of enjoying a certain autonomy from assumptions about 
human nature; international-political theories can perhaps ascribe different degrees of 
significance or place-values to the concept of human nature; and they can perhaps 
capitalise on the flexibility and malleability of how human nature is conceptualised, which 
160 
Chapter 4 
allows the concept of human nature to appear as unimportant as possible. Yet, neglecting 
or discarding the human nature question seems intellectually short-sighted. 
We may never be able to get rid of the human nature question, because we may 
never be able to get rid of the concept of human nature. Hence, the same sort of problems, 
questions, and discontents wi l l surface over and over again. This relates back to a concern 
raised earlier. The apparent failure of both post-classicals as well as the various human 
nature critics to present us with human nature-freed (international-) political theories 
suggests that the project of perfecting post-classical realism wi l l most likely end in failure. 
Regardless of how cleverly IR theorists may approach the concept of human nature, it 
seems virtually impossible to theorise the international-political without making any 
explicit or implicit references to the nature of Man. 
Conclusion 
The six sins of human nature are incapable of deciding whether human nature ought to be 
dead—neither in the affirmative (nor in the negative). No matter whether we use these 
human nature criticisms in their entirety or pick out several single points of concern, the 
human nature question cannot be definitively answered. It may be entirely justified to 
decry potentially crude forms of determinist biologism in the sphere of the (international-) 
political or legitimate to decry the deduction of a politico-theoretical ought from a human 
nature-w. Surely, these arguments can be used to tear apart individual international-
political theories, whether of realist or any other provenance, that have fallen prey to these 
sins. Yet these individual concerns, or even i f the whole six-fold package of human nature 
concerns were legitimately applicable, do no t elevate the human nature critics into a 
position from which they can succeed in wiping the concept of human nature o f f the 
intellectual map of contemporary international-political theory. The concept is too 
complex. Critics cannot lump together the entirety of (realist) international-political 
theories and declare the concept of human nature irrelevant. 
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The six sins of the concept human nature in international-political theory are of great 
significance in their own right, but these criticisms cannot pose a serious threat to those in 
favour of assumptions about human nature in (realist) international-political theory. We 
must not forget the sheer omnipresence of assumptions about human nature in their own 
Weltanschauungen and theories. This leaves the current pursuit of an answer to the ought-
question at the following: it seems that we are all human nature sinners. 
Classical realists, particularly Morgenthau and Niebuhr but also Kennan, Carr, and 
Lippmann, have pro-actively and almost habitually amalgamated assumptions about 
human nature with international-political theorising. Post-classical realists have tried to 
purify (international-) political theory from the concept of human nature, but they have 
failed. And so have the human nature critics. We may conclude it is impossible to theorise 
the (international-) political without making some profound assumptions about the nature 
of Man. It seems, then, that we are being left with the concept of human nature until some 
IR theorists wi l l have figured out how to get rid of the tutelage of human nature. 
Such intellectual attitude vis-a-vis the concept of human nature is, however, too 
defensive and too passive; and the ought-question remains largely unanswered. The fact 
that most of the human nature criticism seems problematic does not necessarily lead to the 
positive argument that we must bring back to realism a particular and explicit conception 
of human nature. But what does? 
In light of this question, the next chapter's title reveals both its analytical task but 
also its argument: 'The Virtues of Freudian Human Nature'. 
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T H E V I R T U E S O F F R E U D I A N H U M A N N A T U R E 
Introduction 
I f human nature is not dead, ought it to be dead? The ought-question entails two ideal-
typical politico-theoretical options. One is purifying realism of the concept of human 
nature (perfecting the Waltzians). The other is pro-actively defending a central role of the 
concept of human nature in realism (resurrecting the classicals and human nature). The 
preceding chapter has marked the start of my politico-theoretical plaidoyer for the human 
nature-friendly position. I unearthed the flaws and vices of much of human nature criticism 
and argued that the six-fold set of human nature sins put forth by the human nature critics 
is not capable of providing convincing evidence and arguments that the concept of human 
nature must not be used in theories of the international-political. 
To answer the ought-question, we require a set of positive arguments in favour of 
the concept of human nature in realism. This chapter provides these arguments which are 
intimately tied to a specific conception of human nature. It deals not so much with the 
question whether we need the concept of human nature in realist international-political 
thought (we know that we cannot avoid making assumptions about human nature), but 
rather with the question which particular conception of human nature is suitable for 
political realism and why. 
I argue for the positive role of a distinctively Freudian conception of human nature 
in political realism. Freudian human nature helps to solve several problems associated with 
many classical and contemporary forms of realist international-political theory. Bringing 
contemporary realism back to its original roots by providing political realism with a 
suitable intellectual substructure or philosophical anthropology, Freud helps contemporary 
realists to explain and legitimise more thoroughly their distinctive conception of the world 
or Weltanschauung. 
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We should turn to Freud because his conception of human nature has three main 
virtues for political realism. First, as the next section argues, Freudian human nature helps 
us to demystify the defining themes, principles, and concepts of political realism. Freudian 
Man helps to resolve into their individual-psychological elements many of post-classical 
realism's anthropomorphological projections and hypostatisations. Secondly, as I argue in 
the subsequent section, Freud's conception of human nature helps us to understand the 
underlying psychological mechanics of group formation and internal and external group 
behaviour vis-a-vis other political communities. Capable of explaining the link between 
the nature of Man and the nature of the political community, Freud offers us a nicely 
developed and powerful statement of the nature and inner workings of the (international) 
human condition and international relations. And, thirdly, in this chapter's last section, I 
argue that the human nature conception of Freud serves as a useful and constant reminder 
for political realists never to expect too much but also not too little from Man. Freudian 
Man helps us to define the possibilities and limits of international relations, to manoeuvre 
consciously and steadfastly between reality and Utopia. 
Freudian human nature and the demystification of political realism 
Political realism has always been a fascinating body of international-political thought as 
well as been controversial. Michael Williams (2005) hits the nail on its head: 
To some, being a Realist represents the height of wisdom: the 
mark of a clear-sighted ability to understand the world the way it 
is, a willingness to confront the dynamics of power and interest 
that are held to govern world politics. To others. Realism is a 
mark of failure: morally obtuse and historically anachronistic, it 
represents a lack of political understanding and imagination that 
is misleading at best, pernicious and destructive at worst. (1) 
To this tension between realism and its critics, we must add the internal tension between 
the Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian classical realists and the Waltzian/Mearsheimerian post-
classical realists. Taking the external and internal tensions together, we cannot but 
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recognise that contemporary realist international-political thought is, despite its continuing 
status as one of the most powerful Weltanschauungen in IR, being attacked on many 
fronts. 
Here, Freud comes in again. It is one of the main virtues of Freud that his conception 
of human nature helps contemporary realism to tackle and solve several of its main 
analytical and normative problems. Turning to Freud helps to demystify and strengthen 
realism, for Freudian Man helps us to explain several principles, themes and concepts that 
have hitherto been either poorly explained or not explained at all. Freud's conception of 
Man provides realists with a suitable and powerful human nature basis or anthropological 
intellectual substructure. Freudian Man provides realism with a suitable and powerful 
reference point for what wi l l be called a human nature background theory for the realist 
Weltanschauung. 
Of all the problems and mysteries currently associated with contemporary realism, 
the most significant theme where Freud can help us relates to much post-classical 
realism's, particularly Waltzian/Mearsheimerian structural realism's, superficial treatment 
of what realism considers to be the primary unit of international relations (theory), the 
state: Specifically, the concept of Freudian Man helps us to move beyond much post-
classical realism's unwillingness to open the 'black box' as well as its related inability to 
explain the sources of state-motivational assumptions by means of deconstructing and 
resolving unexplained and/or anthropomorphised social wholes such as the state into their 
human-psychological elements. Such a deconstructive and resolutive move, which is part 
and parcel of Freud's own wider scientific, demystifying and unravelling Enlightenment 
conception of the world, is a significant and mandatory step for contemporary realists, both 
from a methodological and politico-theoretical viewpoint. 
The main problem of post-classical realism in form of Waltzian/Mearsheimerian 
structural realism is its tendency to crudely simplify and/or anthropomorphise crucial 
concepts. As a consequence, post-classical realists' move away from the concept of Man 
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meant a crude simplification of the nature of international relations, which, in turns, has 
had negative implications for its ability to explain and predict international-political 
outcomes and foreign-policy behaviour. To avoid the concerns with human nature, Kaplan 
turned to general systems-theory and anthropomorphised the international system. Waltz 
was dissatisfied with what he saw as the naive inductivist empiricism of earlier realists and 
turned to the concept of the international-political structure. To some, this has made Waltz 
a 'realist giant' (Mearsheimer 2001) and 'king of thought in IR theory' (Mearsheimer 
2006[2004]:109; also Mouritzen 1997). Others argued that this new form of political 
realism—the neorealism of Waltz/Mearsheimer—is a largely hollow realism, an 'orrery of 
errors' (Ashley 1986:267) or a 'parody of science' (Lebow 2007:53). For various reasons, 
Waltzian neorealism has been 'shot at, embellished, misunderstood, and caricatured' 
(Buzan et al. 1993:6) and its criticism has become almost a 'cottage industry' (Sullivan 
2005). 
But criticism is justified. Waltzian/Mearsheimerian-style realism cannot any longer 
hide behind methodological arguments that the explicit presupposition of a conception of 
human nature would reveal a rather antiquated and almost pre-scientific understanding of 
what the nature of a proper international-political theory was. In fact, the contrary is the 
case. Freudian Man is helpful in what Markus Fischer (1996) identified as the problem of 
the 'missing microfoundation'. A significant part of the problem is Waltz's concept and 
conception of international-political structure. Constituting a major theoretical element of 
his structural realism, Waltz (1979) argued that 
International-political systems, like economic markets, are 
formed by the coaction of self-regarding units. International 
structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an 
era...Structures emerge from the coexistence of states. No state 
intends to participate in the formation of a structure by which it 
and others wi l l be constrained. (91) 
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To this elevation of the concept of international-political structure towards the centre of his 
theoretical endeavour. Waltz adds as a mere theoretical assumption that states want to 
survive. Taking the concept of international-political structure and the state-survival 
assumption together. Waltz argues that this would suffice and allow international-political 
theorists to deduce, explain and predict now some general patterns of world politics. 
Broadly inspired by Durkheimian anthropology and economic theory (Waltz 1986:339, 
1990), Waltz explicitly constructs the concept of international-political structure akin to 
the concept of market structure in economics and endowed it with immense explanatory 
power. Waltz's underlying logic is that changes within the international-political structure 
cause changes of international-political outcomes and foreign-policy behaviour; and 
changes of the international-political structure may even cause radical or unforeseen 
changes in international relations (and make his theory obsolete) (Waltz 2000). 
Though nicely constructed. Waltz endows, however, the international-political 
structure with too much theoretical significance and explanatory power. The problem is 
that his structural realism is based largely upon the abstract concept of the international-
political structure with the added help of yet another abstract concept, namely, the political 
unit (state) and its survival-motive. This is highly problematic, partly because it is 
theoretically inconsistent when compared with its role model, economic theory, which is 
based on a distinctive conception of human nature, mostly the homo oeconomicus (Sen 
1977; Nitsch 1990, 1991). The legitimate objection is that Waltz created, as Fischer (1996) 
correctly argues, a 'theory without a microfoundation' (273). Rather than relying almost 
solely on the hollow concept of international-political structure and relegating the concept 
of the state to the black box by merely assuming that states seek survival (Waltz 1986: 
331; my Waltz section above). Waltz should have abided by economic theory which 
explains the nature and general behavioural patterns of firms in a market by making 
fundamental assumptions about the nature of Man. Mutatis mutandis, then. Waltz should 
have 'generate[d] political units from assumptions about the elementary properties and 
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propensities of individuals' to make sure that structural realism is not 'vulnerable to critics 
who argue from first principles' (Fischer 1996:273). Such critics dissatisfied with 
structural realism's reliance on unexplained and anthropomorphised concepts and mere 
state-motivational assumptions are plentiful and include not only critical theorists of 
international relations but also, of course, classical-style realists. But as my F reudian 
human nature background theory wil l demonstrate en detail below, Freudian Man is a 
suitable and powerful reference point for providing such a microfoundation for 
contemporary realism. 
Freud provides us, however, not only with a proper microfoundation but the concept 
of Freudian Man helps realism to explain and legitimise its state-centric approach to 
international relations. This signifies a second, related problem of 
Waltzian/Mearsheimerian-style realism where Freud is useful. In a truly massive essay on 
the development of political realism, Ashley Tellis (1996) shows how Kaplan and Waltz 
have shifted realism from a 'historically based and inductively justified set of 
explanations' towards 'a more abstract and deductively systematized body of causal 
hypotheses' (51). The implications of the Kaplanian/Waltzian project have been positive 
and negative. Positive because of increasing reflectivity vis-a-vis philosophy of science, 
theory building and its testing, but negative because Waltzian/Mearsheimerian structural 
realism is based upon abstract social wholes rather than upon 'acting individuals as the 
theoretical primates' (90). As Mearsheimer (2007) readily concedes: 'Structural realists 
treat states as i f they were black boxes' (72). This is crudely insufficient. For any 
meaningful legitimation and defense of these social wholes—states—as realism's prime 
analytical and normative units in the study of international politics cannot and must not be 
based any longer, as Tellis (1996:92) rightly argues, on either mere affirmation (Gilpin 
1986:304-305), mere assumption (Waltz 1986:338-339), or mere historical empiricism 
(Waltz 1979:93-95). Instead, realism must defend the 'privileged entitative and 
explanatory status' of the state which can 'only be based on a deduction generated from 
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the solely visible unit of all social reality, namely, the individual' (92); or, as I argue, the 
Freudian Man. 
Such a theoretical defense is a laborious but imperative and fruitful task. It implies, 
to use Tellis's (1994:92) succinct words, 'standing Waltz's methodological approach on its 
head' (for his attempt, see Tellis 1994). But realism must provide this defense and must be 
based on a proper microfoundation. This wil l enable realists to counter those arguing from 
first principles and to make realism internally more coherent. Further, contemporary 
realism wil l be able to explain some of the basic but hitherto strangely neglected 
international phenomena. A proper, explicit conception of human nature wil l help realists 
to look inside the black box, the political community, thereby helping to explain, among 
other things, why 
it is necessary for political authority to be organized in mutually 
exclusive units such as city-states, empires, and nations; why a 
structural condition of anarchy must exist among such units; and 
why they tend to pursue certain ends, ranging from mere 
preservation to world domination. (Fischer 1996:273-274) 
A Freudian conception of Man helps us to bring contemporary realism back to its roots, to 
defend it against legitimate criticisms that it follows pseudo-analogies with economic 
theory, and to emancipate it from relying solely on pseudo-scientific rhetorical, theoretical, 
historical and anthropomorphological assumptions and claims. 
To the methodological imperative to bring contemporary realism back to its 
classical-style roots, we must add the politico-theoretical. This is an important argument, 
for post-classical realism's move to pseudo-structural concepts such as the security 
dilemma have meant a creeping neglect and depreciation of the genuine roots of political 
realism. Freud helps realists to regain confidence in human nature-based international-
political theorising. Freudian Man provides a secure and powerful conception of human 
nature to help contemporary realists to both re-invent and demystify the realist 
Weltanschauung. Re-inventing and demystifying political realism are closely related tasks, 
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but I deal with them separately. My argument is that political realism requires an explicit 
conception of human nature. My specific argument is that Freudian Man is a suitable 
candidate for realist international-political theory in the form of a human nature 
background theory. But such Freudian Man-based intellectual substructure, which helps 
demystify and explain several key concepts and themes of both realism as well as 
international relations, cannot be constructed without offering an explicit understanding of 
political realism. This, then, implies the next two related tasks. First, to explicate the 
nature of what 1 call the Freudian human nature background theory of political realism. 
Secondly, to explicate what I consider to be the nature of political realism. 
Political realism requires an explicit conception of human nature. It requires a 
distinctively Freudian human nature background theory (henceforth: background theory or 
Freudian background theory). The central element of such a background theory is the 
concept of the 'Realist Man' (term taken from Tellis 1994, 1996); so to speak, the 
Freudian Realist Man. As it is common practice since Waltz's description of international-
political theory in terms of the three images to associate the concept of human nature with 
the first image (on the level-of-analysis problem, see Waltz 2001[1959]:102-120; Wight 
2006), it is vital to clearly distinguish between first image theories and my Freudian 
background theory. It is not a first image theory in the Waltzian sense. Throughout this 
thesis and at the risk of being accused for using masculine language, I have persistently 
and consciously spoken o f ' M a n ' rather than 'individual'. This was done not because of a 
wish to perpetuate gendered language in IR theory, but rather to distinguish clearly 
between the classical-style politico-theoretical realm and the post-classical-style politico-
scientific realm. 'Man' belongs to the former, the 'individual' to the latter. The 
Morgenthauians/Niebuhrians have spoken of 'Man', political psychologists are concerned 
with 'individuals' (Cashman 1993:14-76). 
The Freudian background theory is not a first image theory o f diplomatic historians 
and political psychologists. It does not seek to establish causal laws that link the Hitlers or 
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Stalins as independent variables to foreign policy behaviour or international-political 
outcomes and does not—and does not seek to—qualify as a social-scientific first image 
theory, albeit Freudian Man may well be a suitable base for the development of such first 
image theories (a review of the scientific first image is provided by Levy 2003). Further, 
my Freudian background theory is not the background theory. I have not shied away from 
confessing my Freudian leanings throughout this thesis, but it goes without saying that we 
can imagine as many background theories as there are human nature conceptions that fit 
with political realism. A human nature background theory is indispensable; a Freudian 
background theory is merely one possibility, though a particularly powerful possibility. 
This, then, helps to explain what the nature of my Freudian background is. Based on 
Freudian Man, it provides the much-needed philosophical backdrop or underpinning for 
actual social-scientific realist theories of international politics. Somewhat akin to a 
Freudian-based philosophical anthropology, the Freudian background theory of realism 
provides realists with an intellectual and theoretical substructure that helps them to 
demystify, legitimise, and explain several key concepts and themes of their 
Weltarischauung. 
Developing and explicating the Freudian background theory is important but not a 
trivial endeavour. Freudian Man surely is a suitable conception of human nature for 
realism but such a statement presupposes not only a sympathetic understanding of Freud 
but also a certain conception of the nature of political realism. For how else could Freud 
and realist international-political theorising be brought together and Freudian Man help to 
explain key tenets of political realism? 
The last few decades have seen a massive proliferation of, so to speak, various 
realisms. We must distinguish be tween lots of realisms—between traditional/scientific 
realism (Tellis 1996), classical/modem/20*-century realism (Donnelly 1992; Forde 1992), 
human nature/defensive/offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2001), 
complex/fundamentalist/structuralist/constitutionalist realism (Doyle 1997), 
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structural/biological/radical/strong/hedged realism (Donnelly 2000), and evil/tragic/hybrid 
realism (Spirtas 1996). Further, we are offered structural realism (Buzan et al. 1993), 
evaluative realism (Spegele 1996), wilful realism (Williams 2005), reflexive realism 
(Steele 2007), empirical realism (Boucher 1998), contingent realism (Glaser 1996), 
specific and generalist realism (Rosecrance 2001), aggressive realism (Snyder 1991:11-12) 
as well as neoclassical realism (Schweller 2003). Another typology of realism 
distinguishes between hawkish/dovish realism, pessimistic/optimistic realism, second-
image/third-image realism, structural/human nature realism, and amoral/moral realism 
(Frankel 1996a); and, following Jeffrey Taliaferro (2000-01:135), we should divide 
realism in offensive structural realism (Mearsheimer 2001; Gilpin 1981), defensive 
structural realism (Waltz 1979; Copeland 2000), offensive neoclassical realism (Zakaria 
1998; Wohlforth 1993), defensive neoclassical realism (Christensen 1997; Brown et al. 
2004). 
Realism has become a diverse and pluralist enterprise. This is not per se 
problematic, perhaps even to be welcomed. As Schweller (2003) correctly points out: 
'After all, cumulative knowledge is the sine qua non of scientific progress' (315). But the 
fragmentation of the contemporary realist theory landscape also poses problems and Glenn 
Snyder (2002) rightly asked rhetorically whether it is 'time to end the proliferation of 
labels and theories in the realist camp and add up what we all have in common' (173). 
Hence, what is the specific nature and what is the common, the common core, of political 
realism? 
The Freudian background theory applies to the following notion of political realism. 
Freudian Man helps us to demystify, legitimise, and explain realist international-political 
theorising thus defined. First and foremost, the Freudian background theory applies to 
political realism conceived as a Weltanschauung. This follows the suggestion of Smith 
(1986), who has shown 'the breadth of its vision' (226). This is generally synonymous 
with realism conceived as 'intellectual construct' (Frankel 1996a:ix), 'philosophical 
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position' (Gilpin 1996:6), 'interpretative framework' (Keohane 1986a:7), 'general 
approach to international politics' (Lynn-Jones & Miller 1995:ix), 'school of thought' 
(Morgenthau 1967[1948]:3-4), and 'theoretical tradition' (Walt 1998:31), but 
Weltanschauung emphasises elegantly that political realism is perhaps best understood as a 
specific world outlook or general conceptualisation of the world based on distinctive 
beliefs, values, and assumptions that 'instil the world with significance, and facilitate the 
transition from thought to action' (Scruton 2007:733). Specifically, and more substantively 
from a politico-theoretical point of view, I believe that the realist Weltanschauung defines 
itself broadly along four interrelated basic principles. 
The first—and most fundamental—basic principle concerns realism's politico-
theoretical dictum that all analytical and normative dimensions of international-political 
life or the (international) human condition have their roots in the nature of Man. The 
contribution of my Freudian background theory wil l be that it helps to make explicit and 
explain the source of the political by means of a distinctive conception of human nature. 
This principle, though essential to political realism since its birth, is often neglected, 
forgotten, or wished away. It is, therefore, even more important to explain and remind 
realists of its nature. Realists of any provenance must not forget that political realism is a 
Weltanschauung that conceives the nature of international relations in terms of the 
political, the concept of power. True, the relations among nations can be approached from 
a variety of different ontological, methodological, and epistemological perspectives 
(Wright 1955; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1990; Booth & Smith 1995; Smith 1996; Walt 
1998; Bay lis & Smith 2005; Sterling-Folker 2006b; Dunne et al. 2007). Chris Brovm 
(2001) puts it nicely: International Relations is first and foremost 'the study of 
"international relations'" (1). 
But political realism is a specific approach to international relations. Realists 
analyse and theorise international relations not in terms of the economic or legal or 
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religious or cultural, but in terms of the political and power. As Morgenthau (1967[1948]) 
argues: 
The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way 
through the landscape of international politics is the concept of 
interest defined in terms of power. This concept...sets politics as 
an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from 
other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest 
defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion. Without it...we 
could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts. (5) 
Post-classical realists seem to agree. Mearsheimer (2007) explicitly and succinctly points 
out that 'Realists believe that power is the currency of international politics' (72). Hence, 
every realist theory of international politics is a theory of international relations, but not 
every IR theory is an international-political theory. Realists are usually not concerned with 
economical, legal, sociological, psychological, or historical approaches to international 
relations but with a distinctively political approach. 
This explains why political realism bases—and cannot but base—its 
Weltanschauung ab out international relations on Man, the Realist Man. Morgenthau's 
international-political theory is not a crude animus dominandi-h&sed first image theory in 
the Waltzian sense. Rather, it is a very 'subtle and complex' balance-of-power theory 
(Little 2007b: 137, 2007a:chap. 4) and recognises that the distinction between a political 
theory and an international-political theory is merely analytical rather than substantively 
justified. Morgenthau (1959) shows that a 'theory of international politics is but a specific 
instance of a general theory of politics' and that 'What is frue of the latter is, mutatis 
mutandis, also true of the former' (16). This means that any genuine political theory, 
whether domestic or international, concerns itself ultimately with essentially the same 
universal human and social phenomenon: namely, the 'striving for a share of power or for 
influence on the distribution of power' (Weber 1994[1919]:311). This preoccupation with 
power, in turn, implies that political realism presupposes a distinctive causal-analytical 
locus in which the drive for power or a share of power is sourced. 
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This source is not the international-political structure, but it can only be Man. On 
that score, the genuine political realism—not the post-classical parody—is more than 
explicit and revealing. Morgenthau (1930) argues insightfully that 'Any attempt to 
comprehend the nature of the Political must begin with a fundamental awareness: the 
nature of the Political is, as to its source, object, and purpose, bound to the nature of Man' 
(1). The object and conveyor of the political is only Man, while the beehive ('state of the 
bees') is not in any meaningful sense political. Morgenthau makes clear that the political 
'acquires its force and purpose exclusively from the nature of Man' (1). That the political 
and international-political roots, ultimately, in the nature of Man does, of course, not deny 
or neglect the intrinsically social nature of all political. 
The Political is a social concept. Its nature derives from the soul 
of Man but is not confined to the intra-psychic sphere, as are, for 
instance, the Ethical or the Religious which can possibly unfold 
their nature within the isolated soul of Man only. True, according 
to its conceptual nature, the Political requires, in order to exist as 
Political, the reaching-out from the depths of the isolated soul and 
the linking-up with an object that lies outside the conveyor's soul 
and that is, with conceptual necessity, the soul of another Man. 
(Morgenthau 1930:2) 
Freudian Man wi l l help contemporary realists to understand why the political, in form of 
the drive to power, has its source in the nature of Man as well as why the political 'belongs 
to the sphere of the real-existing interpersonal human associations' (4). Further, Freud wil l 
help to explain the individual and group psychological processes or underlying mechanics 
why the social nature of the political turns the international sphere into the realm of 
potentially endless struggles for power and peace. 
Realism's grounding of the international-political in the nature of Man signifies not 
only the second basic principle of political realism but also one of its major problems, the 
assumption/explanation dilemma. The second principle concerns what political realism 
considers to be the three building blocks of its analytical understanding of international 
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relations. These are, paraphrasing Waltz: Man, the state, and war. Of these three, the 
Realist Man is the most significant, for it provides the philosophical basis for explaining 
both the nature and behaviour of political communities as well as the seemingly 
inevitability of conflictual international relations. In line with the philosophy of 
methodological individualism that characterises the pre-Waltzian/Mearsheimerian, genuine 
political realism (Smith 1986; Tellis 1996), Morgenthau (1930) argues forcefully that 
We have...no other access to the knowledge of...social facts or 
social structures than through Man: for the political as well as the 
social is experienced by Man only—it would not exist without 
Man, just as society itself would not exist without Man—and all 
actualities which we call political lead to the soul of Man as 
conveyor of the political. Only through the knowledge of its 
nature can we come to the knowledge of the nature of the 
political. (4) 
Hence, realism requires a detailed understanding of the nature of Man, a conception of the 
Realist Man. 
I presume that Robert Gilpin's account of human nature, which forms part of his 
brief but widely cited discussion about the three core assumptions or building blocks of 
political realism (Gilpin 1986:304-305 as the basis for the following discussion of 
realism's building blocks), is not wide of the mark. He argued that the striving for power 
and securing of security are two major motivational impulses that characterise political 
life; and though Man does, of course, value other objectives in life such as beauty, truth, 
and goodness, political realism believes that these goals lose meaning and significance 
unless s ecurity is achieved. This seems a fair description of human nature. But it is 
nonetheless problematic. For these character traits are merely assumed and not properly 
sourced, evidenced, and explained. This makes such human nature conception rather 
vulnerable. As part of a human nature background theory, Freudian Man is able to help 
realism to explain rather than assume the nature of the Realist Man. Much the same applies 
to the other two building blocks: political community and international conflicts. 
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Political realism emphasises the perennial forces of nationalism and group loyalties. 
The Realist Man is not the purely individualistic and self-concerned Man of much liberal 
political and social thought, but rather some sort of crowd animal that can thrive only in an 
political or social context. Man's loyalties present themselves in the form of concentric 
circles that begin with the familial nucleus and almost always end at the tribal group, city-
state, or, today, the (nation-)state. The visible and problematic units that analytically and 
normatively characterise world affairs are not individuals but political communities. 
Ultimately based on Man's group loyalty, these political communities enter the 
international arena. They want to push through their rational and often irrational interests 
vis-a-vis other political communities and want to prevail by using all effective means 
available, mostly and ultimately the determined use of power and force based on interests. 
The relations among sovereign political communities are conflictual; anarchy is an 
essential feature of the international system; justice and morality beyond borders are often 
secondary aims. This seems, again, a fair description of international affairs from a realist 
standpoint. But realism faces again the assumption/explanation dilemma. How is this bleak 
view of international relations not merely assumed but properly explained with, and 
deduced from, the Realist Man? 
Freud can help realism to explain and demystify its emphasis on an intimate human 
nature/political connection, its conception of the nature of Man, and its underlying logic of 
the triadic and symbiotic relationship between conflictual Man, conflictual political 
communities, and conflictual international affairs. Moreover, Freudian Man can help us to 
demystify, explain and legitimise two f\irther basic principles of the realist 
Weltanschauung, all of which relate to the question: what are the limits of international 
relations? One of these basic principles concerns the role of morality. Genuine political 
realism is not, and never has been, indifferent to the moral problems and dimensions of 
international affairs. Particularly the classicals such as Morgenthau and Niebuhr have 
shown that political realism is not so much a technical science but rather an ethics or 
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almost moral philosophy of international relations (Morgenthau I967[1948], 1945, 1946, 
1984; Niebuhr 2001 [1932]; also Lebow 2003; Russell 2007; Molloy 2009). 
Closely related to the morality principle is another basic principle of realism, the 
neutrality or ideology-critical principle. Realism is in itself politically neutral and a 'broad 
church' (Buzan 1996:62). Morgenthau adopted the ideology-critical element of his 
political realism largely from Kelsen's construction of the pure theory of law and state 
(Morgenthau 1971). More broadly, realism shows a genuine and deep-seated scepticism of 
purely ideological f oreign-policies and contains an ideology-critical dimension (Payne 
2007; Cozette 2008; Behr & Heath 2009). Hence, even though unfortunately often done, 
realism must not automatically associate itself with or be associated with any kind of 
political ideology. This applies particularly vis-a-vis conservative-leaning ideologies. 
Realism's Weltanschauung, which contains a strong belief in engagement and diplomacy, 
makes realism and the conservative as well as neoconservative right a rather awkward pair 
(Gelb 2008; Muravchik & Walt 2008; Schmidt & Williams 2008). This neutrality or 
ideology-critical element, which makes realism broadly compatible with both the left and 
the right (on some sort of left or critical realism, see Scheuerman 2008b; Osbom 2009), 
means that the realist Weltanschauung is, per se, neither naively progressivist nor 
fatalistically pessimist. Its conception of the world and international relations is 
characterised by a deep commitment to prudence which is compatible with some forms of 
elitism and streaks of idealist optimism. Naturally, then, i f everything does ultimately root 
in the nature of Man, realism must be able to explain how their idealist realism or optimist 
prudence derives from their conception of the Realist Man. Freudian Man helps realists to 
explain more thoroughly why their particular world outlook is justified. 
'Man, state, war': Freud and the human nature of international relations 
According to its first and most fiindamental principle, the realist Weltanschauung believes 
that the ultimate source of all earthly evil (and good) is to be found in the nature of Man. 
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This includes the nature of all social facts as well as the nature of international relations. In 
a first step, Freud helps realism to explain and legitimise its analytical and normative 
primacy of the Realist Man as part of its theorising the nature, internal mechanics, and 
external behaviour of political communities in international relations. 
In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Freud helps realists to 
understand the superficiality of structural-sociological modes of thought (following 
citations on pp. 69-71). Freud's methodological individualism reveals itself in his often 
cited assertion that 'individual psychology...is at the same time social psychology [and 
sociology] as well ' . To Freud, individual psychology is the science which concerns 
'individual man and explores the paths by which he seeks to find satisfaction for his 
instinctual impulses'; it is concerned largely with the individual's psycho-physiological, 
instinctual make-up. This does, however, not mean, Freud warns us, that we can conceive 
of Man in pure isolation. Psycho-analytical psychology has shown that in Man's 'mental 
life ' other individuals are 'invariably involved'. Whether those involved are parents, 
brothers, sisters or other objects of love, all these resulting relations are 'social 
phenomena' that are formed by individuals that come under the influence of, and 'become 
enormously important' to, each other. The important question is: how should we approach, 
explain, and understand these resulting social relations, social phenomena, and social 
facts? 
The answer may be put thus: just as we cannot explain the nature and behaviour of 
Man without recourse to his relations to his fellow Men, we cannot explain the nature of 
social relations and phenomena as well as the behaviour of social facts such as political 
communities without recourse to Man's psycho-physiological nature. Freud criticises 
structuralist social or group psychology for committing a fundamental mistake: namely, 'to 
leave these relations [of individual Man to parents, brothers, sisters, objects of love, etc.] 
on one side and to isolate as the subject of inquiry the influencing of an individual by a 
large number of people simultaneously'. These social or group psychologists from Gustave 
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LeBon (1896) through Wilfred Trotter (1919) to William McDougall (1920), renowned 
thinkers that £u-e still influential today (Waltz explicitly draws from LeBon's concept of the 
group mind (see Waltz 1979:75)), have treated Man falsely as an isolated member-
individual of a race, nation, caste, profession, institution, or any other organised group. 
Such black-box-style thinking has led them to assume the existence of a 'special instinct 
that is not further reducible', i.e. some sort of 'social instinct', 'herd instinct', or 'group 
mind'. 
Freud's group psychology helps realists to guard against the dangers of falling prey 
to structural modes of thought, anthropomorphological projections, and hypostatisations of 
political communities. Freud agreed with many of his contemporaries that internal and 
external group behaviour is 'basically irrational' (Bimbach 1962:27). Yet Freud did not 
stop at what he considered to be the almost obvious. Further, he did not accept the then-
contemporary and still widespread thesis 'that in a crowd there comes into being a new and 
single mind differing from the minds of the individuals composing it ' (Rieff 1959:231). 
Freud also asked what it is that holds groups together, but he did so acknowledging that the 
only reality there is in the social world is Man. The group does not possess an instinct, 
only Man does. Freudian Man is the product of Freud's methodological individualism 
which is so archetypical of his psycho-analytic psychological and social/political theory. 
As Freud (1935) argues: 
I perceived ever more clearly that the events of human history, 
the interactions between human nature, cultural developments 
and the precipitates of primaeval experiences...are no more than 
a reflection of the dynamic conflicts between the ego, the id and 
the super-ego, which psychoanalysis studies in the individual— 
are they very same processes repeated upon a wider stage. (72) 
Freud studied all social phenomena and social facts such as groups through their parts, 
through the human psyche. Realists should draw from Freud's approach, for his Freudian 
Man helps realism to explain the nature and internal and external behaviour of political 
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communities without relying on mere assumptions about some sort of anthropomorphised 
or hypostasised group instinct. 
International relations cannot be explained without recourse to the nature of Man. 
Realism requires, therefore, a proper conception of the Realist Man. My specific claim as 
regards the necessity of a human nature background theory for the realist Weltanschauung 
is that Freudian Man is the ideal source of a realist human nature of international relations 
which helps to explain the underlying mechanics of why political communities are being 
formed, how political communities are internally being structured, and why relations 
among separate political communities are inherently problematic. Since we cannot 
understand Man without recourse to the inner instinctual motivations and 
environmental/societal pressures; and since we cannot understand the nature and behaviour 
of political communities without recourse to the inner and outer urges and pressures that 
Man is facing, the explication of the Freudian human nature of international relations is 
presented in terms of explaining the nature and behaviour of political communities. This 
approach is also justified because, even though Man forms the sole philosophical basis of 
all analytical and normative realist international-political theorising, the political 
community or group or state is the main, and most problematic, actor in international 
relations. 
Realism believes that international-political life revolves mainly around groups or 
political communities. On what basis, other than the historical record (we have seen tribes, 
feudal principalities, states, nations-states, empires (Holsti 2004:29)), can realism explain 
the primacy of the political community both in the past, present, and the future of 
international relations? Based on Freudian Man, Freud offers realism a proper explanation 
of why political communities are formed and what holds them together that is far superior 
and more realist(ic) than the often usual reliance on homo oeconomicus-based models of 
rational self-interest. At the same time, Freud offers realism a powerful and timeless 
statement on the burdens of civilisation and the (international) human condition. 
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Freudian Man is to a large degree, but not exclusively, a natural security seeker. One 
of the major stimuli to form groups can be explained by Man's natural inclination to avoid 
pain. In terms of Freud's metapsychology, the pleasure principle (or unpleasure-pleasure 
principle and unpleasure principle) explains and sees the mental processes and general 
behavioural patterns of Man from the economic viewpoint. Being as fundamental to 
Freudian Man as the duality of instincts (dynamic viewpoint) and motivational 
(un)consciousness (structural viewpoint), Freud has shown that our mental processes must 
be understood in terms of the fact that we relentlessly 'strive towards gaining pleasure' or, 
vice versa, that 'psychical activity draws back from any event which might arouse 
unpleasure' (1911:219). A defining and natural characteristic of Freudian Man is that he 
seeks pleasure and seeks to avoid pain. As Freud argues in Civilization and its Discontents: 
What do they demand of life and wish to achieve in it?...They 
strive after happiness; they want to become happy and to remain 
so. This endeavour has two sides, a positive and a negative aim. It 
aims, on the one hand, at an absence of pain and unpleasure, and, 
on the other hand, at the experiencing of strong feelings of 
pleasure...As we see, what decides the purpose of life is simply 
the programme of the pleasure principle. This principle dominates 
the operation of the mental apparatus from the start. (1930:76) 
The underlying reasons why Man is a security seeker or why he seeks to avoid 
pain/suffering are both of physiological and social nature. They derive firom essentially 
three directions: fi-om 'our own body', from the 'external world', and from 'our relations 
to other men' (77). It is the mix of these three ever-present and imminent sources of 
suffering and pain that helps to explain why the human condition and international 
relations must not be seen romantically. 
The first source of suffering is his bodily physis. Though his mind and body are 
'doomed to decay and dissolution' (77), i.e. doomed to physiological and psychological 
sickness and eventually irrevocable death, Man seeks, nonetheless, as much protection as 
is possible. A life in pure isolation would even further reduce the chances for sustaining a 
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healthy body. This source of pain is a significant motivational force as the fear of 
physiological decay and death is a major constant in Man's mental life, although it is 
perhaps the most implicit stimulus of Man's inclination to form and enter groups. 
By contrast, the second major source of suffering—^Nature—is one of the most 
explicit and imminent impetuses. Throughout the ages, Man has feared Mother Nature 
because it 'may rage against us with overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction' 
(77). True, the threats, pains, and sufferings that derive from the third source, i.e. Man's 
relations vis-a-vis other Men, are perhaps the most profound and greatest in comparison. 
The most obvious shield of protection would, therefore, be to live in pure isolation, to live 
somewhat akin to Rousseau's pre-societal noble savage. But we know that this would be 
both unwise and virtually impossible. Even i f not based on pure a priori reason, the 
unpredictable nature of Nature dictates each single Man to cooperate with his fellows. 
Despite all scientific, economic, and social progress through the ages, isolated Man has 
remained more or less powerless against Nature's darker aspects such as natural disasters, 
climate changes, diseases, famines, and epidemics. Only collective behaviour, concerted 
actions, and the use of science make it perhaps never possible but at least a possibility to 
'attack nature and subjecting her to the human w i l l ' (77). From a more economic 
perspective but still related to the dictates of Nature, scarcity or necessity (Ananke) also 
drives Man into cooperative behaviour and division of labour. Human society is 
significantly motivated by 'economic' reasoning because it simply 'does not possess 
enough provisions to keep its members alive unless they work' (Freud 1916-17b:312). 
When it comes to Man's socialisation with others, Freud is very clear about its 'actual 
raison d'etre', which is 'to defend us against nature' (Freud 1927:15). 
Equally i f not more imperative is, however, the defense and protection against the 
third source of pain and suffering: Man's relations to his fellow Men. The fear of decay 
and death inflicted by other Men represents perhaps the strongest motivational reason to 
form groups and enter communal relationships. In this regard, Freud's conception of 
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human nature, human condition, and history of civilisation seems fairly reminiscent of 
Hobbesian-style social contract thought—the characteristic and main underlying feature of 
which is the transformation of individual violence/force into communal violence/force by 
means of common consent. The pre-civilisational state of nature depicted by Freud comes 
close to Hobbes's description of the natural state in the Leviathan as a 'condition which is 
called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man' (1996[1651]: chap. 
X i i i , 89). It was argued by Freud (1933b) that the universal principle of human history in 
this regard is essentially three-fold. First, Man has always decided conflicts of interests by 
the use of violence. Secondly, Man has followed the rules of the 'whole animal kingdom, 
from which men have no business to exclude themselves'. Thirdly, the means of violence 
have changed during the course of history: from pure physical muscular strength over the 
usage of tools and weapons to the use of intellectual superiority (204). 
But the underlying, essential fact of civilisation remains. Despite all change and 
progress in social practices, we still have to deal with the nature of Man which is such that 
we must not wish it away. Freud (1930) forcefully reminds us that Man is not a gentle and 
soft creature. Men are viciously aggressive and 
their neighbour is for them not only a potential helper or sexual 
object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their 
aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without 
compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize 
his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture 
and ki l l him. Homo homini lupus. Who, in the face of all his 
experience of life and history, wil l have the courage to dispute 
this assertion? ( I l l ) 
Freud's view of human nature and the human condition, which is peppered with some 
Hobbesian rhetoric, is certainly not saintly and fits, therefore, nicely with the realist 
Weltanschauung. 
Both his account of the state of nature—i.e. the state of fear of suffering and pain— 
and also Freud's argument of the exit of the unpleasant state of nature follows broadly the 
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Hobbesian logic. The intimate, physiologically and socially-caused fear of pain and 
suffering drives Man into cooperative forms of social organisation. Based on the fear of 
others, the Hobbesian notion that 'the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest' 
(Hobbes 1996[1651]: chap X i i i , 87), and reinforced by the fear o f physiological decay. 
Nature and Ananke, savage Man recognised the 'dangers and uselessness of these 
struggles' which led him to enter into a mutual agreement with his fellow Men—Men 
entered into some 'sort of social contract' (Freud 1939:82). Over the course of the 
civilisational process, the state of nature— t^he realm of the purely physical muscular 
violence, power, and brute force of the one or few strongest—had been replaced by right, 
law, and the power of the many (also Freud 1930, 1933b). Despite all civilisational 
progress and societal virtues, the contract between Men that created political communities 
meant severe interferences with the nature of Freudian Man. With the underlying logic still 
relevant today, being a member of a political community means to us both security and 
protection as well as overarching societal pressure to live contrary to our instinctual 
dictates of seeking pleasure, instinct renunciation, and being subjected to group-wide, 
powerful and essentially constraining institutions. 
This helps realism to understand one of the many major facets of human nature as it 
plays itself out in the societal sphere. True, Man is not only driven by concerns for his 
well-being as well as for status and a proper place among his fellows to achieve the 
former. Man is not only driven by security and power, respectively. Like realists, Freud 
knows that Men across time and space do also value and seek beauty, cleanliness and order 
(Freud 1930:92ff.). But these latter traits are merely secondary or civilisational goals that 
have arisen as some sort of by-products from the necessities of forming political 
communities. The preservation of his own life and the accumulation of the means to 
achieve such security are the two main motivational forces of Man. Since these 
motivational forces can, however, not be gratified in pure isolation, Man is almost 
automatically drawn towards forming and entering political communities. As strange as it 
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may seem, despite his fears of his fellows, Man needs fellow Men just like the fish does 
need the water. 
The significance of Freudian Man for the realist Weltanschauung derives, however, 
also from the fact that Freud is not merely some sort of Viennese neo-Hobbesian. This is 
not only a largely undisputed qualification (Rieff 1959; Wallwork 1991; Drassinower 
2003), but it is, indeed, a highly significant qualification. It helps realism to get a much 
more multifaceted account of human nature. This, in turn, helps realists to understand and 
explain the primacy of political communities in social and political reality and, further, 
why political communities remain most likely the primary units of international relations 
to which irrational loyalties, sympathies, and emotions are attached. From Freud, realists 
learn that Man is not merely the self-interested, security-driven, and quasi-rational creature 
that exhibits an enlightened, rational, self-interested and limited commitment to the 
Leviathan or any other form of historicised political community. Rather, Freudian Man is 
an instinct-driven and instinctively libidinal creature. This provides a useful human nature 
foundation as it helps to explain the intricacies of the inner-workings of groups that 
determine their often hostile outward behaviour vis-a-vis other political communities. In 
this regard, Freud (1930) makes clear that ' In consequence of this primary mutual hostility 
of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration. The 
interest of work in common would not hold it together; instinctual passions are stronger 
than reasonable interests' (112). Thus, besides Man's fear of pain and suffering inflicted 
by Nature, by scarcity, and by the aggressiveness of other Men, there must be other forces 
at work that drive Man into political communities. This force is Eros. 
The primacy, nature, and behaviour of political communities in international 
relations cannot be understood without the Eros instinct. Eros represents another human 
nature-based major impetus to form and enter groups. There is no doubt that Man's wish to 
avoid pain and suffering is an important and constant driving force behind civilisation and 
group formation, but it is not the strongest. For Man is, above all, a pleasure seeking 
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creature. Though a major motivational force, Freudian Man is not merely 'content to aim 
at an avoidance of unpleasure' (Freud 1930:82), but Man yearns for positive fulfilment of 
pleasure and happiness, too. Driven by Eros, Freudian Man gains most pleasure from 'the 
way of life which makes love the centre of everything, which looks for all satisfaction in 
loving and being loved' (82). Since the longing for love and being loved cannot, however, 
be achieved in a state of pure isolation, Man cannot but work relentlessly towards forming 
groups and entering some forms of group relations. The first stable and most formative 
group of Men is the family (99), but the underlying purpose of Eros is 'to combine single 
human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great 
unity; the unity of mankind' (122). From a political realist perspective characterised 
largely but not exclusively by the wider formula 'Man, state, war', to speak of a unity of 
mankind must seem somewhat awkward. But thus is Freud's psycho-analytical 
presumption. Eros, the instinct of life, joins the forces that result from Man's fear of pain 
and suffering and inclines Man to erect and enter groups and political communities. Group 
formation, as Freud argues, is 'an inherited deposit from the phylogenesis of the human 
libido'(1921:143). 
The Freudian human nature traits of fear, security, aggressiveness, and power seem 
of hardly any dispute when raised vis-a-vis the realist Weltanschauung. Yet proposing 
Freud's theory of Man as a useful human nature background theory for political realism 
may still seem puzzling. For the Freudian presumption of a love-instinct or Eros, which is 
said to drive Man into ever larger groups, may seem entirely incompatible vis-a-vis a 
political philosophy that emphasises perennial power and security competition among Men 
and political communities regardless of time and space. Such viewpoint is, however, 
wrong. As is known and recognised by most classical realists, the fact that international 
affairs have, in fact, been so vicious, complicated, and often irrational cannot be derived 
from, or explained by, assuming a nicely-calculating homo oeconomicus or homo politicus 
that merely seeks to maximise utility or power, respectively. Rather, to arrive at such 
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unpleasant international outcomes, Man must be equipped with motivational traits that are 
more irrational. These traits are Man's longing for prestige, recognition, and above all: 
love. 
In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud provides realism with an 
astute metaphor for Freudian Man. Men are reminiscent of porcupines. Taken from 
Schopenhauer's famous parable, it accurately captures the inner tensions of Man vis-a-vis 
fellow Men: 
A company of porcupines crowded themselves very close 
together one cold winter's day so as to profit by one another's 
warmth and so save themselves from being frozen to death. But 
soon they felt one another's quills, which induced them to 
separate again. And now, when the need for warmth brought them 
nearer together again, the second evil arose once more. So that 
they were driven backwards and forwards from one trouble to the 
other, until they had discovered a mean distance at which they 
could most tolerably exist, (quoted in Freud 1921:101n.l; also 
Schopenhauer 2000[1851]:651-652) 
That Freud mentioned Schopenhauer's porcupine is hardly astonishing. Freud's whole 
theory of Man and civilisation is built around the inherent inner and social ambivalence of 
Man. Regardless of whether we refer to our social relations within families, marriages, 
friendships, businesses, associations, large-scale institutions such as the state, or whatever 
other social phenomena or social facts there are, Freud showed that all these relationships 
contain sediments of attraction but also 'feelings of aversion and hostility' (Freud 
1921:101), that they contain ambivalences within but also beyond their borders. The 
resulting tragedy is that social and political efforts to remedy the attraction/aversion 
tension prevalent particularly in political communities imply almost invariably that 
tensions and struggles with those outside the in-group ('them') are being reinforced and 
made worse. 
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This attraction/aversion tension, which is fundamental to Freudian Man and helps 
realism to explain the nature and tragedy of the human condition and international 
relations, has its source in Man's essentially dualistic instinct structure; and so has the 
universal but often subtle hostility or aggression that political communities display vis-a-
vis others. It is exactly the virtue of Freud for realists that literally all cultural, social, and 
political phenomena can be explained by recourse to Man. According to Freud's early 
instinct theory, Man is driven both by ego-libidinal drives—the ego-instinct—as well as by 
object-libidinal drives, i.e. the sexual-instinct (or Eros). These two instincts are in a 
perennial and fierce battle. Eros provides the major impetus for Man to long for the group, 
but the ego-instinct, which is, first and foremost, being concerned with pure self-
preservation, inclines Man to stay away or withdraw from groups. Later in life, Freud 
merged ego-instinct and sexual-instinct into Eros because both instinct are essentially 
libidinal instincts; the only difference between these two is that the former pertains to the 
self (self-love, ego-libido) and the latter to others (other-love, object-libido). Reinforced by 
the pleasure-principle which inclines Man to form and enter groups in order to avoid pain 
and suffering, the reality of social life is that Man is being dragged constantly—like the 
porcupine—in two almost diagonally-different directions. 
Freudian Man must cope with a constant back and forth from fellow Man. This 
essential fact of human existence is also reinforced by another of Freud's instincts: the 
(in)famous Thanatos or death-instinct. According to the latest of Freud's instinct theories, 
Man's psycho-physiological structure must be seen as a perennial and inescapable conflict 
between Eros, i.e. the amalgamation of ego-libidinal drives (ego-instinct) and object-
libidinal drives (sexual-instinct), and Thanatos. Freud (1930) argues that 'the meaning of 
the evolution of civilization is no longer obscure...It must present the struggle between 
Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works 
itself out in the human species' (122). While Eros aims for life and love, Thanatos inclines 
Man to hate, aggression, death. The aim of Thanatos is to 'provide the ego with the 
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satisfaction of its vital needs [self-preservation] and with control over nature' (121). Thus 
are the instinctual origins of Man's primordial ambivalence or attraction/aversion tension 
vis-a-vis fellow Man. 
Since being rooted in the nature of Man, it is now the depressing—but perhaps 
realist(ic)—fact of the human condition that Man's attraction/aversion tension vis-a-vis 
fellow Men can never be completely resolved. It can only be ameliorated. But even the 
proper balancing of the conflicting instinctual demands by the ego may merely lead to 
what the realist Weltanschauung considers an almost universal and problematic 
phenomenon of international relations: namely, that Man gives much of his loyalty to his 
political community and that, therefore, the relations between political communities are 
essentially and inherently conflictual. Eros demands unity with fellow Men. At the same 
time, Man wants to satisfy his ego-instincts (or the demands of Thanatos). These latter 
demands are truly powerful, for Man is not only a primordial security-seeker but also a 
primordial power-seeker. Freud shows that the history of Man's psychosexual 
development is the history of yearning for pleasure and power. The child is 
'polymorphously perverse' and virtually every object represents a source for pleasure. Yet 
the child is also a power-seeker, for only power provides the necessary means to annex and 
indulge in these respective objects of pleasure. Soon, however, the child's yearning for 
pleasure and power comes to an abrupt halt. This does not happen voluntarily; and it is the 
transformation from the pleasure principle to the reality principle which explains much of 
our international-political dilemmas. 
The essential fact of life is that, on one hand, Man's libidinal drives seek pure 
gratification of pleasure. On the other hand, however, an essential fear of death, of Nature, 
and of other Men as well as socio-economical necessity {Ananke) requires from Man to 
cooperate with his fellows. This means that Man must adapt his instinctual demands in 
light of that reality. Though Freudian Man is a largely instinct and pleasure-driven 
creature, Man's ego representing the conscious reality principle assumes great 
190 
Chapter 5 
responsibility. It seeks to balance the instinctual demands that arise from the ego-instincts 
of the id, which represents the pleasure-principle, with the requirements of Ananke and 
also the demands of Eros. This act of balancing and managing the attraction/aversion 
tension comes, however, at big costs. For it requires of Man substantial instinctual 
renunciation. ' [ I ] t is impossible to overlook the extent', Freud (1930) argues 
to which civilization is built up upon a renunciation of instinct, 
how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction...of 
powerful instincts. This 'cultural frustration' dominates the large 
field of social relationships between human beings...it is the 
cause of the hostility against which all civilizations have to 
struggle. (97) 
This equation of civilisation and instinct renunciation is one of Freud's most important 
social and political philosophical tenets; and it is of utmost significance to the realist 
Weltanschauung. For it helps realists to explain why forming and entering political 
communities is both the solution to Man's existential dilemmas but, at the same time, the 
cause of the primacy of political communities in international relations as well as the cause 
of much international tragedy. 
The primacy of political communities derives from the fact that the group is not only 
the enemy of Man but also his saviour. The political community is of such significance to 
Man because it helps him to solve some of his instinctual-based existential problems. 
Erecting and entering political communities provides Man with the much-needed means to 
gratify the societal demands of Man's Eros but also with the protective demands inherent 
in Man resulting from the potential pains and sufferings inflicted by outside human and 
environmental dangers. Further, political communities help Man to cope with the 
attraction/aversion tension. The underlying basic mechanic is explained by Freud's defense 
mechanism of identification which represents one of the earliest expressions of emotional 
ties with libidinal objects such as the father in the Oedipus Complex. The little boy who is 
attracted to his mother but aware that the father stands in his way 'w i l l exhibit a special 
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interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be like him, and take his place 
everywhere' (Freud 1921:105). Since the father is too powerfiil, he knows that he will 
never actually and fully possess the mother. What the ego, therefore, does is trying to 
satisfy the id's demands for the mother by another and perhaps more implicit or indirect 
means: namely, by means of identifying with the father, i.e. the object that is actually 
capable of possessing the mother, the boy's original but unreachable source of pleasure. 
The same underlying logic applies to the nature of political communities and 
explains why the political community is not only the ameliorative solution to Man's 
attraction/aversion dilemma but also the underlying cause that international relations are 
inherently conflictual. Regardless of whether we deal with families, artificial groups such 
as corporations, army, the Church or political communities, the inner mechanisms of these 
groups are essentially similar, for all social facts—both their nature and behaviour—relate 
back to Man's dualistic instinct structure. Man knows that he both deplores and needs the 
group. To him, the group stands for security and instinctual satisfaction as well as for 
instinctual renunciation. On a larger scale than the family, then, the ameliorative strategy 
of Man's ego means to identify with some fellow Men and erect a group. It is characterised 
by the fact that a 'number of individuals...have put one and the same object in the place of 
their ego ideal [super-ego] and have consequently identified themselves with one another 
in their ego' (Freud 1921:116). In the social and political context. Men form political 
communities led by some leader. The group and its leader help Man to compensate for the 
loss of instinctual satisfaction and power that the group took necessarily away. For now-
impotent Man feels, after all, not that much restricted. Being now a member of a political 
community, being one among 'us', Man retains some profound feelings of omnipotence 
because he partakes psychologically in the power of the object of the group members' 
shared libido. In political communities, the actual or perceived libidinal object is usually 
the leader or statesman. Identifying with the leader of a nation, Man feels as he has a share 
in the power of the nation. Man feels powerfiil. Hence, despite actually transferring power 
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to a higher level, he thinks, feels, and enjoys that entering political community does not 
compromise his own instinctual demands for pleasure, power, and security. 
Such is the virtue of political communities for the instinctual life of Man as a means 
to ameliorate the attraction/aversion tension. But we must not neglect or forget the other 
side of the coin. The strategy of Man's ego to achieve a reduction of the attraction/aversion 
tension through the conscious use of the defense mechanism of identification can only 
succeed where there are present other outlets for all the repressed instincts. The political 
community cannot allow too much satisfaction of the darker and hostile instincts of Man. 
This would mean to risk its own dissolution and destruction as libidinal ties among its 
members would be jettisoned or cut off. Hence, the necessary outlet is to be found in the 
realm between political communities. The individual and collective yearning for power, 
pleasure, and security as well as profound feelings of hostility and aversion are displaced 
onto the international sphere. This is hardly a matter of much choice because Man's 
instincts must find their gratification. The Eros instinct remains within the in-group, but 
the love-harming instincts are directed to the out-group, to foreign nations, to 'them'. As 
Freud (1930) argues succinctly: ' I t is always possible to bind together a considerable 
number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the 
manifestations of their aggressiveness' (114). Therefore, international relations have 
always been and wil l most likely remain essentially conflictual. 
It is one of the many virtues of Freud that he provides the realist Weltanschauung 
with a well-developed conception of human nature that does explain and not merely 
assume that Man is a problematic and conflictual creature, that political communities are 
problematic and conflictual entities, and that international relations are inherently 
problematic and conflictual. Freud helps to explain via deductive logic why Man is the 
root cause of the tragedy of the international human condition. Being the root element of a 
human nature background theory for realism, Freudian Man provides a powerftil account 
of the underlying human nature of international relations. 
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Further, Freudian human nature is useful for realism as it helps, as the next section 
argues, to explain and shed light on the questions of potential progress and immanent 
limits of international relations. Freudian Man helps realists to balance prudently their 
concerns for, and beliefs in, the reality and the Utopia of international relations. 
Freudian human nature and the balancing of reality and Utopia 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that the concept of human nature is and ought to be 
the sole philosophical basis when theorising international relations. This applies 
particularly to political realism, a Weltanschauung that should turn to Freudian Man in its 
inevitable search for a proper explanatory human nature foundation. My argument ascribes 
to any conception of human nature a great deal of theoretical power as it functions as the 
analytical and normative backdrop against which international relations are approached. 
This means, in turn, that the respective conception of human nature in question must be a 
powerful conception. Freudian Man is a powerful conception as it is based on a powerful 
theory of human nature. 
Freudian Man helps realism to explain the underlying logic of the international 
human condition and its limits. Even more so, because Freud provides us with a strong 
human nature foundation in the sense that it is widely recognised and accepted. It goes 
without saying that this does not mean that realists ought to indulge in Freud worshipping 
and adopt all of Freud's concepts and theories without some degree of natural scepticism. 
Nor must realists turn merely to Freud when it comes to analytical and normative matters 
of international relations. Freud is, despite his great range and depths of interest in matters 
psychological and cultural, not a genuine scholar and thinker of international relations. Yet 
Freud's conception of human nature is certainly comprehensive and elegant, and realists 
can use it, following Mearsheimer's (2001:11) metaphor of his offensive realist theory of 
great power politics, as a 'powerful flashlight in a dark room': Freud cannot illuminate 
every nook and cranny realists deal with, but what Freudian Man can provide is being an 
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excellent tool that helps navigating through the darkness of analytical and normative 
questions and dilemmas of international relations. 
Freud is, of course, not uncontroversial, but we must not forget that Freudian Man is 
not the Man of pure speculation and religious or other mythical belief systems. Rather, 
Freudian Man is, so to speak, a scientific Man, for Freud's theory of human nature stems 
from scientific investigation based on medical-therapeutic work with clinical patients. This 
makes the defense of Freud fairly easy and realists can broadly capitalise on the scientific 
origins of Freudian Man. Explaining the underlying logic and tragedy of international 
relations as well as legitimising a particular world outlook against the backdrop of 
Freudian Man, realism draws from a conception of human nature that has come to be the 
most consequential and defining theory of Man of our age. It is not that the rise of 
neuroscience made Freud obsolete. As Nobel laureate neuroscientist Eric Kandel (1999) 
reminded us only recently, quoting him again: 'psychoanalysis still represents the most 
coherent and intellectually satisfying view of the mind' (505). 
We can defend Freud, however, also from the opposite angle. Realists who do not 
wish to rely on the scientific credentials of Freud for proving the latter's strengths can turn 
to the other Freud, the philosopher Freud. I f it was accepted that Freud's theory of human 
nature is not a scientific but rather a philosophical account of Man, then, realists could use 
the relevant philosophical argument to defend Freud. Rorty (1998a) makes a valid point 
when he argues that it is 'a mistake to ask Freud for scientific evidence...Plato didn't have 
evidence for dividing up the soul in three parts, Aristotle didn't have evidence for making 
all sorts of distinctions which we still take as perfectly commonsensible' (3). This does not 
imply that Freud is uncontroversial or that a distinctively Freudian human nature 
background theory is immune against criticism, or that he provides us with the Truth 
regarding the nature and behaviour of Man and political communities in international 
relations. It means, however, that realism does not need to rely any longer on the 
assumptions about human nature of a Thucydides, St. Augustine, Hobbes, or Machiavelli, 
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antiquated as these theories of Man are, making them easy targets for effective criticism. 
Instead, realism can furnish itself with a much stronger human nature foundation when it 
comes to the question of its own theoretical explanatory substructure—namely: Freudian 
Man. 
A further virtue of Freud is that, based on such human nature foundation, Freudian 
Man helps realists to explain and legitimise two of realism's major normative claims. 
These are realism's elitism and rejection of moral universalism. The first concerns what 
has been called realism's neutrality principle, the second its morality principle; but both 
concern, ultimately, realism's ability to steer prudently between the two ideal-typical poles 
of international-political thought that set the boundaries regarding the prospects and limits 
of international relations and inform the wider or specific programme of actual political 
action: realism/idealism, reality/utopia, or optimism/pessimism. 
Despite much and insightful efforts to reinterpret some key realist thinkers and to 
make them appear in a new and more non-realist light, it remains a defining feature of the 
realist Weltanschauung that it shows profound scepticism regarding the prospects of a 
major transformation of international relations. The realist logic is rather straightforward: a 
problematic Man leads to problematic political communities leads to problematic 
international affairs. Since it is important to understand realism's normative claims and 
their source, I briefly recapitulate the Freudian human nature of international relations. 
Man is a tension-ridden and ambivalent creature. The pleasure principle dictates to seek 
pleasure and to avoid pain. The gratification of instinctual demands is his raison d'etre. 
Being polymorphously perverse, Man's satisfaction of the ego-instincts (self-preservation 
or ego-libido) and Eros (object-libido) reinforces the yearning for power and security, both 
individually and collectively. Fear of nature and Eros drive Man into groups and political 
communities, but the ego-instincts work relentlessly against group formation because the 
group demands instinct renunciation. Metaphored as a Schopenhauerian porcupine, Man is 
constantly and instinctually driven towards the community but also away from it. 
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This attraction/aversion tension is an essential element of the human condition that 
can perhaps never be resolved entirely. It can be ameliorated, though, by the ego's 
employment of a particular defense mechanism. By identifying with other members of the 
community and its leader, Man is capable of repressing his ego-instincts within the 
community and gives his ful l loyalty (love) to it. But the problem is that the individually 
repressed ego-instincts, which are now being concentrated in the hands of the community 
or its leader(s), still exist. These collectivised instincts continue to aim for gratification. 
Yet since these hostile ego-instincts would threaten the libidinal ties within the 
community, these unsatisfied instincts are turned to the out-groups and cause, therefore, 
conflictual relations among separate political communities. According to the realist 
Weltanschauung, the international human condition is, ultimately, rooted in the Realist 
Man. More specifically, it has its source in the nature of Man whose instinctual structure is 
such that he is inherently being faced with profound tensions that can never be fully 
resolved but only ameliorated: pleasure/pain, ego-instincts/sexual-instincts, EroslThanatos, 
id/super-ego, pleasure principle/reality principle, or attraction/aversion. Men struggle on 
three levels: on the intimate, on the societal, and on the international. Seen in this light, 
realists have rightly agreed with Gilpin (1986:304) when he pointed to Hobbes's 
(in)famous dictum: ' i t 's a jungle out there'. 
In light of the Freudian conceptions of human nature, political communities, and 
international 'jungle', the natural and important question for realists has always been how 
effective and proper foreign-policy based on the concept of the national interest can be 
formulated and conducted. Aware of the irrationalities of the masses, realists have 
answered this question in a somewhat elitist manner. The masses must be kept away as far 
as possible from the levers of foreign-policy and international relations. The classicals 
were rather explicit on this point. Kennan confessed to have an 'extreme dislike of all 
masses' (1993:82). Lippmann's elitism led him to argue that a naive democratic-idealist 
belief in the 'omnicompetent, sovereign citizen' is as unrealistic and unattainable as for 'a 
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fat man to try to be a ballet dancer' (1993[1925]:29). Upholding the standard distinction 
between the enlightened intellectual and the emotive man in the street, Carr also pointed to 
the 'limited capacity of the elephant for aviation' (1936:854). And in the same vein, 
Niebuhr criticised that 'collective man always tends to be morally complacent, self-
righteous' (2008[1952]:169; also 2001[1932]). This form of democratic elitism—the 
thorough 'elitist bias' (Ferguson & Mansbach 2008)—is characteristic of both classical 
and post-classical realists (Rosenthal 1991:chap. 4; Ish-Shalom 2006). 
Morgenthau was particularly afraid of the man in the street and the influx of public 
opinion on the conduct of foreign-policy making. His belief in, and reliance on, the 
statesman and diplomacy as the effective means to maintain peace and order and avoid war 
and chaos can be directly traced back to his sceptical view of the masses. In Politics 
among Nations, Morgenthau (1967[1948]) makes the concern with public opinion a 
primary concern. He argues that is one of the nine essential rules of diplomacy that 'The 
government is the leader of public opinion, not its slave' (547). That he presents this 
dictum as the ninth and final rule is no coincidence because Morgenthau is aware that the 
rational, good, and responsible conduct of foreign-policy required is hardly achievable i f 
statesmen 'do not keep this principle constantly in mind' (547). The reality of political life 
is that the masses are particularly wary of making sober judgments and compromises and 
that statesmen often give in to popular pressures. It is, therefore, the task of the statesman 
'to strike a prudent balance' between the demands of good foreign-policy and the demands 
of the masses. As Morgenthau writes succinctly: ' In one word, he must lead' (548). The 
statesman must lead and become the dompteur of the masses, for the man in the street 
follows his own and often primitive patterns of thought. Distinguishing archetypically 
between ordinary man and enlightened man, Morgenthau argues in classic elitist fashion: 
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The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the 
statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple 
moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 
The statesman must take the long view, proceeding slowly and by 
detours, paying with small losses for great advantage; he must be 
able to temporize, to compromise, to bide his time. The popular 
mind wants quick results; it wil l sacrifice tomorrow's real benefit 
for today's apparent advantage. (142) 
When it comes to the role of the masses and public opinion in the realm of foreign-policy 
and international relations, realism can certainly not hide its elitist attitude. 
But realism must not even hide the elitist foreign-policy dimension of its 
Weltanschauung, for there are many good reasons as to why realists are cautious and 
prudent vis-a-vis the masses. Freudian Man helps realism to explain and legitimise such 
caution and prudence. It is one of Freud's virtues to have provided a more subtle 
understanding of political communities. The formation of groups cannot be solely 
explained by the motive of self-interest. Rather, we must not neglect the forces of libidinal 
ties that hold masses together. The positive side of Eros is that it may eventually lead us to 
the world-state as it seeks to bind ever more Men together, but the negative and more 
problematic side is one of imminent and permanent practical-political concern. For where 
the libidinal ties of the Eros are stronger than the motives of self-interest, then, we do not 
deal with the rational but politics must always reckon that it takes place firmly in the realm 
of individual and collective irrationality. Freud did not hold Man in high regard; as he 
(in)famously said: ' I have found little that is "good" about human beings on the whole. In 
my experience most of them are trash' (quoted in Roazen 1969:245). 
Freud's somewhat depreciatory view of Man and general elitism is mostly explained 
by what he saw is the nature of the masses. Man longs for the group; and this helps to tame 
some of his instincts which makes political communities possible, but it does not l i f t Man 
from his instinctual structure and make him a more enlightened, less instinctual-driven and 
less irrational creature. The id does not disappear, but it merely submerges in the group. 
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These psychodynamics lead the 'horde' to socially and politically unhealthy forms of 
collective regression which, then, more often than not, lead, in turn, to mere 'mass 
madness' (Ulman & Abse 1983:650). Freud's group psychology serves as a useful 
reminder for realists that 'when individuals come together in a group all their inhibitions 
fall away and all the cruel, brutal and destructive instincts, which lie dormant in 
individuals as relics of a primitive epoch, are stirred up to find free gratification' (Freud 
1921:70). Man undergoes psychological transformations by becoming a member of the 
mass but we must not forget that 'The apparently new characteristics which he then 
displays are in fact the manifestations of [the] unconscious, in which all that is evil in the 
human mind is contained as a predisposition' (101). Based on a distinct conception of 
human nature, Freud helps explain the more unpleasant features of collective Man which 
are 'irrationality, intolerance, illogical type of thinking, and...deterioration in moral 
standards and behaviour' (Jones 1957:362). To this, we may add what realism also fears, 
namely, collective feelings of moral superiority vis-a-vis 'them'. 
Hence, the important theoretical and practical-political question is what should be 
done in light of such collectively regressed Men and such groups which remind Freud of 
the 'revival of the primal horde' (1921:123). The realist Weltanschauung, aware of the 
dark sides of mass dynamics, believes in the enlightened, rational diplomat and statesman. 
Directly stemming from his individual and group psychological insights, Freud also sees 
good leadership as the main means to keep the masses at bay. In plain language, Freud 
divides society into essentially two parts: the leaders and the led (Freud 1933b:213). The 
following passage from The Future of an Illusion, worth quoting at ful l length, sums up 
nicely why Freud relies heavily on the concept of strong leadership: 
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It is just as impossible to do without control of the mass by a 
minority as it is to dispense with coercion in the work of 
civilization. For masses are lazy and unintelligent; they have no 
love for instinctual renunciation, and they are not to be convinced 
by argument of its inevitability; and the individuals composing 
them support one another in giving free rein to their indiscipline. 
It is only through the influence of individuals who can set an 
example and whom masses recognize as their leaders that they 
can be induced to perform the work and undergo the 
renunciations on which the existence of civilization depends. A l l 
is well i f these leaders are persons who possess superior insight 
into the necessities of life and who have risen to the height of 
mastering their instinctual wishes. But there is a danger that in 
order not to lose their influence they may give way to the mass 
more than it gives way to them, and it therefore seems necessary 
that they shall be independent of the mass by having means to 
power at their disposal. (Freud 1927:7-8) 
Freud did not concern himself too much with the psychology of leaders, save perhaps in 
the psychological study of President Wilson whom he deplored for his 'insincerity, 
unreliability and tendency to deny the truth' (Freud & Bullitt 1967:xii). But since 
collective Man is in an almost hypnotic state of mind and regresses into the Man of the 
primal horde, Freud sees the leader of the mass in terms of being its primal father or its 
hypnotiseur. As Freud argues: 
He, at the very beginning of the history of mankind, was the 
"superman" whom Nietzsche only expected from the future. Even 
today the members of a group stand in need of the illusion that 
they are equally and justly loved by their leader; but the leader 
himself need love no one else, he may be of a masterful nature, 
absolutely narcissistic, self-confident and independent. (Freud 
1921:123) 
In fact, deeply aware of the individual and collective irrationalities of Man in the street, 
Freud's faith in the 'horde leader' went as far as to make him argue that throughout human 
history 'breakthroughs to a higher and more rational cultural system had been initiated by 
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outstanding individuals who devoted themselves to a higher purpose and managed to 
mesmerize the masses to do the same' (Brunner 2001[1995]:168). On occasions, Freud 
appears to be too elitist, but being broadly consistent with the realist Weltanschauung, 
Freud helps realists to explain and legitimise why the democratisation of policy-making as 
regards international relations—after all a 'matter of life and death'(Keohane 1986a: 1)— 
must be taken with a pinch of salt. Public opinion is often, as realism fears, too irrational, 
emotive, shortsighted, manipulable, moralistic, and too uncompromising. 
These features of collective Man reinforce, then, another of political realism's major 
fears; put more positively: reinforce one of their major normative claims. This is their fear 
of moral universalism and tough stance against moral crusading. Though it has often been 
painted as such, the realist Weltanschauung is not amoral vis-a-vis international-political 
action and has always wrestled with the complex issue of moving international politics and 
foreign-policy beyond the dictates of crudely all-justifying expediency. As Morgenthau 
(1967[1948]) once lamented: ' I am still being accused of indifference to the moral problem 
in spite of abundance evidence...to the contrary' (x). Much has been written on the subject 
of the ethics of political realism showing that various realists have used various 
philosophical and ethical-theoretical bases in their respective international-political 
thought (Russell 1990; Rosenthal 1991; Wrightson 1996; Murray 1997; Lebow 2003; 
Russell 2007; Bell 2008; Molloy 2009). But it can safely be presumed that the ethics of 
political realism cannot be detached from the concept of the national interest. Morgenthau 
(1951) puts the political as well as moral imperative of the national interest nicely when he 
writes: 
Above all, remember always that it is not only a political 
necessity but also a moral duty for a nation to follow in its 
dealing with other nations but one guiding star, one standard for 
thought, one rule for action: the national interest. (242) 
Further, the realist Weltanschauung can be placed securely in the larger context of a 
Weberian-style ethics of responsibility (Smith 1986; Williams 2005). 
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The same applies to one of the most interesting theoretical, moral, and practical-
political timeless challenges of international relations, namely, the question of moral 
universalism and moral crusading. Morgenthau (1967[1948]:323) reminds us that mid-
20'''-century world politics was haunted by a powerful moral force which he calls 
'nationalistic universalism'. IP^-century nationalism wanted, Morgenthau writes, 'one 
nation in one state and nothing else'; nationalistic universalism, however, has claimed 'for 
one nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations and standards of action 
upon all the other nations' (323). Not much has changed since. Save perhaps in Europe—if 
at all—^tribes, states, and nations remain people's moral reference points; and IR scholars 
and foreign-policy makers are no less confronted with the political, economical, social, and 
moral/ethical dilemmas of small-state nationalism and great-power nationalistic 
universalism than they were. Hence, in light of recent Western democracy-promoting 
crusading in Iraq (Schmidt & Williams 2008), the 'return of history' (Kagan 2008), 
premature proclamations of the 'end of history' (Fukuyama 2002[1992]) and of foedus 
pacificum-style politico-philosophical reflections about 'laws of peoples' (Rawls 1999), 
David Clinton (2007a) has rightly argued that the continual warning of Morgenthau—and 
other realists from the classicals to post-classicals as Mearsheimer (2005)—not 'to take the 
interests of our own group and make them into the moral law of the universe was never 
more timely' (252). 
Freudian Man helps realism to explain and legitimise the sort of international moral 
relativism of the realist Weltanschauung. It is not the case that Freudian Man, because 
driven by certain instincts, is per se an immoral Man. To the contrary, Freudian Man does 
act morally and 'psycho-analysis has never said a word in favour of unfettering instincts 
that would injure our community' (Freud 1923b:219). But the much more important 
question is what the source of Man's morality is and why this source is essentially 
incommensurate with the idea of a universal moral order, whether religious or secular, to 
which states or policy-makers could adhere. For Freud, morality is essentially synonymous 
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with the super-ego and authority; moral development is essentially a part of the child's 
psychosexual development. Men's sense of right/wrong and moral ought derives merely 
from what they had been taught by their parents as well as other early influences including 
wider sets of cultural socialisations. By means of identification—because the child fears 
the loss of love inflicted when instinctual urges are not renounced—^their 'injunctions and 
prohibitions', Freud (1923a) argues, become and 'remain powerfiil in the ego ideal and 
continue, in form of conscience, to exercise moral censorship' (37). 
The implications of Freud's moral psychology are important in more than one 
respect. First, in a narrower sense, it guards us against religious-driven moral universalism. 
Based on his moral psychology, taken together with his critical psycho-analysts of religion 
(Freud 1927), Freud tells us that the presumption of 'a moral world order', as upheld by 
religious belief systems, is merely a 'pious illusion' (taken from Roazen 1969:126). 
Arguing entirely antithetical to theological and natural law accounts of individual and 
collective morality and in line with his general approach to socio-cultural and political 
phenomena, Freud argues that we need to resolve into its psychological components—and 
look beyond—^the superficialities of the prevailing mora! orders. This wi l l l i f t the veil of f 
much of prevailing and supposedly God-given morality and help us to understand the 
'purely human origin of all the regulations and precepts of civilization' (1927:42). Further, 
putting the belief in God aside implied that 'these commandments and laws would lose 
their rigidity and unchangeableness' and that 'People could understand that they are made, 
not so much to rule them as...to serve their interests' (42). The same applies to secular 
universal moral orders such as Kant's deontological a priori ethics. This means, then, in a 
wider sense, that the super-egos of Men are to a large extent contingent upon time and 
space. Further, it means that these moral codes do merely reflect the sanctioned moral 
obligations that have been put in place because they are vital to ensure individual and 
collective survival and cohabitation; this includes Ananke. And, lastly, we may consider 
Man as a creature that is not so much immoral as it is driven by an ego which, informed by 
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the contingent demands of the super-ego, seeks 'obtaining rewards and avoiding external 
punishments and internal guilt' (Wallwork 1991:222; on Freud's moral psychology, see 
also Deigh 1996). The crux is, then, that even though Freudian Man, particular the 
collective Freudian Man of the masses, is susceptible to moral and nationalistic 
universal ism, the moral development and moral psychology of Freudian Man does not 
justify a moral-universalist political ethics. Although Freud's conception of human nature 
is universalist, Freudian Man is particularist-historicist—so are 'Freudian' political 
communities. Realists are right to focus on respective conceptions of the national interest 
and maintain a strong cultural and international-moral relativist stance. 
Despite the virtues of Freudian Man for realism to help explain the more realist(ic) 
and tragic dimension of international relations as it unfolds across time and space, Freud's 
theory of human nature helps realists to stay clear from falling prey to irrationalism and 
fatalism. I f we take optimism to mean that 'reality is good, society basically harmonious' 
(Waltz 2001 [1959]: 19), then, realism is not an optimistic Weltanschauung. The belief in 
teleological and automatic progress is regarded as misleading and dangerous; so are the 
genuine peace projects envisaged by such consequential thinkers as Abbe de Saint-Pierre 
(2002[1713]), Kant (1991 [1795]), and Rawls (1999). Realists' scepticism derives from 
their underlying assumptions about human nature. Realism is 'particularly sharp-eyed in 
seeing the self-interest and hypocrisy that lie behind all human (and therefore all 
collective) actions. Pride and self interest have not been cleansed from human behavior' 
(Clinton 2007a:252). Or, as Morgenthau (1967[1948]) argued much earlier, realism 
'believes that the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result from 
forces inherent in human nature' (3). Realism knows that the international-political cannot 
be severed from the concept of human nature—i.e. from some constants or absolutes—and 
that it therefore must not lose sight of the inherent limitations of international relations. 
But nor must realism lose sight of the Utopia of international relations or, perhaps 
better, the reasonably possible. Realism is, per definitionem, neither power-apologetic nor 
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fatalist. A major overhaul of the basic patterns of international relations may never 
materialise, but piecemeal improvement is possible. As Max Weber (1994[1919]) 
famously argued: 
Politics means slow, strong drilling through hard boards, with a 
combination of passion and a sense of judgement. It is of course 
entirely correct, and a fact confirmed by all historical experience, 
that what is possible would never have been achieved if, in this 
world, people had not repeatedly reached for the impossible. 
(369). 
The realist perspective on the nature, implications, and limits of politics is in line with 
Freud's perspective on the human condition. Freud, too, is neither optimist nor fatalist, his 
scepticism hardly contested. Yet Freud does not indulge in pessimistic irrationalism and 
fatalism. This may seem surprising given Freud's instinctual theory of Man; he often 
emphasised 'the strict determination of mental events' (1923c:236) or 'the illusion of Free 
W i l l ' (1919:236). Still, Freud is not the high-priest of the irrational and/or unconscious 
determinism (an excellent discussion along these lines is provided by Wallwork 1991:49-
100). Freud is a strict psychic determinist, but this does not imply a belief in uniform 
chains of mental causation and mental and behavioural outcomes. It merely means that all 
mental activities and events are caused; they are caused by nature or Man's physiology. 
Even the ego—the authority of reason or the reality principle—is part of Man's nature or 
physiology. 
Yet this does not mean that the ego has no degree of autonomy from the instinctual 
demands of the id. This is, of course, highly significant, both on an individual and 
collective level. The medical efforts of psycho-analytical psychotherapy aim at healing 
mental and emotional illnesses and diseases. Its methods and techniques have liberating 
effects and the main goal is to strengthen the ego vis-a-vis the unconscious id and semi-
unconscious super-ego demands. The raison d'etre of psycho-analysis is straightforward: 
'Where id was, there ego shall be' (Freud 1933a:80). This signifies Freud's belief in the 
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potentiality of human change. As Michael Nicholson (1981) puts it: the 'basic feature of 
the psychoanalytic viewpoint [is] that people are changeable' (113). The ego is not the 
mere slave of the id but ought to be its master; a healthy and mature ego does potentially 
possess enough power to keep the id at bay. The means of the ego are manifold: 'by 
gaining control over the demands of the instincts, by deciding whether they are to be 
allowed satisfaction, by postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favourable 
in the external world or by suppressing their excitations entirely' (Freud 1940:146). 
Yet there are limits. Freud's ego autonomy must not be interpreted in a Kantian 
light. The ego cannot free itself entirely from instincts, emotions, and desires. It cannot 
follow the pure a priori reasonable. As Freud (1917) argues: 
You [the ego] over-estimated your strength when you thought 
you could treat your sexual [and ego] instincts as you liked and 
could utterly ignore their intentions. The result is that they have 
rebelled and have taken their own obscure paths to escape this 
suppression...How they have achieved this, and the paths which 
they have taken, have not come to your knowledge. A l l you have 
learned is the outcome of their work—the symptom which you 
experience as suffering. Thus you do not recognize it as a 
derivative of your own rejected instincts and do not know that it 
is a substitutive satisfaction of them. (142) 
Surely, the ego or ego autonomy has its limits vis-a-vis the instincts. Freudian Man is, 
therefore, perhaps best conceived as some sort of 'middle way between the British 
empiricist-utilitarian view that freedom is the absence of external coercion in the 
realization of desires and the contrasting Kantian conception of freedom as absolute moral 
autonomy' (Wallwork 1991:88-89). 
This middle-position between a Kantian and an utilitarian self is, however, a virtue. 
Freudian Man helps prevent realism from committing two fallacies—naivety and fatalism. 
As regards naivety, realist must not forget that Man bears within his instinctual structure 
the possibility of change and progress. At the same time, realists must not forget that both 
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change and progress are neither easily nor promptly achievable. In a passage in 'Why 
War?', worth quoting at length, Freud (1933b) argues that human nature 
makes it easy for us to find a formula for indirect methods of 
combating war. ...the most obvious plan wil l be to bring 
£'ros...into play...Anything that encourages the growth of 
emotional ties between men must operate against war. These ties 
may be of two kinds. In the first place they may be relations 
resembling those towards a loved object...The second kind of 
emotional tie is by means of identification. Whatever leads men 
to share important interests produces this community of feeling, 
these identifications... 
The ideal condition of things would of course be a community of 
men who had subordinated their instinctual life to the dictatorship 
of reason. Nothing else could unite men so completely and so 
tenaciously, even i f there were not emotional ties between them. 
But in all probability that is a Utopian expectation. No doubt the 
other indirect methods of preventing war are more practicable, 
though they promise no rapid success. An unpleasant picture 
comes to one's mind of mills that grind so slowly that people may 
starve before they get their flour. (212-213) 
Freud is surely not an overly optimistic and naive thinker. 
But nor is he a fatalist. In fact, Freud's virtue for realism is the ambivalence. 
Freudian Man is a universal psycho-physiological instinct creature that is also to some 
certain extent malleable, changeable, and improvable. Freud's conception of human nature 
allows for change and progress, even though these may come only iteratively and 
extremely slowly. Freudian Man is, therefore, incommensurable with a—merely 
allegedly—realist international-political theory that represents or risks becoming a 
'historicism of stasis.. Xhsl freezes the political institutions of the current world order' 
(Ashley 1986:289). Realism is abundantly aware of human imperfection, but it does not 
lose sight o f the 'hope that reason may one day gain greater control over passions' (Gilpin 
1986:321). Freudian Man helps realists explain and understand that their hope is both a 
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realist as well as a realistic hope and that they must work unceasingly towards its 
realisation. As Freud (1927) describes Man's eternal struggle between reason and instincts: 
We may insist as often as we like that man's intellect is powerless 
in comparison with his instinctual life, and we may be right in 
this. Nevertheless, there is something peculiar about this 
weakness. The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not 
rest t i l l it has gained a hearing. (53) 
Without compromising the emphasis on human imperfection, scepticism, and fear of 
naivety, Freudian Man helps realism to ensure that their Weltanschauung wil l always 
oscillate healthily between the ideal-typical poles of reality and Utopia. Realism is realistic 
about the inherent intricacies of the international human condition, but it is not pessimistic 
fatalist. In Weberian language, then, Freudian Man is both the reason why international 
politics necessitates the slow and strong drilling through hard boards but it is also the 
reason why it is worth drilling with a combination of both passion and pragmatic 
judgement. 
Conclusion 
I argued that Freudian Man provides realism with a powerful human nature foundation. 
This argument pro Freudian Man was the last element of a chain of arguments that sought 
to answer this thesis's second main research question whether human nature ought to be 
dead in realism. The preceding chapter pursued a largely negative analytical-argumentative 
strategy. The present chapter changed the perspective, though not the argument. 
Identifying positive arguments vis-a-vis the concept of human nature in realism, I argued 
that human nature ought not to be dead. More specifically, Freudian human nature ought 
not to be dead. Freudian Man provides realism with a strong and much-needed intellectual 
explanatory substructure that helps explain, illuminate, and legitimise in greater depth the 
realist Weltanschauung. 
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Freudian Man helps to bring back realism to its classical variant, the genuine 
realism. Contemporary realists must recognise the fact that the intimate relationship 
between the concept of human nature and the political does apply, mutatis mutandis, also 
vis-a-vis the international-political. The Waltzians/Mearsheimerians may correctly 
discriminate analytically politics within borders from politics beyond borders. This, 
however, must not imply that the nature and origins of the political pertaining to the 
international domain is different to the political pertaining to the domestic sphere. An 
intemational-/7o//7/ca/ theory remains—after all—a political theory, a political theory of 
international relations. We cannot meaningfully sever the international-political from 
human nature. Structural realists are right that recurrent international-political outcomes 
and repetitive foreign-policy behaviours cannot sufficiently be explained by recourse to the 
personalities and childhoods of statesmen. But they are wrong when they imply that the 
root cause why political communities yearn for power is the international system's 
anarchical structure and not the nature of Man. 
Freud helps us to understand that the international anarchical structure comprising 
sovereign political communities is not so much the root cause for the international-
political. Rather, it is merely the reflection of a universalised human nature that ultimately 
causes not only the formation and spatial separation of political communities in 
friends/enemies or us/them but also these communities' yearning for power in the first 
place. This does not necessarily imply a rejection or devaluation of structural realism. Its 
parsimony and locus of independent variables surely has its virtues. The profound problem 
begins, however, when post-classicals argue that the international-political and the longing 
for power are caused by the international structure and that we must distinguish between a 
structural realism and some sort of human nature or biological realism. Analytical-
empiricist realists that place the independent variable at the level of the individual can 
surely coexist side-by-side with structuralists emphasising the structural level. Yet the 
realist Weltanschauung—the philosophical home of these various analytical-empiricist 
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scientific theories—cannot be divided into a structural and a human nature camp. Realism 
is per se 'human nature realism'. It is based upon the concept of human nature. Every 
realist international-political theory is 'human nature realism' (a tautology, indeed) or it is 
nothing. 
Structural realism cannot avoid the concept of human nature. Not only because it 
was shown how infused it is with hidden assumptions about human nature but also because 
it requires a proper human nature microfoundation comparable to that of the homo 
oeconomicus in economic theory. Being part of a philosophy of international politics with 
a strong methodological individualist heritage that has always argued from first principles, 
structural realism cannot continue to rely on unreflective assumptions of social wholes 
such as the state. Instead, it must provide itself with a proper human nature foundation 
from which it can deduce the necessity of the existence of political communities as well as 
their conflictual relations vis-a-vis others. This forces structural realism to engage with the 
intricacies o f the concept of human nature, a theme it thought dead long ago. 
Based on the central concept of the Realist Man, the realist Weltanschauung requires 
a politico-theoretical human nature-based background theory. This background theory is 
not a scientific Waltzian first image theory of diplomatic historians or political 
psychologists. Rather, it provides actual scientific realist international-political theories 
with a philosophical human-nature backdrop, i.e. with a theoretical explanatory 
substructure that helps realism to explain rather than merely assume its major analytical 
and normative claims. Based on Freudian Man, the Freudian background theory helps 
demystifying the realist Weltanschauung and resolve into their individual-psychological 
elements what otherwise appear to be either mere assumptions or mere 
anthropomorphological projections and hypostatisations. 
Freudian Man helps realism not only to explain why the international human 
condition is rooted in Man's tension-ridden instinctual structure. Further, Freud's theory of 
human nature illuminates by means of deductive reasoning why a conflictual nature of 
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Man must of necessity lead to a conflictual nature of political communities which, in turn, 
must lead of necessity to inherently conflictual international relations. The scepticism of 
realism vis-a-vis the prospects for large-scale changes and transformations of international 
relations as well as Kantian-style peace plans is, therefore, to be derived directly from the 
nature and behaviour of Freudian Man. The same applies to realism's elitism in foreign-
policy, fear of the masses and public opinion as well as realism's international moral-
relativist stance. 
Freudian Man provides realism with a powerful human nature foundation also 
regarding the questions of naivety, fatalism, and the balancing of Utopia and reality in 
international relations. Freud's theory of Man helps realists not to forget that the nature of 
Man must not lead to pessimistic fatalism. We must not be naive optimists, but piecemeal 
improvement of Man and collective Man is possible. The main signpost remains—and 
ought to remain—the concept of the national interest, but our social and political dealings 
vis-a-vis others must not be based on the crude assumptions that all Men are purely self-
interested, destructive and entirely irrational creatures that enjoy being slaves of their 
instincts. Based on Freudian Man, there is neither room for naivety nor for crude human 
nature and power apologetism. It is, then, another virtue that although Freud's theory of 
human nature is not uncontroversial or immune against attacks, it is Freud who has 
profoundly defined our age and how we think of ourselves and others. Realism can 
capitalise on this powerful source. Freudian Man provides a powerful intellectual 
explanatory substructure for the realist Weltanschauung and is insofar a strong human 
nature foundation as it takes much more effort to attack realism as regards its human 
nature foundation when these are Freudian compared to when realism continues to rely on 
Thucydidean, Augustinian, Hobbesian, Machiavellian, or—in the worst case—on entirely 
unidentifiable and unreflective assumptions about human nature. 
The virtues of Freudian Man for realism are plentiful and thus are the virtues of the 
concept of human nature. The implications for realism as well as for IR are plentifiil, too. 
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T H E ' R E S U R R E C T I O N ' O F T H E R E A L I S T M A N , F R E U D , AND H U M A N 
N A T U R E 
In a recent Morgenthau Festschrift, John Herz recalled how Morgenthau began his invited 
presentation on the given theme 'Political Realism Revisited' at the ISA 1980 annual 
conference by saying wittily: 'Revisited? I never left i t ' (quoted in Herz 2005:25). True, 
Morgenthau never left realism—and, accordingly, he never left the concept of human 
nature or his profound concern with Man and the human condition. It is no mere 
coincidence that the essay on the derivation of the political from the nature of Man 
(Morgenthau 1930) is one of his earliest and the essay on the roots of narcissism 
(Morgenthau & Person 1978) one of his last works. Still, when Morgenthau died, genuine 
realism died, the genuine and profound concern with Man in realist international-political 
theory died. 
This does, however, not imply that the concept of human nature has really died. As I 
argued in this thesis, the concept of human nature may have been considered dead, but it is 
still haunting us (is-question); and it is haunting us, indeed, in many different ways (ought-
question). Thus, to paraphrase Morgenthau: 'Human Nature Revisited?—We never left it! ' 
But what does it mean that we never left one of international-political theory's most 
ancient but most controversial concepts? It means that we must deal with what I see as the 
overarching implication of my thesis's arguments: namely, the 'resurrection' of the 
concept of human nature (resurrection in inverted commas, for it was never really dead). In 
the following three concluding sections, I wi l l discuss what I see s uch 'resurrection' 
requires realism and wider IR to embark on. First, that we bring the Realist Man 'back' 
into realism. Secondly, that we bring Freud 'back' into realism. And, last not least, that we 
bring 'back' both Freud and the concept of human nature into wider contemporary IR. 
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Bringing the Realist Man 'back' in 
The two main research questions of this thesis—Is human nature dead? Ought human 
nature to be dead?—took their starting point in what I described in the introduction as the 
strange death of human nature in realism. There, I presented some preliminary evidence 
that suggested that post-Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian realists may not be as purified of 
assumptions about human nature as they would have themselves and others believe. I also 
hypothesised that the assumptions about human nature of several leading 20'''-century 
classical realists may require substantial reinterpretation along Freudian lines. In light of 
these two hypotheses, I presented my own readings of classical realist and post-classical 
realist-intemational-political theory, respectively, and came to the conclusion that the 
concept of human nature is not dead in contemporary realist international-political 
theorising. This conclusion was important in its own right. 
But the is-question naturally led the thesis to consider another question. For i f the 
concept of human nature is not dead, what ought to be done—ought the concept of human 
nature be dead? On the basis of a critique of the human nature critics and of presenting 
pro-active arguments in favour of human nature, the conclusion was that the concept of 
human nature ought not to be dead in contemporary realism. Contemporary realism must 
bring 'back' human nature. The Realist Man must be recognised and appreciated as a core 
concern and core concept by realists. This is not so much a question of individual choice 
but of profound necessity: the necessity to protect and perfect the realist Weltanschauung. 
The post-classical realist intellectual project has failed. There are several reasons for 
its failure (see Keohane 1986c; Dunne et al. 2007). This thesis has identified one—the 
hypocritical approach vis-a-vis the Realist Man. My criticism concerns the blatant neglect 
of the concept of the Realist Man taken together with the continuing but hidden relevance 
of the concept of human nature. We must recognise that several leading post-classical 
realists are, despite their claims to the contrary, heavily infused with assumptions about 
human nature. They share not only the conviction that the concept of human nature is some 
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sort of antiquated relict of the pre-Herzian/Waltzian era. They also share what has been 
referred to as their 'human nature lie'—attempting to substitute the concept of 
international-political structure for the concept of human nature but still falling back on 
certain hidden assumptions about the nature of Man. 
But the fact that this human nature lie by the post-classical realists has been 
uncovered cannot fiiUy satisfy Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-inspired realists. These post-
classicals and their assumptions about human nature can be defended against some largely 
unwarranted points of criticism, but one must still be alarmed in view of these post-
classicals' degree of unreflectiveness when it comes to matters of human nature. Their 
unreflectiveness seems striking in comparison to the way how the classicals have 
approached the concept of the Realist Man and used assumptions about the nature of Man 
in their respective international-political theories. Thus, contemporary realists, both of 
classical and post-classical provenance, are being faced with a rather unpleasant 
intellectual situation. With the concept of human nature still being a largely discredited 
idea, not only the classicals remain easy prey, but the post-classical realists, too, are now 
in the focus of attention by those realism critics seeking to identify and criticise hidden 
assumptions about human nature as well as realism as a whole. 
The problem is that contemporary realism wi l l most likely continue facing such a 
hostile situation, unless both classical and post-classical realists are doing their respective 
intellectual and argumentative share to re-discover and re-consider the concept of human 
nature as one of the most foundational concerns and concepts of realism. They must help 
to bring 'back' the Realist Man. This wi l l help protect and perfect realism. 
Perhaps the heaviest burden must be shouldered by post-classicals. This seems fair, 
for they were the ones who set out to raise realism to an allegedly more sophisticated level. 
The Waltzs and Mearsheimers have kept repeating over and over again that mere 
'interpretations' and 'explanations' of international relations are 'plentiful' but that 
'theories are scarce' (Waltz 1998:386; also Mearsheimer 2001:18). Such post-classical 
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mantra has always been directed against the classicals implying that the latter were merely 
offering us some sort of bedtime reading regarding international politics—but honestly: 
who would we recommend i f one was looking for an explanation of the genuine nature of 
international politics? Morgenthau or Waltz; Carr or Kaplan; Niebuhr or Mearsheimer? 
Part of the quarrel between the classicals and the post-classicals had been the concept of 
the Realist Man. 
The failure to get rid of assumptions about human nature sets the first intellectual 
homework for post-classical realism. They must accept that they cannot any longer wish 
away the concept of human nature. Too many post-classical realist international-political 
theories have been caught having smuggled in some fundamental assumptions about 
human nature without which these theories would internally collapse. The task for post-
classicals is, therefore, to provide their respective theories with a proper human nature 
foundation that is comparable to how economic theory is based upon a human nature 
microfoundation. Post-classical realists cannot any longer rely on unexplained and 
unreflective assumptions upon which their respective international-political theories are 
currently being built. Their assumptions about individual-psychological and social facts 
may even be correct, but they must explicate these assumptions in more detail, explain 
where these assumptions come from, and present us with the proper argumentative 
deduction as to how such assumptions as state-survival relate, ultimately, back to the 
nature of Man. These post-classical realists must pro-actively bring 'back' in the concept 
of the Realist Man and make it the genuine philosophical foundation upon which their 
respective international-political theories are being constructed. Otherwise, post-classical 
realism wil l not only remain defenceless vis-a-vis those who are (rightly) discontent with 
their human nature lie and methodological flaws, but wi l l also remain a largely deficient 
body of realist international-political theory—one that may have nothing to do with 
genuine realism. 
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By contrast, the Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style realists have never had any 
reservations about the concept of human nature. Instead, they have perfectly understood 
what I see ought now to be their main task: namely, to pro-actively argue that realism is 
inherently intertwined with the concept of the Realist Man. Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-
style realists must preach and defend what is not controversial among historians of 
Western (international-) political theory: that virtually every political theory has been 
founded upon a certain conception of human nature. Across the millennia, (international-) 
political theorists have used Man as the starting points for their forays into the world of 
freedom and oppression, human and social (in)justice, violence, war, and peace. 
The human nature-sceptics must be reminded that the intimate relationship between 
the political and human nature applies, mutatis mutandis, also vis-a-vis the international-
political. There may be all sorts of good reasons to analytically distinguish carefully 
between a theory concerned with the domestic and a theory concerned with the 
international (until someone presents us with a comprehensive general theory of politics 
that comprises both spheres). But this must not lead to the separation of the concept of 
human nature from the international-political. Post-classical realists must be reminded that 
the nature and origins of the political pertaining to the domestic are by no means different 
to the nature and origins of the political pertaining to the international. Be it voting cards 
or tanks, the underlying object of interest is not only the same—the political (and 
power)—but it has its roots in the same source: the Realist Man. Since post-classical 
realists seem to have forgotten about the triadic intimate relationship between realism, the 
political, and the (international-) political, it is naturally the task of the 
Morgenthauians/Niebuhrians to argue for and defend the Realist Man as the 'new' age-old 
core concept or philosophical basis of realism. 
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Bringing Freud 'back' into political realism 
Based on my readings of Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr, I argued 
that their respective conceptions of Man are to varying degrees of explicitness and depths 
of Freudian provenance. With respect to the post-classical realists, I argued that with the 
exceptions of Herz and Kaplan, who also seem to have been influenced by Freudian 
psychology, the hidden assumptions about human nature of Waltz, Mearsheimer, and the 
neoclassicals are too unreflective to allow a conclusion regarding their intellectual sources. 
My interpretation of these realists along Freudian lines is open for debate. That is 
legitimate and to be valued, for how else would there be scientific progress? The fear is, 
however, that a healthy debate about respective assumptions about human nature may not 
materialise, unless contemporary realists begin to engage more pro-actively with the 
concept of human nature and scrutinise more thoroughly the nature and origins of their 
respective assumptions about human nature. 
The imperative task for contemporary realists to engage more consciously with their 
own overt and covert assumptions about human nature is related to the causa Freud. In this 
thesis, I have been concerned with the concept of human nature vis-a-vis 20*-century 
classical as well as contemporary post-classical realism with special reference to one of the 
truly consequential figures of Western thought. I wondered about the seemingly strange 
fact that Freud has been such a ubiquitous figure of influence and of theoretical concern in 
virtually all subjects across the sciences, social sciences, and arts and humanities on the 
one hand, but that Freud seems to be a terribly neglected and under-studied figure in IR. I 
hypothesised that Freud might be helpftil both in terms of the is-question and the ought-
question. I argued that several classicals and post-classicals have been influenced by 
Freudian psychology, but I also argued that when it comes to the question of a 
sophisticated theory of human nature for realism, Freud's theory of Man seems to offer a 
most appropriate starting point. I argued that the philosophy of realism requires a politico-
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theoretical human nature-based background theory and I presented a distinctively Freudian 
background theory. 
Based on this thesis's special reference to Freud, the conclusion must not be, 
however, to close the causa Freud/realism but rather to engage in greater depth with 
Freud's psychology and social/political philosophy. Realism scholars should explore 
further Freud's potential impact and expand the analytical focus. We must ask whether 
other 20'''-century classical realists as well as contemporary post-classicals have also been 
influenced by Freudian assumptions about human nature. I examined Morgenthau, 
Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, Niebuhr as well as Herz, Kaplan, Waltz, Mearsheimer, and the 
neoclassicals. We must also examine the nature and origins of the assumptions about 
human nature of the likes of Aron, Berlin, Butterfield, Schmitt, Schwarzenberger, Wight, 
Weber as well as of the Gilpins, Copelands, Wohlforths, or Zakarias. I f these assumptions 
are not Freudian, we wil l know what has taken the place of Freud and can then enquire into 
the reasons why Freud fell out of the picture. Given Freud's impact, it is, however, likely 
that we find more Freudian realists or some Freudian traces. In this regard, we can build on 
varying sources that have already shown the nature of the intellectual relationships 
between Freud and Berlin (Esman 2000), Freud and Schmitt (Carty 1995), Freud and 
Weber (Mcintosh 1970; Strong 1987). Upon further exploration, we may then wonder 
whether 20*-century realism may perhaps be seen as the politico-philosophical mirror 
image or implication of the Freudian Man and the Freudian revolution. This brings me to 
second theme of further research that should be pursued. 
I argued for a distinctively Freudian background theory for the realist 
Weltanschauung. Freud's theory of Man offers a most appropriate starting point for such a 
background theory for realism—mostly because Freudian Man is a powerful and strong 
human nature foundation. It helps realists to explain, demystify and also legitimise the core 
principles and concepts of their Weltanschauung. Rather than relying on mere assumptions 
or principles on how the nature and behaviour of Man reinforces the hostile behaviour of 
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political communities vis-a-vis their counterparts on the world stage, Freudian Man helps 
explain the underlying individual and social psychological mechanics and dynamics that 
make the relations among nations perhaps an endless struggle for power and peace. From 
Freudian Man, realists can deduce their healthy scepticism of a too open conduct of 
foreign-policy, their fear of moral crusading, and their notion of international moral 
relativism. At the same time, Freudian Man helps prevent realists falling prey to the ills of 
pessimistic fatalism and helps retain the belief in both rational foreign-policy conduct as 
well as in piecemeal progress in international relations. 
Freud is certainly not immune to attacks and what I presented here as the Freudian 
background theory is certainly not the ' f u l l ' Freud. As I mentioned before, Freud's (Buvre 
fills 24 volumes (Freud 1953-74; 18 vols, in the original German, Freud 1940-52) and this 
thesis was not so much a thesis on Freud than it was a thesis on realism and the human 
nature question, albeit with a special reference to Freud. This thesis has sought to help 
raise the low profile of Freud in realism and contemporary IR. It has hopefully achieved 
such a task by arguing how important Freud has been among realists (is-question) and how 
useful Freud still is for realism (ought-question). 
This can be, however, merely a first step of a hopefully much more thorough 
engagement with Freud. Political theorists have long recognised the virtues as well as the 
vices of Freud (see the book-length studies by Rieff 1959; Johnston 1965; Roazen 1969; 
Abramson 1984; Anderson 1993; Drassinower 2003). But political theorists of 
international relations and IR theorists have been unduly neglecting Freud's psychology 
and social/political philosophy. This does injustice to one of our most important thinkers. 
Further, scholars of international relations are cutting themselves o f f from the insights of 
one of the most profound psychological traditions that could, otherwise, help them 
illuminate, explain and understand in more depth several of the most important issues and 
timeless themes of international relations. Even i f we do not agree with Freud's own social 
and (international-) political thought and do not agree with his own conclusions that he 
220 
Chapter 6. Conclusion 
derived from his own psychology, we should study Freudian Man thoroughly. It provides a 
powerful foundation upon which we can address—from a classical realist-style 
perspective—the question of the nature and origins of political communities, the 
prevalence and dangers of nationalism, and the ubiquity of aggression, violence and war in 
international relations. Further, Freudian Man can help us to explain the psychological 
nature and origins of power, legitimacy, ethics, human agency and human progress in 
international relations. 
Particularly for Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style realists, who wish to continue to 
approach the timeless dilemmas of international relations with recourse to the dilemmas of 
Man and the human condition because of their awareness that the relations among nations 
are but a subtle yet brutal reflection of the nature of Man, Freud provides an insightful 
account of the intimate triadic relationship between Man, the human condition, and the 
international struggle for power and peace. As part of an analytical and explanatory 
endeavour, Freud can help these realists to strengthen their case that international politics 
is, ultimately, merely the politics of the nature of Man writ large. And, as part of the 
normative and ethical endeavour, Freud can help these realists to strengthen their case as to 
what is possible in international politics and what is not. Such a lengthy study and 
treatment of Freud's theory of Man and civilisation vis-a-vis the realist Weltanschauung 
that is devoted solely to these questions and themes of the international-political remains 
to be embarked on. 
Bringing Freud and human nature 'back' into International Relations 
Though this thesis established an intellectual connection between Freud and realism; 
though I argued for the virtues of such Freud/realism connection, I concede without 
hesitation that a thinker of the calibre of Freud and his theory of Man cannot solely be 
hijacked by, or straitjacketed into, realist international-political thought. Whether we 
sympathise with Freud's psychology and social/political philosophy or are critical of it; 
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whether we see Freud—to use Peter Gay's (1988:xvi) words—as a 'genius, founder, 
master, a giant among the makers of the modem mind' or as an 'autocrat, plagiarist, 
fabulist, the most consummate of charlatans' (this thesis has placed itself broadly in the 
former camp), there can be hardly any doubt that Freud has been one of the prime shapers 
of our age when it comes to the nature of Man and his human condition. Several leading 
realists have recognised Freud's achievements. 
But liberals, Marxists, and conservatives have also valued and used Freud's 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic insights. We know that Freud's psycho-analytical 
psychology has influenced diverse thinkers such as Kelsen, Lasswell, Keynes, and 
Parsons, to name only a few. We know that we cannot really understand modem social 
sciences and their (meta-)theories without Freud. We also know that both Frankfurt School 
-inspired critical theory as well as post-modem theories have been drawing from Freudian 
psycho-analysis. It seems, therefore, vital to widen the analytical focus and explore in 
greater depth the potential influence of Freud in other theoretical traditions of the study of 
international relations since we can reasonably expect that quite a number of thinkers and 
scholars of international relations have built—consciously or unconsciously, implicitly or 
explicitly—^their respective analytical research and normative thinking upon Freudian 
foundations. 
Such an endeavour wi l l surely face obstacles. First and foremost because not many 
of those who have drawn from Freudian ideas have admitted openly the Freudian portions 
of their analytical or normative research (a recent exception is Gammon 2008). The real 
problem wi l l be that, since Freud's theory of Man is such a pervasive part of our 
'collective assumptions' about the social and political world (Elliott 1998a:2; Wallerstein 
1999:9; Merlino et al. 2008), Freudian Man lurks secretly and quietly in the back of much 
international-political theorising without Freud ever been explicitly mentioned. It is, 
however, exactly these often hidden Freudian themes, traces or residues that we must 
attempt to excavate. This wi l l help us to determine in more depth and fro m various 
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different scientific-theoretical, ontological, methodological, and epistemological 
perspectives the continuing relevance and politico-theoretical implications of Freudian 
Man for the study of international relations. 
The wider and more in-depth theoretical concern with Freud can, however, merely 
represent the specific instance of a much wider and more in-depth theoretical concern with 
the concept and conceptions of human nature among contemporary thinkers and scholars 
of international relations. In this thesis, I argued that the concept o f human nature is not 
and ought not to be dead in contemporary realism of international relations. Yet this does 
not imply that the question of the role, origins, and nature of assumptions about human 
nature must merely become again the core concern of a handful of 
Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style theorists of international relations. Rather, the concept of 
human nature must become again one of the core concerns of literally every single scholar 
of international relations. We must deal with it properly regardless of to what particular 
Weltanschauung and level of analysis we belong. 
The main task of theorists of international relations remains to describe, to explain, 
and to predict foreign-policy behaviour and international-political outcomes. Further, we 
must not forget to examine and theorise the normative-ethical dimension of the relations 
among nations that include their relentless search for power, security, prosperity, prestige, 
and peace. But we must also not forget what lies underneath our analytical and particularly 
normative international-political theorising—namely, particular conceptions of human 
nature. The classical realists did know that Man is the ultimate source of all evil and 
tragedy in the social and political world but that Man is also the only bearer of all potential 
progress in international relations setting the prospects and limits. The post-classical 
realists have thought that they can theorise the international-political without any recourse 
to assumptions about human nature. They have failed badly, for they have done exactly 
just that. Likewise, those critical of the concept of human nature in (international-) 
political theory, those who argued vigorously against the analytical and moral vicissitudes 
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of assumptions about human nature, these Weltanschauungen have dispensed with the term 
'human nature' only and continue assuming certain characteristics, behavioural traits, and 
perfectibility ideas. 
The task is, therefore, that not only realists but contemporary IR theorists ask anew 
the analytical (is) and normative (ought) human nature questions. We can doubt that the 
concept of human nature is really as dead and irrelevant as we came to believe. And even 
i f human nature-based theorising was completely eradicated from the study of international 
relations, the death of the concept of human nature would not enlighten but deprive our 
understanding of international politics. The 'resurrection' of the Realist Man in 
contemporary realism, the failures and weaknesses of human nature criticism, and the 
seeming omnipresence of assumptions about human nature throughout the history of much 
of Western (international-) political thought lead us to believe that however vague and 
hidden they may be, particular ideas of the nature, behaviour, and perfectibility of Man 
inform every facet of our theorising of the international-political. These assumptions about 
human nature must be discussed and their relative significance to the respective claims 
assessed. 
This theoretical concern with the concept of human nature concerns the whole 
theoretical spectrum of the study of international relations. It concerns realists. It concerns 
those thinkers and scholars that work broadly in the allegedly human nature-critical 
Weltanschauungen such as Marxian, postmodern, and feminist IR theory. Last but not 
least, the re-engagement with assumptions about human nature is equally pressing with 
respect to the liberal, English school, and constructivist tradition. Criticism has been 
levelled at the realists regarding their alleged human nature vices (Freyberg-Inan 2004); 
human nature discussions, particularly regarding sociobiology, have cropped up (Goldstein 
1987; Bell 2006); human nature-based theological and Augustinian-inspired approaches to 
international relations are still attractive (Loriaux 1992; Stevenson 2007; Elshtain 2008a, 
2008b), as are theories of international relations based on ancient Greek theories of human 
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motives (Lebow 2008); the broader patterns of assumptions about human nature of realist, 
liberal, and constructivist IR theory have been briefly examined (Freyberg-lnan 2004:162-
168); and a recent enquiry into the return of human nature in IR theory has been made 
(Freyberg-lnan 2006; Hall 2006; Mercer 2006; Sterling-Folker 2006a). This body of 
literature is to be commended. But despite the fact that assumptions about human nature 
are still being made, and despite all evidence that the question of the admissibility of 
assumptions about human nature ought still be an important matter of concern in the study 
of international relations, the concept of human nature is still being neglected widely 
among contemporary theorists and scholars of international relations. 
This neglect is, however, a fundamental mistake. It has helped to make appear 
contemporary analytical and normative theorising of international relations as exactly what 
the post-Morgenthauians/Niebuhrians wanted to avoid when they embarked on cleansing 
international-political theories from assumptions about human nature: namely, some sort 
of myth. Contra the post-classical realists and the human nature critics, the problem is not 
that we make assumptions about human nature and that these assumptions function as the 
philosophical backdrop against which we ultimately attune, adjust and judge our theorising 
of foreign-policy behaviour and international-political outcomes. We must use the concept 
of human nature—however depressing or Utopian it may be conceptualised—as the 
ultimate reference point and ultimate test against which particularly normative 
international-political theories are to be judged. The concept of human nature helps us to 
guard against building castles in the air. At the same time, only a fu l l and frank dealing 
with the concept of human nature helps us to guard against turning the nature of Man into 
an outright 'cliche' which 
225 
Chapter 6. Conclusion 
can grease the wheels of a failing argument, polish the buttons of 
ignorance, and evoke pride or shame at the wi l l of the orator. 
Why is there war? 'Human nature.' Why were you unfaithful to 
your wife? 'Human nature.' Why do we do anything? 'Human 
nature'. There is no easier explanation, no easier excuse. 
(Budziszewski 1986:18) 
The concept of human nature is powerful, perhaps even dangerously powerful and has 
often been dangerously misused. 
But, still, the problem is not that we make assumptions about human nature. We 
cannot avoid making them. We know how leading, guiding and determining assumptions 
about human nature are when theorising the international-political. The real problem is that 
we often do not know, do not recognise, are not fully aware, or are kept in the dark of what 
nature and origins these assumptions about human nature inbuilt in our international-
political theories are. We are not able to assess the soundness of international-political 
conclusions put forth by theorists and scholars of international relations, for we do not get 
to the bottom of all the sources on which these have been based. 
This problem can, however, be easily rectified. We must explore in greater depth 
and in wider breadth the underlying assumptions about human nature of contemporary IR 
theories. Most likely, and despite all nuances, it would bring about a familiar ideal-typical 
picture. International-political optimism derives from human nature optimism; 
international-political pessimism derives from human nature pessimism. But, be that as it 
may. We must lay the cards on the table when it comes to the question of the nature and 
origins of assumptions about human nature and how they inform our international-political 
theorising. 
Regardless of whether we work with psycho-analytical, theological, sociobiological, 
neuroscientific or any other set of assumptions about human nature, we must present, 
explain, and justify them. Surely, the subject matter of our field, the issues it is being dealt 
with, and the potential implications of IR research has helped turning theorising about the 
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international-political into an often emotional and ideology-driven endeavour. But we must 
not forget about the nature and culture of science (Wissenschaft). Science is the domain, as 
Kelsen (1957[1952]) once put it aptly, of truth and sincerity. We, therefore, literally owe 
each other, regardless of how fierce the theoretical differences may be, to be truthful and 
sincere regarding all our assumptions and beliefs—assumptions and beliefs about human 
nature—that we pour into our theories of international relations. We also owe it, however, 
to ourselves. We must bear in mind the dictum that 'The student of politics must, 
consciously or unconsciously, form a conception of human nature, and [that] the less 
conscious he is of his conception the more likely is he to be dominated by it ' (Wallas 
I948[1908]:38). The scientific dictate of truth and sincerity requires from us to seek the 
highest possible degree of reflectiveness vis-a-vis ourselves and vis-a-vis the nature and 
origins of the facts, data, and methodologies we use. Butterfield (1949) warned succinctly 
that 'the blindest of all the blind are those who are unable to examine their own 
presuppositions, and blithely imagine therefore that they do not possess any' (46). We 
must not be blind to our assumptions regarding the perhaps most perplexing question of 
humankind—^the nature of Man. Instead, we must face and make explicit our assumptions 
about human nature, regardless of how pessimist-fatalist or Utopian our individual or 
collective pictures of Man may be. 
The contemporary study of international relations should remedy its agnosia and 
peculiar renunciation of the concept of human nature. We should appreciate its 
inevitability and its virtues and display a greater interest in, and reflectiveness for, the role, 
nature, and origins of assumptions about human nature. 
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